Convert the Tor manpage to asciidoc.

This should be a very faithful conversion, preserving as much of the layout
of the old manpage as possible. This wasn't possible for the nt-service
and the DataDirectory/state parts. See a later commit for some small
cleanups.

Tiago Faria helped with the asciidoc conversion, big thanks!

3 files changed, 1409 insertions, 1645 deletions

diff --git a/doc/Makefile.am b/doc/Makefile.am
index 2a6bba965..25d0a64b2 100644
--- a/doc/Makefile.am
+++ b/doc/Makefile.am
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-asciidoc_files = tor-gencert tor-resolve torify
+asciidoc_files = tor tor-gencert tor-resolve torify
 
 html_in = $(asciidoc_files:=.html.in)
 
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = HACKING                                         \
              tor-osx-dmg-creation.txt tor-rpm-creation.txt   \
              tor-win32-mingw-creation.txt
 
-nodist_man_MANS = tor.1 $(asciidoc_files:=.1)
+nodist_man_MANS = $(asciidoc_files:=.1)
 
 doc_DATA = $(asciidoc_files:=.html)
 
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ DIST_SUBDIRS = design-paper spec
 $(html_in) :
 	$(top_srcdir)/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh html @ASCIIDOC@ @SED@ $@
 
+tor.html.in : tor.1.txt
 torify.html.in : torify.1.txt
 tor-gencert.html.in : tor-gencert.1.txt
 tor-resolve.html.in : tor-resolve.1.txt
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ tor-resolve.html.in : tor-resolve.1.txt
 $(man_in) :
 	$(top_srcdir)/doc/asciidoc-helper.sh man @A2X@ @SED@ $@
 
+tor.1.in : tor.1.txt
 torify.1.in : torify.1.txt
 tor-gencert.1.in : tor-gencert.1.txt
 tor-resolve.1.in : tor-resolve.1.txt
@@ -42,9 +44,11 @@ tor-resolve.1.in : tor-resolve.1.txt
 $(asciidoc_product) :
 	../config.status --file=$@;
 
+tor.1 : tor.1.in
 torify.1 : torify.1.in
 tor-gencert.1 : tor-gencert.1.in
 tor-resolve.1 : tor-resolve.1.in
+tor.html : tor.html.in
 torify.html : torify.html.in
 tor-gencert.html : tor-gencert.html.in
 tor-resolve.html : tor-resolve.html.in
diff --git a/doc/tor.1.in b/doc/tor.1.in
deleted file mode 100644
index 8cd9e1e00..000000000
--- a/doc/tor.1.in
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1643 +0,0 @@
-.TH TOR 1 "August 2009" "TOR"
-.SH NAME
-tor \- The second-generation onion router
-.SH SYNOPSIS
-.B tor
-[\fIOPTION value\fR]...
-.SH DESCRIPTION
-.I tor
-is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
-service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
-negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
-knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
-the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
-the downstream node.
-.PP
-Basically \fItor\fR provides a distributed network of servers ("onion
-routers"). Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc --
-around the routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers
-themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
-.SH OPTIONS
-\fB-h, -help\fP
-Display a short help message and exit.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fB-f \fR\fIFILE\fP
-FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fB--hash-password\fP
-Generates a hashed password for control port access.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fB--list-fingerprint\fP
-Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fB--verify-config\fP
-Verify the configuration file is valid.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fB--nt-service\fP
-\fB--service [install|remove|start|stop]\fP
-Manage the Tor Windows NT/2000/XP service.  Current instructions can
-be found at https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService
-.LP
-.TP
-\fB--list-torrc-options\fP
-List all valid options.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fB--version\fP
-Display Tor version and exit.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fB--quiet\fP
-Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do
-so.  (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or
-higher to the console, until it has parsed its configuration.)
-.LP
-.TP
-Other options can be specified either on the command-line (\fI--option
-value\fR), or in the configuration file (\fIoption value\fR or
-\fIoption "value"\fR).  Options are case-insensitive.  C-style escaped
-characters are allowed inside quoted values.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBBandwidthRate \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
-A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node
-to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
-bandwidth usage to that same value. (Default: 5 MB)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBBandwidthBurst \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
-Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the
-given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBMaxAdvertisedBandwidth \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
-If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
-BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
-who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
-advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their
-server without impacting network performance.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBRelayBandwidthRate \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
-If defined, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
-usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of
-bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same
-value. Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory
-requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBRelayBandwidthBurst \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
-Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
-_relayed traffic_ to the
-given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBPerConnBWRate \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
-If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay.
-You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value
-is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value.
-(Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBPerConnBWBurst \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
-If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay.
-You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value
-is published in the consensus and your relay will use that value.
-(Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBConnLimit \fR\fINUM\fP
-The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to
-the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as
-many file descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this
-by "ulimit -H -n"). If this number is less than ConnLimit, then
-Tor will refuse to start.
-
-You probably don't need to adjust this. It has no effect on
-Windows since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBConstrainedSockets \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
-sockets to the size specified in \fBConstrainedSockSize\fP.  This is useful
-for virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP
-buffers may be limited.  If you're on a virtual server, and you
-encounter the "Error creating network
-socket: No buffer space available" message, you are likely experiencing
-this problem.
-
-The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
-the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; this
-configuration option is a second-resort.
-
-The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce.  The
-cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates the
-problem.
-
-You should \fBnot\fP enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
-space available" issue.  Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
-the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
-time on long paths.  (Default: 0.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBConstrainedSockSize \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fP
-When \fBConstrainedSockets\fP is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
-all sockets will be set to this limit.  Must be a value between 2048
-and 262144, in 1024 byte increments.  Default of 8192 is recommended.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBControlPort \fR\fIPort\fP
-If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
-connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
-(described in control-spec.txt).  Note: unless you also specify one of
-\fBHashedControlPassword\fP or \fBCookieAuthentication\fP, setting
-this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to
-control it. This option is required for many Tor controllers; most use
-the value of 9051.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBControlListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
-Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port,
-bind to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We
-strongly recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're
-doing, since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
-dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1)
-This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
-addresses/ports.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBControlSocket \fR\fIPath\fP
-Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
-socket.  (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHashedControlPassword \fR\fIhashed_password\fP
-Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other process
-knows the password whose one-way hash is \fIhashed_password\fP.  You can
-compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
-\fIpassword\fP". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using
-more than HashedControlPassword line.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBCookieAuthentication \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
-If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port
-except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
-"control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory.  This
-authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
-security. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBCookieAuthFile \fR\fIPath\fP
-If set, this option overrides the default location and file name for Tor's
-cookie file.  (See CookieAuthentication above.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBCookieAuthFileGroupReadable \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR|\fIGroupName\fP
-If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read
-the cookie file.  If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file
-readable by the default GID.  [Making the file readable by other
-groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some
-reason.]  (Default: 0).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDataDirectory \fR\fIDIR\fP
-Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDirServer \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBflags\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
-Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided
-address and port, with the specified key fingerprint.  This option can
-be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory
-servers.  Flags are separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an
-authority this directory is.  By default, every authority is authoritative
-for current ("v2")-style directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given.  If the "v1" flags is provided, Tor will use this server as an
-authority for old-style (v1) directories as well.  (Only directory mirrors
-care about this.)  Tor will use this server as an authority for hidden
-service information if the "hs" flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and
-the "no-hs" flag is \fBnot\fP set.  Tor will use this authority as a bridge
-authoritative directory if the "bridge" flag is set.  If a flag
-"orport=\fBport\fR" is given, Tor will use the given port when opening
-encrypted tunnels to the dirserver.  Lastly, if a flag "v3ident=\fBfp\fR" is
-given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority whose v3 long-term
-signing key has the fingerprint \fBfp\fR.
-
-If no \fBdirserver\fP line is given, Tor will use the default
-directory servers.  NOTE: this option is intended
-for setting up a private Tor network with its own directory authorities.  If
-you use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you won't
-believe the same authorities they do.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAlternateDirAuthority \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBflags\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAlternateHSAuthority \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBflags\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAlternateBridgeAuthority \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBflags\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
-As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities.
-Using AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory
-authorities, but leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge
-authorities in place.  Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces
-the default hidden service authorities, but not the directory or
-bridge authorities.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDisableAllSwap \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages.
-On supported platforms, this should effectively disable any and all attempts
-to page out memory. Under the hood, DisableAllSwap uses mlockall() on unix-like
-platforms. Windows is currently unsupported. We believe that this feature works
-on modern Gnu/Linux distributions. Mac OS X appears to be broken by design. On
-reasonable *BSD systems it should also be supported but this is untested. This
-option requires that you start your Tor as root. If you use DisableAllSwap,
-please consider using the User option to properly reduce the privileges of
-your Tor.
