gnu: openssl@1.1: Update to 1.1.0i [fix CVE-2018-0737].

Also includes a fix for CVE-2018-0732, and a different approach to
fixing CVE-2018-0495.

* gnu/packages/tls.scm (openssl-next): Update to 1.1.0i.
[sources]: Remove CVE patches.
* gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch: Delete...
* gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch: ...both files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.

2 files changed, 0 insertions, 202 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 15dedbcbd0..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2018-0495:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0495
-https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/our-research/technical-advisory-return-of-the-hidden-number-problem/
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0c27d793745c7837b13646302b6890a556b7017a
-
-From 0c27d793745c7837b13646302b6890a556b7017a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 12:10:13 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Add blinding to an ECDSA signature
-
-Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
-ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
-
-s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
-
-The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
-flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
-operations.
-
-As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
-the operation so that:
-
-s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
-
-Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
----
- CHANGES                |  4 +++
- crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
-index 72e2f0f28b..449be0e92a 100644
---- a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
-@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-                                EC_KEY *eckey)
- {
-     int ok = 0, i;
--    BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
-+    BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *blind = NULL;
-+    BIGNUM *blindm = NULL;
-     const BIGNUM *order, *ckinv;
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     const EC_GROUP *group;
-@@ -243,8 +244,18 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-     }
-     s = ret->s;
- 
--    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
--        (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-+    ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new();
-+    if (ctx == NULL) {
-+        ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+    m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+    blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+    blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+    if (blindm == NULL) {
-         ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-         goto err;
-     }
-@@ -284,18 +295,64 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-             }
-         }
- 
--        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
-+        /*
-+         * The normal signature calculation is:
-+         *
-+         *   s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
-+         *
-+         * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
-+         *
-+         *   s := k^-1 * blind^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
-+         */
-+
-+        /* Generate a blinding value */
-+        do {
-+            if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(order) - 1, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY,
-+                         BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
-+                goto err;
-+        } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
-+        BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+        BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+        BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+
-+        /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod order */
-+        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, priv_key, order, ctx)) {
-             ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-             goto err;
-         }
--        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
-+        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
-             ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-             goto err;
-         }
-+
-+        /* blindm := blind * m mod order */
-+        if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, order, ctx)) {
-+            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod order */
-+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, order)) {
-+            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod order */
-+        if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, order, ctx) == NULL) {
-+            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+        if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, order, ctx)) {
-+            ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        /* s := s * k^-1 mod order */
-         if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
-             ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-             goto err;
-         }
-+
-         if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
-             /*
-              * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to
-@@ -317,9 +374,8 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-         ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
-         ret = NULL;
-     }
-+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
--    BN_clear_free(m);
--    BN_clear_free(tmp);
-     BN_clear_free(kinv);
-     return ret;
- }
--- 
-2.17.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index dfea6e7d06..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2018-0732:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0732
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ea7abeeabf92b7aca160bdd0208636d4da69f4f4
-
-From ea7abeeabf92b7aca160bdd0208636d4da69f4f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:38:54 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Reject excessively large primes in DH key generation.
-
-CVE-2018-0732
-
-Signed-off-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
-
-(cherry picked from commit 91f7361f47b082ae61ffe1a7b17bb2adf213c7fe)
-
-Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6457)
----
- crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-index fce9ff47f3..58003d7087 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-@@ -78,10 +78,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
-     int ok = 0;
-     int generate_new_key = 0;
-     unsigned l;
--    BN_CTX *ctx;
-+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
- 
-+    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-     if (ctx == NULL)
-         goto err;
--- 
-2.17.1
-