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-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitbuild.c551
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitbuild.h3
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuituse.c11
-rw-r--r--src/or/config.c7
-rw-r--r--src/or/connection_edge.c9
-rw-r--r--src/or/entrynodes.c48
-rw-r--r--src/or/entrynodes.h7
-rw-r--r--src/or/or.h32
-rw-r--r--src/or/relay.c2
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendclient.c9
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendservice.c13
11 files changed, 588 insertions, 104 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index b98624386..435ccd9a2 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@ static int entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
static void pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ);
static void pathbias_count_successful_close(origin_circuit_t *circ);
static void pathbias_count_collapse(origin_circuit_t *circ);
-static void pathbias_count_unusable(origin_circuit_t *circ);
+static void pathbias_count_use_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ);
+static int pathbias_check_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard);
+static int pathbias_check_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard);
/** This function tries to get a channel to the specified endpoint,
* and then calls command_setup_channel() to give it the right
@@ -1210,19 +1212,65 @@ pathbias_get_mult_factor(const or_options_t *options)
pathbias_get_scale_factor(options));
}
+/** The minimum number of circuit usage attempts before we start
+ * thinking about warning about path use bias and dropping guards */
+static int
+pathbias_get_min_use(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_USE 20
+ if (options->PathBiasUseThreshold >= 3)
+ return options->PathBiasUseThreshold;
+ else
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_minuse",
+ DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_USE,
+ 3, INT32_MAX);
+}
+
+/** The circuit use success rate below which we issue a notice */
+static double
+pathbias_get_notice_use_rate(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_USE_PCT 90
+ if (options->PathBiasNoticeUseRate >= 0.0)
+ return options->PathBiasNoticeUseRate;
+ else
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_noticeusepct",
+ DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_USE_PCT,
+ 0, 100)/100.0;
+}
+
/**
- * If this parameter is set to a true value (default), we use the
- * successful_circuits_closed. Otherwise, we use the success_count.
+ * The extreme use rate is the rate at which we would drop the guard,
+ * if pb_dropguard is also set. Otherwise we just warn.
+ */
+double
+pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_USE_PCT 70
+ if (options->PathBiasExtremeUseRate >= 0.0)
+ return options->PathBiasExtremeUseRate;
+ else
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_extremeusepct",
+ DFLT_PATH_BIAS_EXTREME_USE_PCT,
+ 0, 100)/100.0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * This is the number of circuits at which we scale our
+ * use counts by mult_factor/scale_factor. Note, this count is
+ * not exact, as we only perform the scaling in the event
+ * of no integer truncation.
*/
static int
-pathbias_use_close_counts(const or_options_t *options)
+pathbias_get_scale_use_threshold(const or_options_t *options)
{
-#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_USE_CLOSE_COUNTS 1
- if (options->PathBiasUseCloseCounts >= 0)
- return options->PathBiasUseCloseCounts;
+#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_USE_THRESHOLD 100
+ if (options->PathBiasScaleUseThreshold >= 10)
+ return options->PathBiasScaleUseThreshold;
else
- return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_useclosecounts",
- DFLT_PATH_BIAS_USE_CLOSE_COUNTS, 0, 1);
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_scaleuse",
+ DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_USE_THRESHOLD,
+ 10, INT32_MAX);
}
/**
@@ -1238,10 +1286,14 @@ pathbias_state_to_string(path_state_t state)
return "build attempted";
case PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED:
return "build succeeded";
+ case PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED:
+ return "use attempted";
case PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED:
return "use succeeded";
case PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED:
return "use failed";
+ case PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED:
+ return "already counted";
}
return "unknown";
@@ -1338,7 +1390,7 @@ pathbias_should_count(origin_circuit_t *circ)
* Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475.
*/
static int
-pathbias_count_circ_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+pathbias_count_build_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
#define CIRC_ATTEMPT_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600)
static ratelim_t circ_attempt_notice_limit =
@@ -1505,6 +1557,126 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
}
/**
+ * Record an attempt to use a circuit. Changes the circuit's
+ * path state and update its guard's usage counter.
+ *
+ * Used for path bias usage accounting.