-(Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBFetchDirInfoEarly \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
-directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for
-fetching early. Normal users should leave it off.
-(Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBFetchDirInfoExtraEarly \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other
-directory caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to
-the start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off.
-(Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBFetchHidServDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from
-the rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using
-a Tor controller that handles hidden service fetches for you.
-(Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBFetchServerDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
-descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
-you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
-(Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBFetchUselessDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the
-authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching
-useless descriptors, for example for routers that are not running.
-This option is useful if you're using the contributed "exitlist"
-script to enumerate Tor nodes that exit to certain addresses.
-(Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHTTPProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
-Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port
-(or host:80 if port is not specified),
-rather than connecting directly to any directory servers.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHTTPProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
-If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy
-authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
-HTTP proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
-patch if you want it to support others.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHTTPSProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
-Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port
-(or host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than
-connecting directly to servers.  You may want to set \fBFascistFirewall\fR
-to restrict the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS
-proxy only allows connecting to certain ports.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHTTPSProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
-If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy
-authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
-HTTPS proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
-patch if you want it to support others.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSocks4Proxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
-Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port
-(or host:1080 if port is not specified).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSocks5Proxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
-Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port
-(or host:1080 if port is not specified).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSocks5ProxyUsername\fR \fIusername\fP
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSocks5ProxyPassword\fR \fIpassword\fP
-If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password
-in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and 255
-characters.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBKeepalivePeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
-To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive
-cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the
-connection has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM
-seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBstderr\fR|\fBstdout\fR|\fBsyslog\fR\fP
-Send all messages between \fIminSeverity\fR and \fImaxSeverity\fR to
-the standard output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system
-log. (The "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.)  Recognized
-severity levels are debug, info, notice, warn, and err.  We advise using
-"notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose may provide sensitive
-information to an attacker who obtains the logs.  If only one
-severity level is given, all messages of that level or higher will be
-sent to the listed destination.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBfile\fR \fIFILENAME\fP
-As above, but send log messages to the listed filename.  The "Log"
-option may appear more than once in a configuration file.  Messages
-are sent to all the logs that match their severity level.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBOutboundBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
-Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified.  This
-is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
-of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBPidFile \fR\fIFILE\fP
-On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove FILE.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBProtocolWarnings \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties
-not following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with
-severity 'info'. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBRunAsDaemon \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has
-no effect on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line
-option. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSafeLogging \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR|\fBrelay\fP
-Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g. addresses)
-by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can still be
-useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying information
-about what sites a user might have visited.
-
-If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is set
-to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to
-relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but all
-messages generated when acting as a client are not. (Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBUser \fR\fIUID\fP
-On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHardwareAccel \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
-If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when
-available. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAccelName \fR\fINAME\fP
-When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic
-engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine. Names
-can be verified with the openssl engine command.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAccelDir \fR\fIDIR\fP
-Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine
-implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAvoidDiskWrites \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
-If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
-This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support only
-a limited number of writes.  (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTunnelDirConns \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
-If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will
-build a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its
-ORPort. (Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBPreferTunneledDirConns \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
-If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don't support tunneled
-directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBCircuitPriorityHalflife \fR\fBNUM\fB1\fP
-If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which
-circuit's cell to deliver or relay next.  When the value is 0, we
-round-robin between the active circuits on a connection, delivering one cell
-from each in turn.  When the value is positive, we prefer delivering cells
-from whichever connection has the lowest weighted cell count, where cells are
-weighted exponentially according to the supplied CircuitPriorityHalflife
-value (in seconds).  If this option is not set at all, we use the behavior
-recommended in the current consensus networkstatus.
-This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn't have mess with it.
-(Default: not set.)
-
-.SH CLIENT OPTIONS
-.PP
-The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if \fBSocksPort\fP is non-zero):
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAllowInvalidNodes\fR \fBentry\fR|\fBexit\fR|\fBmiddle\fR|\fBintroduction\fR|\fBrendezvous\fR|...\fP
-If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory
-authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not
-recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You
-can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is
-"middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBExcludeSingleHopRelays \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with
-the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true.  If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set to
-0, these relays will be included.  Note that these relays might be at higher
-risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally included.
-(Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBBridge \fR\fIIP:ORPort\fR [fingerprint]\fP
-When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
-"IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
-is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that
-the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
-fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
-it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBCircuitBuildTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
-Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit
-isn't open in that time, give up on it.
-(Default: 1 minute.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBCircuitIdleTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
-If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds,
-then close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can
-expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also,
-if we end up making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of
-the requests we're receiving, it won't forever take up a slot in the
-circuit list.
-(Default: 1 hour.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBCircuitStreamTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
-If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for
-how many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new
-circuit. If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set
-this to a number like 60. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBClientOnly \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve
-directory requests. The default
-is to run as a client unless ORPort is configured.  (Usually,
-you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at figuring out whether
-you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a useful server.)
-(Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBExcludeNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
-A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns
-of nodes to never use when building a circuit.  (Example: ExcludeNodes
-SlowServer, $ABCDEFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBExcludeExitNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
-A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns
-of nodes to never use when picking an exit node.  Note that any node
-listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
-list.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBEntryNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
-A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns
-of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits.
-These are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see
-below) is also set.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBExitNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
-A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address patterns
-of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits.
-These are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see
-below) is also set.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBStrictNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If 1 and EntryNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any
-nodes besides those listed in EntryNodes for the first hop of a normal
-circuit. If 1 and ExitNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any
-nodes besides those listed in ExitNodes for the last hop of a normal exit
-circuit. Note that Tor might still use these nodes for non-exit circuits
-such as one-hop directory fetches or hidden service support circuits.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBFascistFirewall \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that
-your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see \fBFirewallPorts\fR).  This will
-allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with restrictive policies,
-but will not allow you to run as a server behind such a firewall.
-If you prefer more fine-grained control, use ReachableAddresses instead.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBFirewallPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
-A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to.  Only
-used when \fBFascistFirewall\fR is set. This option is deprecated; use
-ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHidServAuth \fR\fIonion-address\fR \fIauth-cookie\fP [\fIservice-name\fR]
-Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
-characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
-characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal
-purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
-for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
-this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden
-services can be configured to require authorization using the
-\fBHiddenServiceAuthorizeClient\fR option.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBReachableAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
-A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows you
-to connect to. The format is as
-for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except that "accept" is understood
-unless "reject" is explicitly provided.  For example, 'ReachableAddresses
-99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept *:80' means that your
-firewall allows connections to everything inside net 99, rejects port
-80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port 80 otherwise.
-(Default: 'accept *:*'.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBReachableDirAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
-Like \fBReachableAddresses\fP, a list of addresses and ports.  Tor will obey
-these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
-GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of \fBReachableAddresses\fP
-is used.  If \fBHTTPProxy\fR is set then these connections will go through that
-proxy.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBReachableORAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
-Like \fBReachableAddresses\fP, a list of addresses and ports.  Tor will obey
-these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL.  If not set
-explicitly then the value of \fBReachableAddresses\fP is used. If
-\fBHTTPSProxy\fR is set then these connections will go through that proxy.
-
-The separation between \fBReachableORAddresses\fP and
-\fBReachableDirAddresses\fP is only interesting when you are connecting through
-proxies (see \fBHTTPProxy\fR and \fBHTTPSProxy\fR).  Most proxies limit TLS
-connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, and some
-limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory information) to
-port 80.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBLongLivedPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
-A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
-(e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
-ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a
-node will go down before the stream is finished.
-(Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBMapAddress\fR \fIaddress\fR \fInewaddress\fR
-When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to
-newaddress before processing it. For example, if you always want
-connections to www.indymedia.org to exit via \fItorserver\fR (where
-\fItorserver\fR is the nickname of the server),
-use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBNewCircuitPeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
-Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 seconds)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBMaxCircuitDirtiness \fR\fINUM\fP
-Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
-but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old.
-(Default: 10 minutes)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBNodeFamily \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
-The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames,
-constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered
-servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a
-NodeFamily is only needed when a server doesn't list the family itself
-(with MyFamily). This option can be used multiple times.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBEnforceDistinctSubnets \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too
-close" on the same circuit.  Currently, two addresses are
-"too close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
-
-.\" \fBPathlenCoinWeight \fR\fI0.0-1.0\fP
-.\" Paths are 3 hops plus a geometric distribution centered around this coinweight.
