diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/common/tortls.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/common/tortls.c | 154 |
1 files changed, 137 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 1075de977..d6a0d8488 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -815,27 +815,22 @@ log_cert_lifetime(X509 *cert, const char *problem) tor_free(s2); } -/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a - * certificate that is currently valid and signed, then set - * *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return - * 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>. - */ -int -tor_tls_verify_v1(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key) +/** DOCDOC helper. + * cert_out needs to be freed. id_cert_out doesn't. */ +static void +try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, + X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out) { X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL; - RSA *rsa; - int num_in_chain; - int r = -1, i; - - *identity_key = NULL; + int num_in_chain, i; + *cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL; if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl))) - goto done; + return; + *cert_out = cert; if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl))) - goto done; + return; num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain); /* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert. * 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link @@ -845,18 +840,38 @@ tor_tls_verify_v1(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key) log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL, "Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)", num_in_chain); - goto done; + return; } for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) { id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0) break; } + *id_cert_out = id_cert; +} + +/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a + * certificate that is currently valid and signed, then set + * *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return + * 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>. + */ +int +tor_tls_verify_v1(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key) +{ + X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL; + RSA *rsa; + int r = -1; + + *identity_key = NULL; + + try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &cert, &id_cert); + if (!cert) + goto done; if (!id_cert) { log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"No distinct identity certificate found"); goto done; } - if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) || X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) { log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0"); @@ -884,6 +899,111 @@ tor_tls_verify_v1(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key) return r; } +/** DOCDOC + * + * Returns 1 on "verification is done", 0 on "still need LINK_AUTH." + */ +int +tor_tls_verify_certs_v2(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, + const char *cert_str, size_t cert_len, + const char *id_cert_str, size_t id_cert_len, + crypto_pk_env_t **cert_key_out, + char *conn_cert_digest_out, + char *id_digest_out) +{ + X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL, *cert_pkey = NULL; + int free_id_cert = 0, peer_used_tls_cert = 0; + int r = -1; + + tor_assert(cert_key_out); + tor_assert(conn_cert_digest_out); + tor_assert(id_digest_out); + + *cert_key_out = NULL; + + if (cert_str && cert_len) { + /*XXXX020 warn on error. */ + const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char*) cert_str; + cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_len); + } + if (id_cert_str && id_cert_len) { + /*XXXX020 warn on error. */ + const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char*) id_cert_str; + id_cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, id_cert_len); + if (id_cert) + free_id_cert = 1; + } + + if (cert) { + int cmp = 0; + X509 *cert_tmp = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl); + if (cert_tmp) { + peer_used_tls_cert = 1; + cmp = X509_cmp(cert, cert_tmp); + X509_free(cert_tmp); + } + if (cmp != 0) { + log_fn(severity, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Certificate in CERT cell didn't match TLS cert."); + goto done; + } + } + + if (!cert || !id_cert) { + X509 *c=NULL, *id=NULL; + try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &c, &id); + if (c) { + if (!cert) + cert = c; + else + X509_free(c); + } + if (id && !id_cert) + id_cert = id; + } + if (!id_cert || !cert) + goto done; + + if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) || + X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) { + log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0"); + tls_log_errors(severity,"verifying certificate"); + goto done; + } + + { + crypto_pk_env_t *i = _crypto_new_pk_env_evp_pkey(id_pkey); + if (!i) + goto done; + crypto_pk_get_digest(i, id_digest_out); + crypto_free_pk_env(i); + } + if (!(cert_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert))) + goto done; + if (!(*cert_key_out = _crypto_new_pk_env_evp_pkey(cert_pkey))) + goto done; + + { + unsigned int len = 0; + X509_digest(cert, EVP_sha1(), (unsigned char*)conn_cert_digest_out, &len); + tor_assert(len == DIGEST_LEN); + } + + r = peer_used_tls_cert ? 1 : 0; + done: + if (cert) + X509_free(cert); + if (id_cert && free_id_cert) + X509_free(id_cert); + if (id_pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey); + if (cert_pkey) + EVP_PKEY_free(cert_pkey); + + return r; +} + /** Check whether the certificate set on the connection <b>tls</b> is * expired or not-yet-valid, give or take <b>tolerance</b> * seconds. Return 0 for valid, -1 for failure. |