| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Apparently some autoconf versions need this, while others don't.
This means documentation will be installed into share/doc/tor/.
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This removes the Makefile.am from doc/design-paper and replaces it with
a static Makefile. We don't need to call it during the normal Tor build
process, as we don't need its targets normally. Keeping it around in
case we want to rebuild the pdf or ps files later.
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I propose a backward-compatible change to the Tor connection
establishment protocol to avoid the use of TLS
renegotiation.
Rather than doing a TLS renegotiation to exchange
certificates and authenticate the original handshake, this
proposal takes an approach similar to Steven Murdoch's
proposal 124, and uses Tor cells to authenticate the
parties' identities once the initial TLS handshake is
finished.
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Updated a little by Sebastian
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Edited a little by Sebastian
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This should be a very faithful conversion, preserving as much of the layout
of the old manpage as possible. This wasn't possible for the nt-service
and the DataDirectory/state parts. See a later commit for some small
cleanups.
Tiago Faria helped with the asciidoc conversion, big thanks!
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The website wasn't used by our packages, and most users will not know how
to open html.en files anyways.
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Fix statistics on client numbers by country as seen by bridges that were
broken in 0.2.2.1-alpha. Also switch to reporting full 24-hour intervals
instead of variable 12-to-48-hour intervals.
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The HSAuthorityRecordStats option was used to track statistics of overall
hidden service usage on the version 0 hidden service authorities. With the
version 2 hidden service directories being deployed and version 0
descriptors being phased out, these statistics are not as useful anymore.
Goodbye, you fine piece of software; my first major code contribution to
Tor.
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Conflicts:
ChangeLog
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It returns the contents that Tor would write if you send it a SAVECONF
command, so the controller can write the file to disk itself.
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plus some other unrelated touchups that have been sitting in my
sandbox
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This commit implements a new config option: 'DisableAllSwap'
This option probably only works properly when Tor is started as root.
We added two new functions: tor_mlockall() and tor_set_max_memlock().
tor_mlockall() attempts to mlock() all current and all future memory pages.
For tor_mlockall() to work properly we set the process rlimits for memory to
RLIM_INFINITY (and beyond) inside of tor_set_max_memlock().
We behave differently from mlockall() by only allowing tor_mlockall() to be
called one single time. All other calls will result in a return code of 1.
It is not possible to change DisableAllSwap while running.
A sample configuration item was added to the torrc.complete.in config file.
A new item in the man page for DisableAllSwap was added.
Thanks to Moxie Marlinspike and Chris Palmer for their feedback on this patch.
Please note that we make no guarantees about the quality of your OS and its
mlock/mlockall implementation. It is possible that this will do nothing at all.
It is also possible that you can ulimit the mlock properties of a given user
such that root is not required. This has not been extensively tested and is
unsupported. I have included some comments for possible ways we can handle
this on win32.
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The old flavored consensus URL format made it harder to decode URLs
based on their prefixes, and didn't take into account our "only give
it to me if it's signed by enough authorities" stuff.
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The point of doing SHA256 twice is, generally, is to prevent message
extension attacks where an attacker who knows H(A) can calculate
H(A|B). But for attaching a signature to a document, the attacker
already _knows_ A, so trying to keep them from calculating H(A|B) is
pointless.
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The original proposal was vague and would have made older Tors reject
detached-signature documents as soon as they saw one with flavors.
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"neonomad" pointed out on or-talk that the order is opposite from the
intuitive order. explain why. we chose to fix the spec rather than the
code because there are controllers like torflow that already expect
the current behavior.
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we made anybody who has 20KB/s Fast by definition, in 0.2.1.14-rc,
but it looks like we forgot to fix the spec.
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Update the HACKING document and the cross compilation helper
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A) We were considering a circuit had timed out in the special cases
where we close rendezvous circuits because the final rendezvous
circuit couldn't be built in time.
B) We were looking at the wrong timestamp_created when considering
a timeout.
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Based on irc discussion with arma.
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Also correct some typos.
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