-.\" Must be >=0.0 and <1.0. (Default: 0.3) NOT USED CURRENTLY
-.\" .TP
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSocksPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
-Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
-applications.  Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
-connections. (Default: 9050)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSocksListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
-Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
-applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port
-(e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100).
-This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
-addresses/ports.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSocksPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
-Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
-SocksPort and DNSPort ports.
-The policies have the same form as exit policies below.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSocksTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
-Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
-unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it.
-(Default: 2 minutes.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTrackHostExits \fR\fIhost\fR,\fI.domain\fR,\fI...\fR\fP
-For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent connections
-to hosts that match this value and attempt to
-reuse the same exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is
-treated as matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it
-means match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to
-sites that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if
-your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of
-making it more clear that a given history is
-associated with a single user. However, most people who would wish to observe
-this will observe it through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTrackHostExitsExpire \fR\fINUM\fP
-Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the association
-between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default
-is 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBUpdateBridgesFromAuthority \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
-from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back
-to a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBUseBridges \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the
-"Bridge" config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and
-directory guards. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBUseEntryGuards \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and
-try to stick with them.  This is desirable because
-constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns
-some servers will observe a fraction of your paths.
-(Defaults to 1.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBNumEntryGuards \fR\fINUM\fP
-If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
-as long-term entries for our circuits.
-(Defaults to 3.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSafeSocks \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
-use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an
-IP address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
-Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
-(Defaults to 0.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTestSocks \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
-each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used
-a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks).
-This helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly
-leaking DNS requests.
-(Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBVirtualAddrNetwork \fR\fIAddress\fB/\fIbits\fP
-When a controller asks for a virtual (unused) address with the
-MAPADDRESS command, Tor picks an unassigned address from this range.
-(Default: 127.192.0.0/10)
-
-When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool like
-dns-proxy-tor,
-change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or "172.16.0.0/12".
-The default \fBVirtualAddrNetwork\fP address range on a 
-properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. 
-For local use, no change to the
-default \fBVirtualAddrNetwork\fP setting is needed.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAllowNonRFC953Hostnames \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
-characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
-resolved.  This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
-(Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAllowDotExit \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If enabled, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the
-SocksPort/TransPort/NatdPort into "www.google.com" addresses that exit
-from the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking websites and
-exit relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBFastFirstHopPK \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first
-hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have
-already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure
-keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower.
-
-Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if
-it's operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if
-it doesn't yet know the onion key of the first hop.
-(Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTransPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
-If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on \fR\fIPORT\fP (by
-convention, 9040).
-.\" This is required to enable support for \fBdns-proxy-tor\fP.
-.\" ControlPort must be set when using \fBTransPort\fP.
-Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
-Linux's IPTables.
-If you're planning 
-to use Tor as a transparent proxy for a network, you'll want to examine 
-and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the default setting. You'll also want
-to set the TransListenAddress option for the network you'd like to proxy.
-(Default: 0).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTransListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
-Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections.
-(Default: 127.0.0.1).  
-This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server 
-to an entire network.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBNATDPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
-Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD,
-etc.) to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol.
-This option is only for people who cannot
-use TransPort.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBNATDListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
-Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections.
-(Default: 127.0.0.1).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAutomapHostsOnResolve\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an
-address that ends with one of the suffixes in
-\fBAutomapHostsSuffixes\fP, we map an unused virtual address to that
-address, and return the new virtual address.  This is handy for making
-".onion" addresses work with applications that resolve an address and
-then connect to it.
-(Default: 0).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAutomapHostsSuffixes\fP \fR\fISUFFIX\fR,\fISUFFIX\fR,...\fP
-A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with \fBAutomapHostsOnResolve\fP.
-The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses."
-(Default: .exit,.onion).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDNSPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
-If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves them
-anonymously.
-(Default: 0).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDNSListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
-Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections.
-(Default: 127.0.0.1).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that tells
-it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
-192.168.0.1).  This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't turn
-it off unless you know what you're doing.  (Default: 1).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDownloadExtraInfo\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents.  These
-documents contain information about servers other than the information
-in their regular router descriptors.  Tor does not use this information for
-anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off.
-(Default: 0).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBFallbackNetworkstatusFile\fP \fIFILENAME\fP
-If Tor doesn't have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using
-this one instead.  Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use
-it to learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn't need to put load on
-the authorities.  (Default: None).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBWarnPlaintextPorts\fP \fR\fIport\fR,\fIport\fR,\fI...\fP
-Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an
-anonymous connection to one of these ports.  This option is designed
-to alert users to services that risk sending passwords in the clear.
-(Default: 23,109,110,143).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBRejectPlaintextPorts\fP \fR\fIport\fR,\fIport\fR,\fI...\fP
-Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses,
-Tor will instead refuse to make the connection.
-(Default: None).
-
-.SH SERVER OPTIONS
-.PP
-The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if \fBORPort\fP is non-zero):
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAddress \fR\fIaddress\fP
-The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g. moria.mit.edu). You can
-leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP address.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAllowSingleHopExits \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop 
-proxy.  If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is
-the only hop in the circuit.  (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAssumeReachable \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
-don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
-immediately. If \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP is also set, this option
-instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and
-list all connected servers as running.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBBridgeRelay \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
-from bridge users to the Tor network. Mainly it influences how the relay
-will cache and serve directory information. Usually used in combination
-with PublishServerDescriptor.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBContactInfo \fR\fIemail_address\fP
-Administrative contact information for server. This line might get
-picked up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact
-that it's an email address.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBExitPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
-Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
-"\fBaccept\fP|\fBreject\fP \fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP]\fB[:\fP\fIPORT\fP]".
-If \fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP is omitted then this policy just applies to the host
-given.  Instead of giving a host or network you can also use "\fB*\fP" to
-denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0).  \fIPORT\fP can be a single port number,
-an interval of ports "\fIFROM_PORT\fP\fB-\fP\fITO_PORT\fP", or "\fB*\fP".
-If \fIPORT\fP is omitted, that means "\fB*\fP".
-
-For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would
-reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and
-accept anything else.
-
-To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
-169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and
-172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
-These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your
-exit policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the
-ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option
-to 0. For example, once you've done that, you could allow HTTP to
-127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to internal networks with
-"accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that may also allow
-connections to your own computer that are addressed to its public
-(external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more
-details about internal and reserved IP address space.
-
-This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put
-it all on one line.
-
-Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If
-you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with
-either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_
-(prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:
-.PD 0
-.RS 12
-.IP "reject *:25"
-.IP "reject *:119"
-.IP "reject *:135-139"
-.IP "reject *:445"
-.IP "reject *:563"
-.IP "reject *:1214"
-.IP "reject *:4661-4666"
-.IP "reject *:6346-6429"
-.IP "reject *:6699"
-.IP "reject *:6881-6999"
-.IP "accept *:*"
-.RE
-.PD
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBExitPolicyRejectPrivate \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP
-address, at the beginning of your exit
-policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBMaxOnionsPending \fR\fINUM\fP
-If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBMyFamily \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
-Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group
-or organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames.
-When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients
-will not use them in the same circuit.  (Each server only needs to list the
-other servers in its family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBNickname \fR\fIname\fP
-Set the server's nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1
-and 19 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters
-[a-zA-Z0-9].
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBNumCPUs \fR\fInum\fP
-How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBORPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
-Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBORListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
-Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
-servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
-specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
-This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
-addresses/ports.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBPublishServerDescriptor \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR|\fBv1\fR|\fBv2\fR|\fBv3\fR|\fBbridge\fR|\fBhidserv\fR, ...\fP
-This option is only considered if you have an ORPort defined. You can
-choose multiple arguments, separated by commas.
-
-If set to 0, Tor will act as a server but it will not publish its
-descriptor to the directory authorities. (This is useful if you're
-testing out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles
-directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptor
-to all directory authorities of the type(s) specified. The value "1" is
-the default, which means "publish to the appropriate authorities".
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBShutdownWaitLength\fR \fINUM\fP
-When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down: we close
-listeners and start refusing new circuits. After \fBNUM\fP seconds,
-we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately.  (Default:
-30 seconds)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAccountingMax \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
-Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given
-accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period.
-For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB
-and receive 800 MB and continue running. It will only hibernate once one
-of the two reaches 1 GB.
-When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some
-time in the next accounting period.  To prevent all servers from
-waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in
-each period before waking up.  If you have bandwidth cost issues,
-enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it
-provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of
-the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
-always "available".