+ */
+void
+pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ entry_guard_t *guard;
+
+ if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (circ->path_state < PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) {
+ log_notice(LD_BUG,
+ "Used circuit is in strange path state %s. "
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.",
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state));
+ } else if (circ->path_state < PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED) {
+ guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(
+ circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest);
+ if (guard) {
+ pathbias_check_use_rate(guard);
+ guard->use_attempts++;
+
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Marked circuit %d as used for guard %s=%s.",
+ circ->global_identifier, guard->nickname,
+ hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
+ }
+
+ circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED;
+ } else {
+ /* Harmless but educational log message */
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Used circuit %d is already in path state %s. "
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.",
+ circ->global_identifier,
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state));
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check the circuit's path stat is appropriate and it as successfully
+ * used.
+ *
+ * We don't actually increment the guard's counters until
+ * pathbias_check_close().
+ *
+ * Used for path bias usage accounting.
+ */
+void
+pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (circ->path_state < PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED) {
+ log_notice(LD_BUG,
+ "Used circuit %d is in strange path state %s. "
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.",
+ circ->global_identifier,
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state));
+
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ);
+ }
+
+ /* We don't do any accounting at the guard until actual circuit close */
+ circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Actually count a circuit success towards a guard's usage counters
+ * if the path state is appropriate.
+ */
+static void
+pathbias_count_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ entry_guard_t *guard;
+
+ if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) {
+ log_notice(LD_BUG,
+ "Successfully used circuit %d is in strange path state %s. "
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.",
+ circ->global_identifier,
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state));
+ } else {
+ guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(
+ circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest);
+ if (guard) {
+ guard->use_successes++;
+
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,
+ "Marked circuit %d as used successfully for guard %s=%s.",
+ circ->global_identifier, guard->nickname,
+ hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
+ }
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
* Send a probe down a circuit that the client attempted to use,
* but for which the stream timed out/failed. The probe is a
* RELAY_BEGIN cell with a 0.a.b.c destination address, which
@@ -1648,7 +1820,7 @@ pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, const cell_t *cell)
/* Check nonce */
if (ipv4_host == ocirc->pathbias_probe_nonce) {
- ocirc->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
+ pathbias_mark_use_success(ocirc);
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Got valid path bias probe back for circ %d, stream %d.",
@@ -1691,24 +1863,11 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason)
return 0;
}
- if (ocirc->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) {
- if (circ->timestamp_dirty) {
- if (pathbias_send_usable_probe(circ) == 0)
- return -1;
- else
- pathbias_count_unusable(ocirc);
-
- /* Any circuit where there were attempted streams but no successful
- * streams could be bias */
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
- "Circuit %d closed without successful use for reason %d. "
- "Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len %d.",
- ocirc->global_identifier,
- reason, circ->purpose, ocirc->has_opened,
- circuit_state_to_string(circ->state),
- ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len);
-
- } else {
+ switch (ocirc->path_state) {
+ /* If the circuit was closed after building, but before use, we need
+ * to ensure we were the ones who tried to close it (and not a remote
+ * actor). */
+ case PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED:
if (reason & END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE) {
/* Remote circ close reasons on an unused circuit all could be bias */
log_info(LD_CIRC,
@@ -1739,11 +1898,41 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason)
} else {
pathbias_count_successful_close(ocirc);
}
- }
- } else if (ocirc->path_state == PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED) {
- pathbias_count_successful_close(ocirc);
+ break;
+
+ /* If we tried to use a circuit but failed, we should probe it to ensure
+ * it has not been tampered with. */
+ case PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED:
+ /* XXX: Only probe and/or count failure if the network is live?
+ * What about clock jumps/suspends? */
+ if (pathbias_send_usable_probe(circ) == 0)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ pathbias_count_use_failed(ocirc);
+
+ /* Any circuit where there were attempted streams but no successful
+ * streams could be bias */
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Circuit %d closed without successful use for reason %d. "
+ "Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len %d.",
+ ocirc->global_identifier,
+ reason, circ->purpose, ocirc->has_opened,
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->state),
+ ocirc->build_state->desired_path_len);
+ break;
+
+ case PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED:
+ pathbias_count_successful_close(ocirc);
+ pathbias_count_use_success(ocirc);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ // Other states are uninteresting. No stats to count.
