diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/circuitbuild.c | 42 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/circuituse.c | 9 |
2 files changed, 24 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 7eae0e7a9..9b1236f34 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -739,8 +739,12 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ) circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */ /* We're done with measurement circuits here. Just close them */ - if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) + if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) { + /* If a measurement circ ever gets back to us, consider it + * succeeded for path bias */ + circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED; circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); + } return 0; } @@ -1156,13 +1160,19 @@ pathbias_should_count(origin_circuit_t *circ) /* We can't do path bias accounting without entry guards. * Testing and controller circuits also have no guards. + * * We also don't count server-side rends, because their - * endpoint could be chosen maliciously. */ + * endpoint could be chosen maliciously. + * Similarly, we can't count client-side intro attempts, + * because clients can be manipulated into connecting to + * malicious intro points. */ if (get_options()->UseEntryGuards == 0 || circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING || circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER || circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND || - circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) { + circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED || + (circ->base_.purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && + circ->base_.purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED)) { return 0; } @@ -1388,7 +1398,7 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason) { circuit_t *circ = ô->base_; - if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) { + if (!pathbias_should_count(ocirc)) { return; } @@ -1399,33 +1409,15 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason) // XXX: May open up attacks if the adversary can force connections // on unresponsive hosts to use new circs. Vidalia displayes a "Retrying" // state.. Can we use that? Does optimistic data change this? - // XXX: Sub-attack: in collusion with an intro point, you can induce bias - // through the web. Need a Torbutton patch to prevent this. - - /* FIXME: This is not ideal, but it prevents the case where a - * CPU overloaded intro point is chosen. - * XXX: Is this reason code authenticated? */ - if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && - reason == - END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE|END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT) { - log_info(LD_CIRC, - "Ignoring CPU overload intro circuit without successful use. " - "Circuit purpose %d currently %s.", - reason, circ->purpose, circuit_state_to_string(circ->state)); - } else { - log_info(LD_CIRC, + + log_info(LD_CIRC, "Circuit closed without successful use for reason %d. " "Circuit purpose %d currently %s.", reason, circ->purpose, circuit_state_to_string(circ->state)); - pathbias_count_unusable(ocirc); - } + pathbias_count_unusable(ocirc); } else { if (reason & END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE) { /* Unused remote circ close reasons all could be bias */ - // XXX: We hit this a lot for hidserv circs with purposes: - // CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND (reasons: 514,517,520) - // CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED (reasons: 514,517,520) - // == reasons: 2,3,8. Client-side timeouts? log_info(LD_CIRC, "Circuit remote-closed without successful use for reason %d. " "Circuit purpose %d currently %s.", diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 9362e2420..0b799b11a 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1402,11 +1402,16 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose, circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose)); - if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND && + if ((purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND || + purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING) && circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) { /* Path bias: Cannibalized rends pre-emptively count as a * successfully used circ. We don't wait until the extend, - * because the rend point could be malicious. */ + * because the rend point could be malicious. + * + * Same deal goes for client side introductions. Clients + * can be manipulated to connect repeatedly to them + * (especially web clients). */ circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED; /* This must be called before the purpose change */ pathbias_check_close(circ); |