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAccountingStart \fR\fBday\fR|\fBweek\fR|\fBmonth\fR [\fIday\fR] \fIHH:MM\fR\fP
-Specify how long accounting periods last.  If \fBmonth\fP is given,
-each accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR on the
-\fIday\fRth day of one month to the same day and time of the next.
-(The day must be between 1 and 28.)  If \fBweek\fP is given, each
-accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR of the \fIday\fRth
-day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, with Monday
-as day 1 and Sunday as day 7.  If \fBday\fR is given, each accounting
-period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR each day to the same time on the
-next day.  All times are local, and given in 24-hour time.  (Defaults to
-"month 1 0:00".)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBServerDNSResolvConfFile \fR\fIfilename\fP
-Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
-\fIfilename\fP.  The file format is the same as the standard Unix
-"\fBresolv.conf\fP" file (7).  This option, like all other
-ServerDNS options, only affects name lookups that your server does on
-behalf of clients. (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems
-parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.
-Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers
-until it eventually succeeds.
-(Defaults to "1".)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBServerDNSSearchDomains \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set to \fB1\fP, then we will search for addresses in the local search
-domain.  For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
-"example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
-connected to "www.example.com".
-This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
-behalf of clients.
-(Defaults to "0".)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBServerDNSDetectHijacking \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine whether
-our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS requests
-(usually to an advertising site).  If they are, we will attempt to correct
-this.
-This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
-behalf of clients.
-(Defaults to "1".)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBServerDNSTestAddresses \fR\fIaddress\fR,\fIaddress\fR,\fI...\fP
-When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these \fIvalid\fP
-addresses aren't getting redirected.  If they are, then our DNS is
-completely useless, and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject *:*".
-This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
-behalf of clients.
-(Defaults to "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com,
-www.slashdot.org".)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
-containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
-exit node to be resolved.  This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
-URLs and so on.
-This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
-behalf of clients.
-(Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBBridgeRecordUsageByCountry \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we
-have GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many
-client addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge
-authority guess which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBServerDNSRandomizeCase \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in
-outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.
-This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack.
-For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through 0x20-Bit
-Encoding".
-This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
-behalf of clients.
-(Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBGeoIPFile \fR\fIfilename\fP
-A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBCellStatistics \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that
-cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed
-while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDirReqStatistics \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number and
-response time of network status requests to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be
-changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBEntryStatistics \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
-directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed
-while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBExitPortStatistics \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
-relayed bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours.
-Cannot be changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBExtraInfoStatistics \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics
-in its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities.
-(Default: 0)
-
-.SH DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
-.PP
-The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, if \fBDirPort\fP is non-zero):
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative
-directory server.  Instead of caching the directory, it generates its
-own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients.
-Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you
-probably do not want to set this option.  Please coordinate with the other
-admins at tor-ops@freehaven.net if you think you should be a directory.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDirPortFrontPage \fIFILENAME\fP
-When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
-the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
-to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in
-contrib/tor-exit-notice.html.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBV1AuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
-generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy
-Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBV2AuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
-generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
-described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers
-running 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBV3AuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
-generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
-described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers
-running at least 0.2.0.x).
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on
-which versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to
-the published directory.  Each version 1 authority is
-automatically a versioning authority; version 2 authorities
-provide this service optionally.  See \fBRecommendedVersions\fP,
-\fBRecommendedClientVersions\fP, and \fBRecommendedServerVersions\fP.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBNamingAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has
-opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings.  It will include these
-opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with
-the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and
-fingerprint has been registered with the dirserver.  Naming dirservers
-will refuse to accept or publish descriptors that contradict a
-registered binding.  See \fBapproved-routers\fP in the \fBFILES\fP
-section below.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHSAuthoritativeDir \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor also
-accepts and serves hidden service descriptors. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHidServDirectoryV2 \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service
-descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients
-connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBBridgeAuthoritativeDir \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
-accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
-networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBMinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
-Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by
-authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDirPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
-Advertise the directory service on this port.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDirListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
-Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind
-to this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
-This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
-addresses/ports.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDirPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
-Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
-directory ports.
-The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
-
-.SH DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS
-.PP
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBRecommendedVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
-STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
-to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which
-pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade.  This
-option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
-spliced together.
-When this is set then
-\fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBRecommendedClientVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
-STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
-to be safe for clients to use.  This information is included in version 2
-directories.  If this is not set then the value of \fBRecommendedVersions\fR
-is used.
-When this is set then
-\fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBRecommendedServerVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
-STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
-to be safe for servers to use.  This information is included in version 2
-directories.  If this is not set then the value of \fBRecommendedVersions\fR
-is used.
-When this is set then
-\fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBConsensusParams \fR\fISTRING\fP
-STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will
-include in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBDirAllowPrivateAddresses \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
-elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private
-IP address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAuthDirBadDir \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
-Authoritative directories only.  A set of address patterns for servers that
-will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this authority
-publishes, if \fBAuthDirListBadDirs\fR is set.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAuthDirBadExit \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
-Authoritative directories only.  A set of address patterns for servers that
-will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
-publishes, if \fBAuthDirListBadExits\fR is set.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAuthDirInvalid \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
-Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
-will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
-authority publishes.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAuthDirReject \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
-Authoritative directories only.  A set of address patterns for servers that
-will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
-authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor submitted
-for publication by this authority.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAuthDirListBadDirs \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-Authoritative directories only.  If set to 1, this directory has
-some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches.  (Do not
-set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad;
-otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared directory.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAuthDirListBadExits \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-Authoritative directories only.  If set to 1, this directory has
-some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes.  (Do not
-set this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad;
-otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared exit
-as an exit.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAuthDirRejectUnlisted \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-Authoritative directories only.  If set to 1, the directory server
-rejects all uploaded server descriptors that aren't explicitly listed
-in the fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get
-hit with a Sybil attack. (Default: 0)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAuthDirMaxServersPerAddr\fR \fINUM\fP
-Authoritative directories only.  The maximum number of servers that we
-will list as acceptable on a single IP address.  Set this to "0" for
-"no limit". (Default: 2)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBAuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr\fR \fINUM\fP
-Authoritative directories only.  Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but
-applies to addresses shared with directory authorities.  (Default: 5)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBV3AuthVotingInterval\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
-V3 authoritative directories only.  Configures the server's preferred
-voting interval.  Note that voting will \fIactually\fP happen at an
-interval chosen by consensus from all the authorities' preferred
-intervals.  This time SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBV3AuthVoteDelay\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
-V3 authoritative directories only.  Configures the server's preferred
-delay between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes
-from all the other authorities.  Note that the actual time used is not
-the server's preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences.
-(Default: 5 minutes.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBV3AuthDistDelay\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
-V3 authoritative directories only.  Configures the server's preferred
-delay between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it
-has all the signatures from all the other authorities.  Note that the
-actual time used is not the server's preferred time, but the consensus
-of all preferences.  (Default: 5 minutes.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBV3AuthNIntervalsValid\fR \fINUM\fP
-V3 authoritative directories only.  Configures the number of
-VotingIntervals for which each consensus should be valid for.
-Choosing high numbers increases network partitioning risks; choosing
-low numbers increases directory traffic. Note that the actual number
-of intervals used is not the server's preferred number, but the
-consensus of all preferences.  Must be at least 2.  (Default: 3.)
-
-
-.SH HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
-.PP
-The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHiddenServiceDir \fR\fIDIRECTORY\fP
-Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY.  Every hidden
-service must have a separate directory.  You may use this option multiple
-times to specify multiple services.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHiddenServicePort \fR\fIVIRTPORT \fR[\fITARGET\fR]\fP
-Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service.  You may use this
-option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent
-hiddenservicedir.  By default, this option maps the virtual port to the
-same port on 127.0.0.1.  You may override the target port, address, or both
-by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port.  You may also have
-multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that VIRTPORT,
-one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBPublishHidServDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
-advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful
-if you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
-(Default: 1)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHiddenServiceVersion \fR\fIversion\fR,\fIversion\fR,\fI...\fP
-A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
-service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBHiddenServiceAuthorizeClient \fR\fIauth-type\fR \fR\fIclient-name\fR,\fIclient-name\fR,\fI...\fP
-If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients
-only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose
-authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also
-hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are
-listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
-are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_
-(no spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible
-for clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data
-can be found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization
-data in their configuration file using \fBHidServAuth\fR.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBRendPostPeriod \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
-Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
-service descriptors to the directory servers.  This information is also
-uploaded whenever it changes.  (Default: 20 minutes)
-
-.SH TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS
-.PP
-The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTestingTorNetwork \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
-If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,
-so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if
-non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running.