+ break;
}
+ ocirc->path_state = PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -1792,6 +1981,7 @@ static void
pathbias_count_collapse(origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
entry_guard_t *guard = NULL;
+
if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) {
return;
}
@@ -1816,8 +2006,13 @@ pathbias_count_collapse(origin_circuit_t *circ)
}
}
+/**
+ * Count a known failed circuit (because we could not probe it).
+ *
+ * This counter is informational.
+ */
static void
-pathbias_count_unusable(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+pathbias_count_use_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
entry_guard_t *guard = NULL;
if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) {
@@ -1886,7 +2081,7 @@ pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ)
* of the doubt.
*/
double
-pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
+pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
{
circuit_t *circ;
int open_circuits = 0;
@@ -1903,7 +2098,12 @@ pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
if (!ocirc->cpath || !ocirc->cpath->extend_info)
continue;
+ /* Don't count known failed or already counted circuits */
+ if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED)
+ continue;
+
if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED &&
+ pathbias_should_count(ocirc) &&
fast_memeq(guard->identity,
ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN)) {
@@ -1915,51 +2115,201 @@ pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
}
/**
- * This function checks the consensus parameters to decide
- * if it should return guard->circ_successes or
- * guard->successful_circuits_closed.
+ * Return the number of circuits counted as successfully used
+ * this guard.
+ *
+ * Also add in the currently open circuits that we are attempting
+ * to use to give them the benefit of the doubt.
*/
double
-pathbias_get_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
+pathbias_get_use_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
{
- if (pathbias_use_close_counts(get_options())) {
- return pathbias_get_closed_count(guard);
- } else {
- return guard->circ_successes;
+ circuit_t *circ = global_circuitlist;
+ int open_circuits = 0;
+
+ /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt */
+ for ( ; circ; circ = circ->next) {
+ origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL;
+ if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) || /* didn't originate here */
+ circ->marked_for_close) /* already counted */
+ continue;
+
+ ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
+
+ if (!ocirc->cpath || !ocirc->cpath->extend_info)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Don't count known failed or already counted circuits */
+ if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED)
+ continue;
+
+ if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED &&
+ pathbias_should_count(ocirc) &&
+ fast_memeq(guard->identity,
+ ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ open_circuits++;
+ }
}
+
+ return guard->use_successes + open_circuits;
}
-/** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to
- * <b>guard</b>, first checking if the failure rate is high enough that
- * we should eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good;
- * return 0 if the guard looks fine.
+/**
+ * Check the path bias use rate against our consensus parameter limits.
+ *
+ * Emits a log message if the use success rates are too low.
+ *
+ * If pathbias_get_dropguards() is set, we also disable the use of
+ * very failure prone guards.
+ *
+ * Returns -1 if we decided to disable the guard, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
-entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
+pathbias_check_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
- entry_guards_changed();
+ if (guard->use_attempts > pathbias_get_min_use(options)) {
+ /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0
+ * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't
+ * change to <= */
+ if (pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)/guard->use_attempts
+ < pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(options)) {
+ /* Dropping is currently disabled by default. */
+ if (pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) {
+ if (!guard->path_bias_disabled) {
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,
+ "Your Guard %s=%s is failing to carry an extremely large "
+ "amount of stream on its circuits. "
+ "To avoid potential route manipluation attacks, Tor has "
+ "disabled use of this guard. "
+ "Use counts are %ld/%ld. Success counts are %ld/%ld. "
+ "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
+ "and %ld timed out. "
+ "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
+ guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(guard->use_attempts),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts),
+ tor_lround(guard->circ_successes),
+ tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits),
+ tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits),
+ tor_lround(guard->timeouts),
+ tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000));
+ guard->path_bias_disabled = 1;
+ guard->bad_since = approx_time();
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else if (!guard->path_bias_extreme) {
+ guard->path_bias_extreme = 1;
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,
+ "Your Guard %s=%s is failing to carry an extremely large "
+ "amount of streams on its circuits. "
+ "This could indicate a route manipulation attack, network "
+ "overload, bad local network connectivity, or a bug. "
