aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/doc/security.mdwn
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJoey Hess <joey@kodama.kitenet.net>2008-04-10 16:35:30 -0400
committerJoey Hess <joey@kodama.kitenet.net>2008-04-10 16:35:30 -0400
commit72b5ef2c5fb01751992c9400afe2690da5df611f (patch)
tree3a7aab2bc11e330e9e73164e438f01afa3846141 /doc/security.mdwn
parent609e74bbd83925d2eea797a64620a20f57df75a5 (diff)
downloadikiwiki-72b5ef2c5fb01751992c9400afe2690da5df611f.tar
ikiwiki-72b5ef2c5fb01751992c9400afe2690da5df611f.tar.gz
Fix CSRF attacks against the preferences and edit forms. Closes: #475445
The fix involved embedding the session id in the forms, and not allowing the forms to be submitted if the embedded id does not match the session id. In the case of the preferences form, if the session id is not embedded, then the CGI parameters are cleared. This avoids a secondary attack where the link to the preferences form prefills password or other fields, and the user hits "submit" without noticing these prefilled values. In the case of the editpage form, the anonok plugin can allow anyone to edit, and so I chose not to guard against CSRF attacks against users who are not logged in. Otherwise, it also embeds the session id and checks it. For page editing, I assume that the user will notice if content or commit message is changed because of CGI parameters, and won't blndly hit save page. So I didn't block those CGI paramters. (It's even possible to use those CGI parameters, for good, not for evil, I guess..) The only other CSRF attack I can think of in ikiwiki involves the poll plugin. It's certianly possible to set up a link that causes the user to unknowingly vote in a poll. However, the poll plugin is not intended to be used for things that people would want to attack, since anyone can after all edit the poll page and fill in any values they like. So this "attack" is ignorable.
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/security.mdwn')
-rw-r--r--doc/security.mdwn11
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/security.mdwn b/doc/security.mdwn
index 373f64557..29ae7d4b3 100644
--- a/doc/security.mdwn
+++ b/doc/security.mdwn
@@ -366,3 +366,14 @@ with the release of ikiwiki 2.31.1. (And a few subsequent versions..)
A fix was also backported to Debian etch, as version 1.33.4. I recommend
upgrading to one of these versions if your wiki can be edited by third
parties.
+
+## Cross Site Request Forging
+
+Cross Site Request Forging could be used to constuct a link that would
+change a logged-in user's password or other preferences if they clicked on
+the link. It could also be used to construct a link that would cause a wiki
+page to be modified by a logged-in user.
+
+These holes were discovered on 10 April 2008 and fixed the same day with
+the release of ikiwiki 2.42. A fix was also backported to Debian etch, as
+version 1.33.4. I recommend upgrading to one of these versions.