-(Default: 0)
-
-.PD 0
-.RS 12
-.IP "ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1"
-.IP "DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1"
-.IP "EnforceDistinctSubnets 0"
-.IP "AssumeReachable 1"
-.IP "AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0"
-.IP "AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0"
-.IP "ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0"
-.IP "ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0"
-.IP "V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes"
-.IP "V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds"
-.IP "V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds"
-.IP "TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes"
-.IP "TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds"
-.IP "TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds"
-.IP "TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes"
-.IP "TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes"
-.RE
-.PD
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
-Like \fBV3AuthVotingInterval\fR, but for initial voting interval before the
-first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
-\fBTestingTorNetwork\fR is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
-Like \fBTestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay\fR, but for initial voting interval
-before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
-\fBTestingTorNetwork\fR is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
-Like \fBTestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay\fR, but for initial voting interval
-before the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
-\fBTestingTorNetwork\fR is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
-After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers are
-Running until this much time has passed.
-Changing this requires that\fBTestingTorNetwork\fR is set.
-(Default: 30 minutes)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBTestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime\fR \fR\fIN\fR \fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fP
-Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this
-time. Changing this requires that \fBTestingTorNetwork\fR is set.
-(Default: 10 minutes)
-
-.\" UNDOCUMENTED
-.\" ignoreversion
-
-.SH SIGNALS
-Tor catches the following signals:
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSIGTERM\fR
-Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSIGINT\fR
-Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
-slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
-(The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSIGHUP\fR
-The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing
-and reopening logs), fetch a new directory, and kill and restart its
-helper processes if applicable.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSIGUSR1\fR
-Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and
-throughput.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSIGUSR2\fR
-Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels
-by sending a SIGHUP.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSIGCHLD\fR
-Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited,
-so it can clean up.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSIGPIPE\fR
-Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
-.LP
-.TP
-\fBSIGXFSZ\fR
-If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
-
-.SH FILES
-.LP
-.TP
-.B @CONFDIR@/torrc
-The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/
-The tor process stores keys and other data here.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/cached-status/*
-The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority.  Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIDataDirectory\fB/cached-descriptors\fR and \fBcached-descriptors.new\fR
-These files hold downloaded router statuses.  Some routers may appear more than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used.    Lines beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about a given router.  The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIDataDirectory\fB/cached-routers\fR and \fBcached-routers.new\fR
-Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new.  When Tor can't find the newer files, it looks here instead.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/state
-A set of persistent key-value mappings.  These are documented in the file.  These include:
-.PD 0
-.RS 5
-.IP "- The current entry guards and their status."
-.IP "- The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see below)."
-.IP "- When the file was last written"
-.IP "- What version of Tor generated the state file"
-.IP "- A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router descriptors."
-.RE
-.PD
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/bw_accounting
-Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period).  This file is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file as well.  Only used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/hsusage
-Used to track hidden service usage in terms of fetch and publish
-requests to this hidden service authoritative directory. Only used when
-recording of statistics is enabled.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/control_auth_cookie
-Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
-overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup.
-See control-spec.txt for details.  Only used when cookie authentication
-is enabled.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/keys/*
-Only used by servers.  Holds identity keys and onion keys.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/fingerprint
-Only used by servers.  Holds the fingerprint of the server's identity key.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/approved-routers
-Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see \fBNamingAuthoritativeDirectory\fP).  This file lists nickname to identity bindings.  Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by whitespace.  See your \fBfingerprint\fP file in the \fIDataDirectory\fP for an example line.  If the nickname is \fB!reject\fP then descriptors from the given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is \fB!invalid\fP then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as not valid, that is, not recommended.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/router-stability
-Only used by authoritative directory servers.  Tracks measurements for router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of how to set their Stable flags.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/hostname 
-The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
-If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
-also contains authorization data for all clients.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/private_key 
-The private key for this hidden service.
-.LP
-.TP
-.B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/client_keys 
-Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by authorized
-clients.
-.SH SEE ALSO
-.BR privoxy (1),
-.BR tsocks (1),
-.BR torify (1)
-
-.BR https://www.torproject.org/
-
-.SH BUGS
-Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.
-.SH AUTHORS
-Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>, Nick Mathewson <nickm@alum.mit.edu>.
diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8179f94f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/tor.1.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,1403 @@
+// Copyright (c) The Tor Project, Inc.
+// See LICENSE for licensing information
+// This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference.
+// Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html
+TOR(1)
+======
+
+NAME
+----
+tor - The second-generation onion router
+
+
+SYNOPSIS
+--------
+**tor** [__OPTION__ __value__]...
+
+DESCRIPTION
+-----------
+__tor__ is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
+service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
+negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
+knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
+the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
+the downstream node. +
+
+Basically __tor__ provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers").
+Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc -- around the
+routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have
+difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
+
+OPTIONS
+-------
+**-h**, **-help**::
+    Display a short help message and exit.
+
+**-f** __FILE__::
+    FILE contains further "option value" paris. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
+
+**--hash-password**::
+    Generates a hashed password for control port access.
+
+**--list-fingerprint**::
+    Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
+
+**--verify-config**::
+    Verify the configuration file is valid.
+
+**--nt-service**::
+    **--service [install|remove|start|stop]** Manage the Tor Windows
+    NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can be found at
+    https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService
+
+**--list-torrc-options**::
+    List all valid options.
+
+**--version**::
+    Display Tor version and exit.
+
+**--quiet**::
+    Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do so.
+    (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or higher to
+    the console, until it has parsed its configuration.)
+
+Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option
+    value), or in the configuration file (option value or option "value").
+    Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside
+    quoted values.
+
+**BandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
+    A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to
+    the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
+    bandwidth usage to that same value. (Default: 5 MB)
+
+**BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
+    Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given
+    number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)
+
+**MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
+    If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
+    BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
+    who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
+    advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server
+    without impacting network performance.
+
+**RelayBandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
+    If defined, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
+    usage for \_relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes
+    per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value.
+    Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory
+    requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0)
+
+**RelayBandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
+    Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
+    \_relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction.
+    (Default: 0)
+
+**PerConnBWRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
+    If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay.
+    You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is
+    published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)
+
+**PerConnBWBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
+    If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay.
+    You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is
+    published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)
+
+**ConLimit** __NUM__::
+    The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor
+    process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file
+    descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n").
+    If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start. +
+ +
+    You probably don't need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows
+    since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
+
+**ConstrainedSockets** **0**|**1**::
+    If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
+    sockets to the size specified in **ConstrainedSockSize**. This is useful for
+    virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may
+    be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error
+    creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are
+    likely experiencing this problem. +
+ +
+    The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
+    the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility;
+    this configuration option is a second-resort. +
+ +
+    The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
+    cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates
+    the problem. +
+ +
+    You should **not** enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
+    space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
+    the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
+    time on long paths. (Default: 0.)
+
+**ConstrainedSockSize** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**::
+    When **ConstrainedSockets** is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
+    all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and
+    262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
+
+**ControlPort** __Port__::
+    If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
+    connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
+    (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of
+    **HashedControlPassword** or **CookieAuthentication**, setting this option will
+    cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control it. This
+    option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051.
+
+**ControlListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
+    Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind
+    to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly
+    recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're doing,
+    since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
+    dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple
+    times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
+
+**ControlSocket** __Path__::
+    Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
+    socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
+
+**HashedControlPassword** __hashed_password__::
+    Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other
+    process knows the password whose one-way hash is __hashed_password__. You
+    can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
+    __password__". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more
+    than HashedControlPassword line.
+
+**CookieAuthentication** **0**|**1**::
+    If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port
+    except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
+    "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
+    authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
+    security. (Default: 0)
+
+**CookieAuthFile** __Path__::
+    If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
+    for Tor's cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
+
+**CookieAuthFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|__Groupname__::
+    If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
+    cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by
+    the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet
+    implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0).
+
+**DataDirectory** __DIR__::
+    Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
+
+**DirServer** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__::
+    Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address
+    and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated
+    many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are
+    separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory
+    is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style
+    directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is
+    provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1)
+    directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will
+    use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs"
+    flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is **not** set.
+    Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the
+    "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=**port**" is given, Tor will use the
+    given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a
+    flag "v3ident=**fp**" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority
+    whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint **fp**. +
+ +
+    If no **dirserver** line is given, Tor will use the default directory
+    servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor
+    network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be
+    distinguishable from other users, because you won't believe the same
+    authorities they do.
