gnu: openssl: Update to 1.0.2p.

* gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.
* gnu/packages/tls.scm (openssl): Update to 1.0.2p.
[source](patches): Remove obsolete.

2 files changed, 0 insertions, 265 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2d54ed03b9..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2018-0495:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0495
-https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/our-research/technical-advisory-return-of-the-hidden-number-problem/
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/949ff36623eafc3523a9f91784992965018ffb05
-
-From 949ff36623eafc3523a9f91784992965018ffb05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 12:10:13 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Add blinding to an ECDSA signature
-
-Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
-ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
-
-s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
-
-The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
-flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
-operations.
-
-As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
-the operation so that:
-
-s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
-
-Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
----
- CHANGES                  |  4 ++
- crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c |  9 ++++-
- crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c  | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
-index 0f301f86d9..a130fc9117 100644
---- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
-+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsatest.c
-@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int restore_rand(void)
-         return 1;
- }
- 
--static int fbytes_counter = 0;
-+static int fbytes_counter = 0, use_fake = 0;
- static const char *numbers[8] = {
-     "651056770906015076056810763456358567190100156695615665659",
-     "6140507067065001063065065565667405560006161556565665656654",
-@@ -158,6 +158,11 @@ int fbytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
-     int ret;
-     BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
- 
-+    if (use_fake == 0)
-+        return old_rand->bytes(buf, num);
-+
-+    use_fake = 0;
-+
-     if (fbytes_counter >= 8)
-         return 0;
-     tmp = BN_new();
-@@ -199,11 +204,13 @@ int x9_62_test_internal(BIO *out, int nid, const char *r_in, const char *s_in)
-     /* create the key */
-     if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL)
-         goto x962_int_err;
-+    use_fake = 1;
-     if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(key))
-         goto x962_int_err;
-     BIO_printf(out, ".");
-     (void)BIO_flush(out);
-     /* create the signature */
-+    use_fake = 1;
-     signature = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, 20, key);
-     if (signature == NULL)
-         goto x962_int_err;
-diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
-index 16d4f59b9b..1d37551803 100644
---- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c
-@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
- {
-     int ok = 0, i;
-     BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *order = NULL;
-+    BIGNUM *blind = NULL, *blindm = NULL;
-     const BIGNUM *ckinv;
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     const EC_GROUP *group;
-@@ -269,14 +270,25 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-     }
- 
-     ret = ECDSA_SIG_new();
--    if (!ret) {
-+    if (ret == NULL) {
-         ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-         return NULL;
-     }
-     s = ret->s;
- 
--    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL || (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
--        (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-+    ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-+    if (ctx == NULL) {
-+        ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-+    order = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+    tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+    m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+    blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+    blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-+    if (blindm == NULL) {
-         ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-         goto err;
-     }
-@@ -315,26 +327,70 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-             }
-         }
- 
--        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
-+        /*
-+         * The normal signature calculation is:
-+         *
-+         *   s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
-+         *
-+         * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
-+         *
-+         *   s := k^-1 * blind^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
-+         */
-+
-+        /* Generate a blinding value */
-+        do {
-+            if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(order) - 1, -1, 0))
-+                goto err;
-+        } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
-+        BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+        BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+        BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+
-+        /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod order */
-+        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, priv_key, order, ctx)) {
-+            ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+        if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
-+            ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        /* blindm := blind * m mod order */
-+        if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, order, ctx)) {
-+            ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod order */
-+        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, order)) {
-+            ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod order */
-+        if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, order, ctx) == NULL) {
-             ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-             goto err;
-         }
--        if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
-+        if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, order, ctx)) {
-             ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-             goto err;
-         }
-+
-+        /* s := s * k^-1 mod order */
-         if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
-             ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
-             goto err;
-         }
-+
-         if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
-             /*
-              * if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to
-              * generate new kinv and r values
-              */
-             if (in_kinv != NULL && in_r != NULL) {
--                ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN,
--                         ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
-+                ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_SIGN, ECDSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES);
-                 goto err;
-             }
-         } else
-@@ -349,15 +405,11 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
-         ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
-         ret = NULL;
-     }
--    if (ctx)
-+    if (ctx != NULL) {
-+        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-         BN_CTX_free(ctx);
--    if (m)
--        BN_clear_free(m);
--    if (tmp)
--        BN_clear_free(tmp);
--    if (order)
--        BN_free(order);
--    if (kinv)
-+    }
-+    if (kinv != NULL)
-         BN_clear_free(kinv);
-     return ret;
- }
--- 
-2.17.1
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 50b95306a5..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2018-0732:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0732
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/3984ef0b72831da8b3ece4745cac4f8575b19098
-
-From 3984ef0b72831da8b3ece4745cac4f8575b19098 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:38:54 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Reject excessively large primes in DH key generation.
-
-CVE-2018-0732
-
-Signed-off-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
-
-(cherry picked from commit 91f7361f47b082ae61ffe1a7b17bb2adf213c7fe)
-
-Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6457)
----
- crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-index 387558f146..f235e0d682 100644
---- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-@@ -130,10 +130,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
-     int ok = 0;
-     int generate_new_key = 0;
-     unsigned l;
--    BN_CTX *ctx;
-+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
- 
-+    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-     if (ctx == NULL)
-         goto err;
--- 
-2.17.1
-