+ "Use counts are %ld/%ld. Success counts are %ld/%ld. "
+ "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
+ "and %ld timed out. "
+ "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
+ guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(guard->use_attempts),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts),
+ tor_lround(guard->circ_successes),
+ tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits),
+ tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits),
+ tor_lround(guard->timeouts),
+ tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000));
+ }
+ } else if (pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)/guard->use_attempts
+ < pathbias_get_notice_use_rate(options)) {
+ if (!guard->path_bias_noticed) {
+ guard->path_bias_noticed = 1;
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC,
+ "Your Guard %s=%s is failing to carry more streams on its "
+ "circuits than usual. "
+ "Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded "
+ "or your network connection is poor. "
+ "Use counts are %ld/%ld. Success counts are %ld/%ld. "
+ "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
+ "and %ld timed out. "
+ "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
+ guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(guard->use_attempts),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts),
+ tor_lround(guard->circ_successes),
+ tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits),
+ tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits),
+ tor_lround(guard->timeouts),
+ tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we get a ton of circuits, just scale everything down */
+ if (guard->use_attempts > pathbias_get_scale_use_threshold(options)) {
+ const int scale_factor = pathbias_get_scale_factor(options);
+ const int mult_factor = pathbias_get_mult_factor(options);
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Scaling pathbias use counts to (%f/%f)*(%d/%d) for guard %s=%s",
+ guard->use_successes, guard->use_attempts,
+ mult_factor, scale_factor, guard->nickname,
+ hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
+
+ guard->use_attempts *= mult_factor;
+ guard->use_successes *= mult_factor;
+
+ guard->use_attempts /= scale_factor;
+ guard->use_successes /= scale_factor;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check the path bias circuit close status rates against our consensus
+ * parameter limits.
+ *
+ * Emits a log message if the use success rates are too low.
+ *
+ * If pathbias_get_dropguards() is set, we also disable the use of
+ * very failure prone guards.
+ *
+ * Returns -1 if we decided to disable the guard, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+pathbias_check_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (guard->circ_attempts > pathbias_get_min_circs(options)) {
/* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0
* rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't
* change to <= */
- if (pathbias_get_success_count(guard)/guard->circ_attempts
+ if (pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)/guard->circ_attempts
< pathbias_get_extreme_rate(options)) {
/* Dropping is currently disabled by default. */
if (pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) {
if (!guard->path_bias_disabled) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
- "Your Guard %s=%s is failing an extremely large amount of "
- "circuits. To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, "
- "Tor has disabled use of this guard. "
- "Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld "
- "were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For "
- "reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
+ "Your Guard %s=%s is failing an extremely large "
+ "amount of circuits. "
+ "To avoid potential route manipluation attacks, Tor has "
+ "disabled use of this guard. "
+ "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. "
+ "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
+ "and %ld timed out. "
+ "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
- tor_lround(pathbias_get_closed_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(guard->use_attempts),
tor_lround(guard->circ_successes),
tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits),
tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits),
@@ -1972,60 +2322,72 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
} else if (!guard->path_bias_extreme) {
guard->path_bias_extreme = 1;
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
- "Your Guard %s=%s is failing an extremely large amount of "
- "circuits. This could indicate a route manipulation attack, "
+ "Your Guard %s=%s is failing an extremely large "
+ "amount of circuits. "
+ "This could indicate a route manipulation attack, "
"extreme network overload, or a bug. "
- "Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld "
- "were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For "
- "reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
+ "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. "
+ "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
+ "and %ld timed out. "
+ "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
- tor_lround(pathbias_get_closed_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(guard->use_attempts),
tor_lround(guard->circ_successes),
tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits),
tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits),
tor_lround(guard->timeouts),
tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000));
}