+
+**AlternateDirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__ +
+
+**AlternateHSAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__ +
+
+**AlternateBridgeAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __ fingerprint__::
+    As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using
+    AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but
+    leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place.
+    Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service
+    authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities.
+
+**DisableAllSwap** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages.
+    On supported platforms, this should effectively disable any and all
+    attempts to page out memory. Under the hood, DisableAllSwap uses mlockall()
+    on unix-like platforms. Windows is currently unsupported. We believe that
+    this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions. Mac OS X appears to
+    be broken by design. On reasonable *BSD systems it should also be
+    supported but this is untested. This option requires that you start your
+    Tor as root. If you use DisableAllSwap, please consider using the User
+    option to properly reduce the privileges of your Tor.
+    (Default: 0)
+
+**FetchDirInfoEarly** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
+    directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for fetching
+    early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
+
+**FetchDirInfoExtraEarly** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory
+    caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the
+    start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off.
+    (Default: 0)
+
+**FetchHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the
+    rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor
+    controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)
+
+**FetchServerDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
+    descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
+    you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
+    (Default: 1)
+
+**FetchUselessDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the
+    authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless
+    descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is
+    useful if you're using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor
+    nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0)
+
+**HTTPProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
+    Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80
+    if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory
+    servers.
+
+**HTTPProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
+    If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy
+    authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP
+    proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
+    want it to support others.
+
+**HTTPSProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
+    Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or
+    host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting
+    directly to servers. You may want to set **FascistFirewall** to restrict
+    the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only
+    allows connecting to certain ports.
+
+**HTTPSProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
+    If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy
+    authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS
+    proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
+    want it to support others.
+
+**Socks4Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
+    Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port
+    (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
+
+**Socks5Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
+    Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port
+    (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
+
+**Socks5ProxyUsername** __username__ +
+
+**Socks5ProxyPassword** __password__::
+    If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password
+    in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and
+    255 characters.
+
+**KeepalivePeriod** __NUM__::
+    To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell
+    every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection
+    has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of
+    idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
+
+**Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
+    Send all messages between __minSeverity__ and __maxSeverity__ to the standard
+    output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The
+    "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are
+    debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,
+    since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an
+    attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all
+    messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination.
+
+**Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **file** __FILENAME__::
+    As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The
+    "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
+    Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity
+    level.
+
+**OutboundBindAddress** __IP__::
+    Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
+    is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
+    of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one.
+
+**PidFile** __FILE__::
+    On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove
+    FILE.
+
+**ProtocolWarnings** **0**|**1**::
+    If 1, Tor will log with severity \'warn' various cases of other parties not
+    following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity
+    \'info'. (Default: 0)
+
+**RunAsDaemon** **0**|**1**::
+    If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect
+    on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.
+    (Default: 0)
+
+
+**SafeLogging** **0**|**1**|**relay**::
+    Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g.
+    addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can
+    still be useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying
+    information about what sites a user might have visited. +
+ +
+    If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is
+    set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to
+    relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but
+    all messages generated when acting as a client are not. (Default: 1)
+
+**User** __UID__::
+    On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.
+
+**HardwareAccel** **0**|**1**::
+    If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when
+    available. (Default: 0)
+
+**AccelName** __NAME__::
+    When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic
+    engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine.
+    Names can be verified with the openssl engine command.
+
+**AccelDir** __DIR__::
+    Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine
+    implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default.
+
+**AvoidDiskWrites** **0**|**1**::
+    If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
+    This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support
+    only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
+
+**TunnelDirConns** **0**|**1**::
+    If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build
+    a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort.
+    (Default: 1)
+
+**PreferTunneledDirConns** **0**|**1**::
+    If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don't support tunneled
+    directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1)
+
+**CircuitPriorityHalflife** **NUM1**::
+    If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which
+    circuit's cell to deliver or relay next. When the value is 0, we
+    round-robin between the active circuits on a connection, delivering one
+    cell from each in turn. When the value is positive, we prefer delivering
+    cells from whichever connection has the lowest weighted cell count, where
+    cells are weighted exponentially according to the supplied
+    CircuitPriorityHalflife value (in seconds). If this option is not set at
+    all, we use the behavior recommended in the current consensus
+    networkstatus. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn't have
+    mess with it. (Default: not set.)
+
+CLIENT OPTIONS
+--------------
+
+The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
+**SocksPort** is non-zero):
+
+**AllowInvalidNodes** **entry**|**exit**|**middle**|**introduction**|**rendezvous**|**...**::
+    If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory
+    authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not
+    recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You
+    can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is
+    "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.
+
+**ExcludeSingleHopRelays** **0**|**1**::
+    This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with
+    the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set
+    to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at
+    higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally included.
+    (Default: 1)
+
+**Bridge** __IP__:__ORPort__ [fingerprint]::
+    When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
+    "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
+    is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that
+    the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
+    fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
+    it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.
+
+**CircuitBuildTimeout** __NUM__::
+    Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't
+    open in that time, give up on it. (Default: 1 minute.)
+
+**CircuitIdleTimeout** __NUM__::
+    If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then
+    close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all
+    of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up
+    making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we're
+    receiving, it won't forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1
+    hour.)
+
+**CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__::
+    If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how
+    many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit.
+    If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a
+    number like 60. (Default: 0)
+
+**ClientOnly** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve
+    directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is
+    configured. (Usually, you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at
+    figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a
+    useful server.) (Default: 0)
+
+**ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
+    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
+    patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example:
+    ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $    EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)
+
+**ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
+    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
+    patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any
+    node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
+    list.
+
+**EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
+    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
+    patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are
+    treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
+
+**ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
+    A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
+    patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These
+    are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
+
+**StrictNodes** **0**|**1**::
+    If 1 and EntryNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes
+    besides those listed in EntryNodes for the first hop of a normal circuit.
+    If 1 and ExitNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes
+    besides those listed in ExitNodes for the last hop of a normal exit
+    circuit. Note that Tor might still use these nodes for non-exit circuits
+    such as one-hop directory fetches or hidden service support circuits.
+
+**FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**::
+    If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports
+    that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see **FirewallPorts**).
+    This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with
+    restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such
+    a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use
+    ReachableAddresses instead.
+
+**FirewallPorts** __PORTS__::
+    A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when
+    **FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses
+    instead. (Default: 80, 443)
+
+**HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]::
+    Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
+    characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
+    characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal
+    purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
+    for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
+    this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden
+    services can be configured to require authorization using the 
+    **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.
+
+**ReachableAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
+    A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows
+    you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except
+    that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For
+    example, \'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept
+    \*:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net
+    99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port
+    80 otherwise. (Default: \'accept \*:*'.)
+
+**ReachableDirAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
+    Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
+    these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
+    GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of
+    **ReachableAddresses** is used. If **HTTPProxy** is set then these
+    connections will go through that proxy.
+
+**ReachableORAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
+    Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
+    these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not
+    set explicitly then the value of **ReachableAddresses** is used. If
+    **HTTPSProxy** is set then these connections will go through that proxy. +
+ +
+    The separation between **ReachableORAddresses** and
+    **ReachableDirAddresses** is only interesting when you are connecting
+    through proxies (see **HTTPProxy** and **HTTPSProxy**). Most proxies limit
+    TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443,
+    and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory
+    information) to port 80.
+
+**LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__::
+    A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
+    (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
+    ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node
+    will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863,
+    5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300)
+
+**MapAddress** __address__ __newaddress__::
+    When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress
+    before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to
+    www.indymedia.org to exit via __torserver__ (where __torserver__ is the
+    nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org
+    www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".
+
+**NewCircuitPeriod** __NUM__::
+    Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30
+    seconds)
+
+**MaxCircuitDirtiness** __NUM__::
+    Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
+    but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10
+    minutes)
+
+**NodeFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__::
+    The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames,
+    constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use
+    any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed
+    when a server doesn't list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option
+    can be used multiple times.
+
+**EnforceDistinctSubnets** **0**|**1**::
+    If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on
+    the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in
+    the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
+
+**SocksPort** __PORT__::
+    Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
+    applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
+    connections. (Default: 9050)
+
+**SocksListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
+    Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
+    applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g.
+    192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind
+    to multiple addresses/ports.
+
+**SocksPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
+    Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
+    SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit
+    policies below.
+
+**SocksTimeout** __NUM__::
+    Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
+    unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:
+    2 minutes.)
+
+**TrackHostExits** __host__,__.domain__,__...__::
+    For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent
+    connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same
+    exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a \'.\', it is treated as
+    matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a \'.', it means
+    match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites
+    that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if
+    your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage
+    of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single
+    user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it
+    through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
+
+**TrackHostExitsExpire** __NUM__::
+    Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the
+    association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is
+    1800 seconds (30 minutes).
