diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | changes/fallback_dirsource | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/tor.1.txt | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/config.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/networkstatus.c | 24 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/or.h | 4 |
5 files changed, 5 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/changes/fallback_dirsource b/changes/fallback_dirsource index 61db81bf2..d8d6c02aa 100644 --- a/changes/fallback_dirsource +++ b/changes/fallback_dirsource @@ -7,3 +7,7 @@ of servers to try to get a consensus from when first connecting to the Tor network, and thereby reduce load on the directory authorities. + + o Removed features: + - Drop the old FallbackNetworkstatus option: we never got it working + well enough to use it. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 231ac528d..c9be6cd5d 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1129,12 +1129,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0) -**FallbackNetworkstatusFile** __FILENAME__:: - If Tor doesn't have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this - one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to - learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn't need to put load on the - authorities. (Default: None) - **WarnPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__:: Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 17b5b79ce..59b4abdfb 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -231,12 +231,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { V(ExtraInfoStatistics, BOOL, "1"), V(FallbackDir, LINELIST, NULL), -#if defined (WINCE) - V(FallbackNetworkstatusFile, FILENAME, "fallback-consensus"), -#else - V(FallbackNetworkstatusFile, FILENAME, - SHARE_DATADIR PATH_SEPARATOR "tor" PATH_SEPARATOR "fallback-consensus"), -#endif + OBSOLETE("FallbackNetworkstatusFile"), V(FascistFirewall, BOOL, "0"), V(FirewallPorts, CSV, ""), V(FastFirstHopPK, BOOL, "1"), diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c index 937d61929..9d402403c 100644 --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@ -219,8 +219,6 @@ router_reload_consensus_networkstatus(void) { char *filename; char *s; - struct stat st; - const or_options_t *options = get_options(); const unsigned int flags = NSSET_FROM_CACHE | NSSET_DONT_DOWNLOAD_CERTS; int flav; @@ -263,25 +261,6 @@ router_reload_consensus_networkstatus(void) tor_free(filename); } - if (!current_consensus || - (stat(options->FallbackNetworkstatusFile, &st)==0 && - st.st_mtime > current_consensus->valid_after)) { - s = read_file_to_str(options->FallbackNetworkstatusFile, - RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL); - if (s) { - if (networkstatus_set_current_consensus(s, "ns", - flags|NSSET_ACCEPT_OBSOLETE)) { - log_info(LD_FS, "Couldn't load consensus networkstatus from \"%s\"", - options->FallbackNetworkstatusFile); - } else { - log_notice(LD_FS, - "Loaded fallback consensus networkstatus from \"%s\"", - options->FallbackNetworkstatusFile); - } - tor_free(s); - } - } - if (!current_consensus) { if (!named_server_map) named_server_map = strmap_new(); @@ -1674,9 +1653,6 @@ networkstatus_set_current_consensus(const char *consensus, if (from_cache && !accept_obsolete && c->valid_until < now-OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE) { - /* XXXX If we try to make fallbackconsensus work again, we should - * consider taking this out. Until then, believing obsolete consensuses - * is causing more harm than good. See also bug 887. */ log_info(LD_DIR, "Loaded an expired consensus. Discarding."); goto done; } diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 9f9316b98..b2d31a67f 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3702,10 +3702,6 @@ typedef struct { * of certain configuration options. */ int TestingTorNetwork; - /** File to check for a consensus networkstatus, if we don't have one - * cached. */ - char *FallbackNetworkstatusFile; - /** If true, and we have GeoIP data, and we're a bridge, keep a per-country * count of how many client addresses have contacted us so that we can help * the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to us. */ |