- } else if (pathbias_get_success_count(guard)/((double)guard->circ_attempts)
- < pathbias_get_warn_rate(options)) {
+ } else if (pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)/guard->circ_attempts
+ < pathbias_get_warn_rate(options)) {
if (!guard->path_bias_warned) {
guard->path_bias_warned = 1;
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
- "Your Guard %s=%s is failing a very large amount of "
- "circuits. Most likely this means the Tor network is "
+ "Your Guard %s=%s is failing a very large "
+ "amount of circuits. "
+ "Most likely this means the Tor network is "
"overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against "
- "you or potentially the guard itself. "
- "Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld "
- "were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For "
- "reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
+ "you or the potentially the guard itself. "
+ "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. "
+ "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
+ "and %ld timed out. "
+ "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
- tor_lround(pathbias_get_closed_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(guard->use_attempts),
tor_lround(guard->circ_successes),
tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits),
tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits),
tor_lround(guard->timeouts),
tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000));
}
- } else if (pathbias_get_success_count(guard)/((double)guard->circ_attempts)
+ } else if (pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)/guard->circ_attempts
< pathbias_get_notice_rate(options)) {
if (!guard->path_bias_noticed) {
guard->path_bias_noticed = 1;
log_notice(LD_CIRC,
- "Your Guard %s=%s is failing more circuits than usual. "
- "Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded. "
- "Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld "
- "were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For "
- "reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
- guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
- tor_lround(pathbias_get_closed_count(guard)),
- tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts),
- tor_lround(guard->circ_successes),
- tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits),
- tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits),
- tor_lround(guard->timeouts),
- tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000));
+ "Your Guard %s=%s is failing more circuits than "
+ "usual. "
+ "Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded. "
+ "Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. "
+ "%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
+ "and %ld timed out. "
+ "For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
+ guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(guard->circ_attempts),
+ tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
+ tor_lround(guard->use_attempts),
+ tor_lround(guard->circ_successes),
+ tor_lround(guard->unusable_circuits),
+ tor_lround(guard->collapsed_circuits),
+ tor_lround(guard->timeouts),
+ tor_lround(circ_times.close_ms/1000));
}
}
}
@@ -2054,7 +2416,24 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
guard->collapsed_circuits /= scale_factor;
guard->unusable_circuits /= scale_factor;
}
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to
+ * 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we should
+ * eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the
+ * guard looks fine. */
+static int
+entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
+{
+ entry_guards_changed();
+
+ if (pathbias_check_close_rate(guard) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
guard->circ_attempts++;
+
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %f/%f for guard %s=%s",
guard->circ_successes, guard->circ_attempts, guard->nickname,
hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
@@ -2078,7 +2457,7 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ,
crypt_path_t *hop;
int rv;
- if ((rv = pathbias_count_circ_attempt(circ)) < 0)
+ if ((rv = pathbias_count_build_attempt(circ)) < 0)
return rv;
if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h
index e6cf802f2..d03a7c532 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h
@@ -58,10 +58,13 @@ const char *build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state);
const node_t *choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose,
cpath_build_state_t *state);
double pathbias_get_extreme_rate(const or_options_t *options);
+double pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(const or_options_t *options);
int pathbias_get_dropguards(const or_options_t *options);
void pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ);
int pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *circ, int reason);
int pathbias_check_probe_response(circuit_t *circ, const cell_t *cell);
+void pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ);
+void pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ);
#endif
diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c
index 83734c9d6..d0b1b4946 100644
--- a/src/or/circuituse.c
+++ b/src/or/circuituse.c
@@ -2037,6 +2037,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn,
if (!circ->base_.timestamp_dirty)
circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ);
+
link_apconn_to_circ(conn, circ, cpath);
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
if (conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
@@ -2163,6 +2165,11 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn)
* feasibility, at this point.