+
+**UpdateBridgesFromAuthority** **0**|**1**::
+    When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
+    from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to
+    a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
+
+**UseBridges** **0**|**1**::
+    When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge"
+    config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory
+    guards. (Default: 0)
+
+**UseEntryGuards** **0**|**1**::
+    If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try
+    to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers
+    increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a
+    fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.)
+
+**NumEntryGuards** __NUM__::
+    If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
+    as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.)
+
+**SafeSocks** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
+    use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP
+    address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
+    Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
+    (Defaults to 0.)
+
+**TestSocks** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
+    each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a
+    safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This
+    helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking
+    DNS requests. (Default: 0)
+
+**VirtualAddrNetwork** __Address__/__bits__::
+    When a controller asks for a virtual (unused) address with the MAPADDRESS
+    command, Tor picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default:
+    127.192.0.0/10) +
+ +
+    When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool
+    like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or
+    "172.16.0.0/12". The default **VirtualAddrNetwork** address range on a
+    properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For
+    local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed.
+
+**AllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
+    characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
+    resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
+    (Default: 0)
+
+**AllowDotExit** **0**|**1**::
+    If enabled, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the
+    SocksPort/TransPort/NatdPort into "www.google.com" addresses that exit from
+    the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking websites and exit
+    relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0)
+
+**FastFirstHopPK** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first
+    hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have
+    already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure
+    keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower. +
+ +
+    Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it's
+    operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it
+    doesn't yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1)
+
+**TransPort** __PORT__::
+    If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on __PORT__ (by convention,
+    9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
+    Linux's IPTables. If you're planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for
+    a network, you'll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the
+    default setting. You'll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for
+    the network you'd like to proxy. (Default: 0).
+
+**TransListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
+    Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default:
+    127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an
+    entire network.
+
+**NATDPort** __PORT__::
+    Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.)
+    to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is
+    only for people who cannot use TransPort.
+
+**NATDListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
+    Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).
+
+**AutomapHostsOnResolve** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address
+    that ends with one of the suffixes in **AutomapHostsSuffixes**, we map an
+    unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address. 
+    This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that
+    resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0).
+
+**AutomapHostsSuffixes** __SUFFIX__,__SUFFIX__,__...__::
+    A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with **AutomapHostsOnResolve**.
+    The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).
+
+**DNSPort** __PORT__::
+    If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves
+    them anonymously. (Default: 0).
+
+**DNSListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
+    Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).
+
+**ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
+    If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
+    tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
+    192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't
+    turn it off unless you know what you're doing. (Default: 1).
+
+**DownloadExtraInfo** **0**|**1**::
+    If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents
+    contain information about servers other than the information in their
+    regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything
+    itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0).
+
+**FallbackNetworkstatusFile** __FILENAME__::
+    If Tor doesn't have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this
+    one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to
+    learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn't need to put load on the
+    authorities. (Default: None).
+
+**WarnPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
+    Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous
+    connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users
+    to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default:
+    23,109,110,143).
+
+**RejectPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
+    Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor
+    will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None).
+
+SERVER OPTIONS
+--------------
+
+The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort
+is non-zero):
+
+**Address** __address__::
+    The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g.
+    moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP
+    address.
+
+**AllowSingleHopExits** **0**|**1**::
+    This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop
+    proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is
+    the only hop in the circuit. (Default: 0)
+
+**AssumeReachable** **0**|**1**::
+    This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
+    don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
+    immediately. If **AuthoritativeDirectory** is also set, this option
+    instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list
+    all connected servers as running.
+
+**BridgeRelay** **0**|**1**::
+    Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
+    from bridge users to the Tor network. Mainly it influences how the relay
+    will cache and serve directory information. Usually used in combination
+    with PublishServerDescriptor.
+
+**ContactInfo** __email_address__::
+    Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked
+    up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it's an
+    email address.
+
+**ExitPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
+    Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
+    "**accept**|**reject** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]". If /__MASK__ is
+    omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving
+    a host or network you can also use "\*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0).
+    __PORT__ can be a single port number, an interval of ports
+    "__FROM_PORT__-__TO_PORT__", or "\*". If __PORT__ is omitted, that means
+    "\*". +
+ +
+    For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:\*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:\*,accept \*:\*" would
+    reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept
+    anything else. +
+ +
+    To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
+    169.254.0.0/16,    127.0.0.0/8,    192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and
+    172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
+    These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit
+    policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the
+    ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you've done
+    that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to
+    internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:\*", though that
+    may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its
+    public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details
+    about internal and reserved IP address space. +
+ +
+    This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put it
+    all on one line. +
+ +
+    Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you
+    want to \_replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with
+    either a reject \*:* or an accept \*:*. Otherwise, you're \_augmenting_
+    (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is: +
+
+       reject *:25
+       reject *:119
+       reject *:135-139
+       reject *:445
+       reject *:563
+       reject *:1214
+       reject *:4661-4666
+       reject *:6346-6429
+       reject *:6699
+       reject *:6881-6999
+       accept *:*
+
+**ExitPolicyRejectPrivate** **0**|**1**::
+    Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address,
+    at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy.
+    (Default: 1)
+
+**MaxOnionsPending** __NUM__::
+    If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject
+    new ones. (Default: 100)
+
+**MyFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__::
+    Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or
+    organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by
+    their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare
+    that they are in the same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the
+    same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its
+    family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.)
+
+**Nickname** __name__::
+    Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19
+    characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
+
+**NumCPUs** __num__::
+    How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
+
+**ORPort** __PORT__::
+    Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
+
+**ORListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
+    Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
+    servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
+    specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified
+    multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
+
+**PublishServerDescriptor** **0**|**1**|**v1**|**v2**|**v3**|**bridge**|**hidserv**,**...**::
+    This option is only considered if you have an ORPort defined. You can
+    choose multiple arguments, separated by commas.
+ +
+    If set to 0, Tor will act as a server but it will not publish its
+    descriptor to the directory authorities. (This is useful if you're testing
+    out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles directory
+    publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptor to all
+    directory authorities of the type(s) specified. The value "1" is the
+    default, which means "publish to the appropriate authorities".
+
+**ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__::
+    When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down:
+    we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM**
+    seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi-
+    ately. (Default: 30 seconds)
+
+
+**AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
+    Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting
+    period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with
+    AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB
+    and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1
+    GB. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some
+    time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at
+    the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period
+    before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation
+    is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a
+    collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more
+    useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available".
+
+**AccountingStart** **day**|**week**|**month** [__day__] __HH:MM__::
+    Specify how long accounting periods last. If **month** is given, each
+    accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ on the __dayth__ day of one
+    month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and
+    28.) If **week** is given, each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__
+    of the __dayth__ day of one week to the same day and time of the next week,
+    with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If **day** is given, each
+    accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ each day to the same time on
+    the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to
+    "month 1 0:00".)
+
+**ServerDNSResolvConfFile** __filename__::
+    Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
+    __filename__. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
+    "**resolv.conf**" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,
+    only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
+    (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
+
+**ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig** **0**|**1**::
+    If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems
+    parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.
+    Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until
+    it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".)
+
+**ServerDNSSearchDomains** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.
+    For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
+    "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
+    connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that
+    your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".)
+
+**ServerDNSDetectHijacking** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine
+    whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS
+    requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to
+    correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
+    on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".)
+
+**ServerDNSTestAddresses** __address__,__address__,__...__::
+    When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these __valid__ addresses
+    aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,
+    and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject *:*". This option only affects
+    name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to
+    "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".)
+
+**ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
+    containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
+    exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
+    URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
+    on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
+
+**BridgeRecordUsageByCountry** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have
+    GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client
+    addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess
+    which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)
+
+**ServerDNSRandomizeCase** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in
+    outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.
+    This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack.
+    For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through
+    0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server
+    does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
+
+**GeoIPFile** __filename__::
+    A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry.
+
+**CellStatistics** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that
+    cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed
+    while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
+
+**DirReqStatistics** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number and
+    response time of network status requests to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be
+    changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
+
+**EntryStatistics** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
+    directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed while
+    Tor is running. (Default: 0)
+
+**ExitPortStatistics** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of relayed
+    bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be
+    changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
+
+**ExtraInfoStatistics** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in
+    its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities.
