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Diffstat (limited to 'doc/TODO')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO | 15 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 7 deletions
@@ -238,29 +238,30 @@ R d Do we want to maintain our own set of entryguards that we use as (This is very similar to proposal 118.) - Fix voting to handle bug 608 case when multiple servers get Named. - - Possibly: revise link protocol to allow big circuit IDs, + d Possibly: revise link protocol to allow big circuit IDs, variable-length cells, proposal-110 stuff, and versioned CREATES? - - Eliminate use of v2 networkstatus documents in v3 authority + o Eliminate use of v2 networkstatus documents in v3 authority decision-making. N . Draft proposal for GeoIP aggregation (see external constraints *) - - Separate Guard flags for "pick this as a new guard" and "keep this + o Separate Guard flags for "pick this as a new guard" and "keep this as an existing guard". First investigate if we want this. - - Figure out how to make good use of the fallback consensus file. Right + . Figure out how to make good use of the fallback consensus file. Right now many of the addresses in the fallback consensus will be stale, so it will take dozens of minutes to bootstrap from it. This is a bad first Tor experience. But if we check the fallback consensus file *after* we fail to connect to any authorities, then it may still be valuable as a blocking-resistance step. + o Write the proposal. - Patch our tor.spec rpm package so it knows where to put the fallback consensus file. - - Something for bug 469, to limit connections per IP. - - Put bandwidth weights in the networkstatus? So clients get weight + d Something for bug 469, to limit connections per IP. + . Put bandwidth weights in the networkstatus? So clients get weight their choices even before they have the descriptors; and so authorities can put in more accurate numbers in the future. d Fetch an updated geoip file from the directory authorities. - Tiny designs to write: - - Better estimate of clock skew; has anonymity implications. Clients + . Better estimate of clock skew; has anonymity implications. Clients should estimate their skew as median of skew from servers over last N seconds, but for servers this is not so easy, since a server does not choose who it connects to. |