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authorSimon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>2017-01-11 13:22:03 +0000
committerSimon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>2017-01-11 18:11:07 +0000
commitd157a97452ae0641f87996b6d0f21c9d222cef3d (patch)
treeef0032b1d5f83010b0f084557fc3690c9b46a7b9 /IkiWiki/CGI.pm
parentb642cbef80d120df3c9f3146eb1e39dfbe395a2d (diff)
downloadikiwiki-d157a97452ae0641f87996b6d0f21c9d222cef3d.tar
ikiwiki-d157a97452ae0641f87996b6d0f21c9d222cef3d.tar.gz
CGI, attachment, passwordauth: harden against repeated parameters
These instances of code similar to OVE-20170111-0001 are not believed to be exploitable, because defined(), length(), setpassword(), userinfo_set() and the binary "." operator all have prototypes that force the relevant argument to be evaluated in scalar context. However, using a safer idiom makes mistakes less likely. (cherry picked from commit 69230a2220f673c66b5ab875bfc759b32a241c0d)
Diffstat (limited to 'IkiWiki/CGI.pm')
-rw-r--r--IkiWiki/CGI.pm5
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/IkiWiki/CGI.pm b/IkiWiki/CGI.pm
index 89f4f2d73..1db96f9f2 100644
--- a/IkiWiki/CGI.pm
+++ b/IkiWiki/CGI.pm
@@ -294,8 +294,9 @@ sub cgi_prefs ($$) {
return;
}
elsif ($form->submitted eq 'Save Preferences' && $form->validate) {
- if (defined $form->field('email')) {
- userinfo_set($user_name, 'email', $form->field('email')) ||
+ my $email = $form->field('email');
+ if (defined $email) {
+ userinfo_set($user_name, 'email', $email) ||
error("failed to set email");
}