+    (Default: 0)
+
+DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
+------------------------
+
+The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is,
+if DirPort is non-zero):
+
+**AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory
+    server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of
+    good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients
+    already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want
+    to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at
+    tor-ops@freehaven.net if you think you should be a directory.
+
+**DirPortFrontPage** __FILENAME__::
+    When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
+    the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
+    to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in
+    contrib/tor-exit-notice.html.
+
+**V1AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
+    generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy
+    Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).
+
+**V2AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
+    generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
+    described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running
+    0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x).
+
+**V3AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
+    generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
+    described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at
+    least 0.2.0.x).
+
+**VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of
+    Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each
+    version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2
+    authorities provide this service optionally. See **RecommendedVersions**,
+    **RecommendedClientVersions**, and **RecommendedServerVersions**.
+
+**NamingAuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has
+    opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these
+    opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with
+    the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint
+    has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to
+    accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See
+    **approved-routers** in the **FILES** section below.
+
+**HSAuthoritativeDir** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor also
+    accepts and serves hidden service descriptors. (Default: 0)
+
+**HidServDirectoryV2** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service
+    descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients
+    connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1)
+
+**BridgeAuthoritativeDir** **0**|**1**::
+    When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
+    accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
+    networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
+
+**MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
+    Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by
+    authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours)
+
+**DirPort** __PORT__::
+    Advertise the directory service on this port.
+
+**DirListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
+    Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to
+    this port rather than the one specified in DirPort.  (Default: 0.0.0.0)
+    This directive can be specified multiple times  to bind to multiple
+    addresses/ports.
+
+**DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
+    Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
+    directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
+
+DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS
+----------------------------------
+
+**RecommendedVersions** __STRING__::
+    STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
+    safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the
+    directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear
+    multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When
+    this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should be set too.
+
+**RecommendedClientVersions** __STRING__::
+    STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
+    safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
+    directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
+    is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
+    be set too.
+
+**RecommendedServerVersions** __STRING__::
+    STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
+    safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
+    directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
+    is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
+    be set too.
+
+**ConsensusParams** __STRING__::
+    STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include
+    in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote.
+
+**DirAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
+    elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP
+    address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.
+
+**AuthDirBadDir** __AddressPattern...__::
+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
+    will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this
+    authority publishes, if **AuthDirListBadDirs** is set.
+
+**AuthDirBadExit** __AddressPattern...__::
+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
+    will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
+    publishes, if **AuthDirListBadExits** is set.
+
+**AuthDirInvalid** __AddressPattern...__::
+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
+    will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
+    authority publishes.
+
+**AuthDirReject** __AddressPattern__...::
+    Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
+    will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
+    authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor
+    submitted for publication by this authority.
+
+**AuthDirListBadDirs** **0**|**1**::
+    Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
+    opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set
+    this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad;
+    otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor  of every declared
+    directory.)
+
+**AuthDirListBadExits** **0**|**1**::
+    Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
+    opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to
+    1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are
+    effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.)
+
+**AuthDirRejectUnlisted** **0**|**1**::
+    Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects
+    all uploaded server descriptors that aren't explicitly listed in the
+    fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil
+    attack. (Default: 0)
+
+**AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr** __NUM__::
+    Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will
+    list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit".
+    (Default: 2)
+
+**AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr** __NUM__::
+    Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies
+    to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5)
+
+**V3AuthVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred voting
+    interval. Note that voting will __actually__ happen at an interval chosen
+    by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time
+    SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
+
+**V3AuthVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
+    between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the
+    other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server's
+    preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.)
+
+**V3AuthDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred  delay
+    between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming  it has all the
+    signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used
+    is not the server's preferred time,  but the consensus of all preferences.
+    (Default: 5 minutes.)
+
+**V3AuthNIntervalsValid** __NUM__::
+    V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals
+    for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers
+    increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases
+    directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the
+    server's preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at
+    least 2. (Default: 3.)
+
+HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
+----------------------
+
+The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
+
+**HiddenServiceDir** __DIRECTORY__::
+    Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service
+    must have a separate directory. You may use this option  multiple times to
+    specify multiple services.
+
+**HiddenServicePort** __VIRTPORT__ [__TARGET__]::
+    Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
+    option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most
+    recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to
+    the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or
+    both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have
+    multiple lines with  the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that
+    VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
+
+**PublishHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
+    advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if
+    you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
+    (Default: 1)
+
+**HiddenServiceVersion** __version__,__version__,__...__::
+    A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
+    service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2)
+
+**HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** __auth-type__ __client-name__,__client-name__,__...__::
+    If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients
+    only. The auth-type can either be \'basic' for a general-purpose
+    authorization protocol or \'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also
+    hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are
+    listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
+    are 1 to 19 characters  long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no
+    spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for
+    clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be
+    found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in
+    their configuration file using **HidServAuth**.
+
+**RendPostPeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
+    Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous 
+    service descriptors to the directory servers. This information  is also
+    uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 20 minutes)
+
+TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS
+-----------------------
+
+The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.
+
+**TestingTorNetwork** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,
+    so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if
+    non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running.
+    (Default: 0) +
+
+       ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1
+       DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1
+       EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
+       AssumeReachable 1
+       AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0
+       AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0
+       ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
+       ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
+       V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes
+       V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds
+       V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds
+       TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes
+       TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds
+       TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds
+       TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes
+       TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes
+
+**TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
+    Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first
+    consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
+    **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
+
+**TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
+    Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before
+    the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
+    **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
+
+**TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
+    Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before
+    the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
+    **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
+
+**TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
+    After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers
+    are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires
+    that **TestingTorNetwork** is set.  (Default: 30 minutes)
+
+**TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
+    Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this
+    time. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default:
+    10 minutes)
+
+SIGNALS
+-------
+
+Tor catches the following signals:
+
+**SIGTERM**::
+    Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
+
+**SIGINT**::
+    Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
+    slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
+    (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
+
+**SIGHUP**:: 
+    The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and
+    reopening logs), fetch a new directory, and kill and restart its helper
+    processes if applicable.
+
+**SIGUSR1**::
+    Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput.
+
+**SIGUSR2**::
+    Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by
+    sending a SIGHUP.
+
+**SIGCHLD**::
+    Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it
+    can clean up.
+
+**SIGPIPE**::
+    Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
+
+**SIGXFSZ**::
+    If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
+
+FILES
+-----
+
+**@CONFDIR@/torrc**::
+    The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
+
+**@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/**::
+    The tor process stores keys and other data here.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/cached-status/**::
+    The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority.
+    Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal
+    identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/cached-descriptors** and **cached-descriptors.new**::
+    These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more
+    than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines
+    beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about
+    a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets
+    too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/cached-routers** and **cached-routers.new**::
+    Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When
+    Tor can't find the newer files, it looks here instead.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/state**::
+    A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in
+    the file. These include:
+            - The current entry guards and their status.
+            - The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see
+            below).
+            - When the file was last written
+            - What version of Tor generated the state file
+            - A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router
+            descriptors.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/bw_accounting**::
+    Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts
+    and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file
+    is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the \'state' file as well. Only
+    used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/hsusage**::
+    Used to track hidden service usage in terms of fetch and publish requests
+    to this hidden service authoritative directory. Only used when recording of
+    statistics is enabled.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/control_auth_cookie**::
+    Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
+    overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See
+    control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is
+    enabled.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/keys/***::
+    Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/fingerprint**::
+    Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server's identity key.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/approved-routers**::
+    Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see
+    **NamingAuthoritativeDirectory**). This file lists nickname to identity
+    bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by
+    whitespace. See your **fingerprint** file in the __DataDirectory__ for an
+    example line. If the nickname is **!reject** then descriptors from the
+    given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is
+    **!invalid** then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as
+    not valid, that is, not recommended.
+
+__DataDirectory__**/router-stability**::
+    Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for
+    router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of
+    how to set their Stable flags.
+
+__HiddenServiceDirectory__**/hostname**::
+    The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
+    If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
+    also contains authorization data for all clients.
+
+__HiddenServiceDirectory__**/private_key**::
+    The private key for this hidden service.
+
+__HiddenServiceDirectory__**/client_keys**::
+    Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by
+    authorized clients.
+
+SEE ALSO
+--------
+**privoxy**(1), **tsocks**(1), **torify**(1) +
+
+**https://www.torproject.org/**
+
+
+BUGS
+----
+
+Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.
+
+AUTHORS
+-------
+Roger Dingledine <mailto:arma@mit.edu[arma@mit.edu]>, Nick Mathewson <mailto:nickm@alum.mit.edu[nickm@alum.mit.edu]>.
+