*/
rendcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+
+ /* We've also attempted to use them. If they fail, we need to
+ * probe them for path bias */
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(rendcirc);
+
link_apconn_to_circ(conn, rendcirc, NULL);
if (connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(conn) < 0)
return 0; /* already marked, let them fade away */
@@ -2214,6 +2221,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn)
case 0: /* success */
rendcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
introcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(introcirc);
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(rendcirc);
+
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc));
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc));
return 0;
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index 4349b670b..42f070f93 100644
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -323,7 +323,12 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = {
V(PathBiasScaleFactor, INT, "-1"),
V(PathBiasMultFactor, INT, "-1"),
V(PathBiasDropGuards, AUTOBOOL, "0"),
- V(PathBiasUseCloseCounts, AUTOBOOL, "1"),
+ OBSOLETE("PathBiasUseCloseCounts"),
+
+ V(PathBiasUseThreshold, INT, "-1"),
+ V(PathBiasNoticeUseRate, DOUBLE, "-1"),
+ V(PathBiasExtremeUseRate, DOUBLE, "-1"),
+ V(PathBiasScaleUseThreshold, INT, "-1"),
OBSOLETE("PathlenCoinWeight"),
V(PerConnBWBurst, MEMUNIT, "0"),
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c
index 870ded98c..41795acb6 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include "router.h"
#include "routerlist.h"
#include "routerset.h"
+#include "circuitbuild.h"
#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_TYPES_H
#include <linux/types.h>
@@ -2205,8 +2206,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply,
U64_PRINTF_ARG(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier),
endreason);
} else {
- TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(conn->edge_.on_circuit)->path_state
- = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
+ // XXX: Hrmm. It looks like optimistic data can't go through this
+ // codepath, but someone should probably test it and make sure.
+ // We don't want to mark optimistically opened streams as successful.
+ pathbias_mark_use_success(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(conn->edge_.on_circuit));
}
}
@@ -2480,7 +2483,7 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
connection_exit_connect(n_stream);
/* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully */
- origin_circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
+ pathbias_mark_use_success(origin_circ);
tor_free(address);
return 0;
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c
index 3e5837164..4ca56cbac 100644
--- a/src/or/entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c
@@ -1098,6 +1098,40 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
continue;
}
digestmap_set(added_by, d, tor_strdup(line->value+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1));
+ } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardPathUseBias")) {
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ double use_cnt, success_cnt;
+
+ if (!node) {
+ *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
+ "EntryGuardPathUseBias without EntryGuard");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (tor_sscanf(line->value, "%lf %lf",
+ &use_cnt, &success_cnt) != 2) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Malformed path use bias line for node %s",
+ node->nickname);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ node->use_attempts = use_cnt;
+ node->use_successes = success_cnt;
+
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Read %f/%f path use bias for node %s",
+ node->use_successes, node->use_attempts, node->nickname);
+
+ /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0
+ * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't
+ * change to <= */
+ if (pathbias_get_use_success_count(node)/node->use_attempts
+ < pathbias_get_extreme_use_rate(options) &&
+ pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) {
+ node->path_bias_disabled = 1;
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Path use bias is too high (%f/%f); disabling node %s",
+ node->circ_successes, node->circ_attempts, node->nickname);
+ }
} else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardPathBias")) {
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
double hop_cnt, success_cnt, timeouts, collapsed, successful_closed,
@@ -1144,7 +1178,7 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
/* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0
* rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't
* change to <= */
- if (pathbias_get_success_count(node)/node->circ_attempts
+ if (pathbias_get_close_success_count(node)/node->circ_attempts
< pathbias_get_extreme_rate(options) &&
pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) {
node->path_bias_disabled = 1;
@@ -1282,10 +1316,20 @@ entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state)
* unusable_circuits */
tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%f %f %f %f %f %f",
e->circ_attempts, e->circ_successes,
- pathbias_get_closed_count(e), e->collapsed_circuits,
+ pathbias_get_close_success_count(e),
+ e->collapsed_circuits,
e->unusable_circuits, e->timeouts);
next = &(line->next);
}
+ if (e->use_attempts > 0) {
+ *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
+ line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardPathUseBias");
+
+ tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%f %f",
+ e->use_attempts,
+ pathbias_get_use_success_count(e));
+ next = &(line->next);
+ }
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
if (!get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites)
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h
index 1e52ba28e..e6c973c95 100644
--- a/src/or/entrynodes.h
+++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ typedef struct entry_guard_t {
* attempted, but none succeeded. */
double timeouts; /**< Number of 'right-censored' circuit timeouts for this
* guard. */
+ double use_attempts; /**< Number of circuits we tried to use with streams */
+ double use_successes; /**< Number of successfully used circuits using
+ * this guard as first hop. */
} entry_guard_t;
entry_guard_t *entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest);
@@ -113,8 +116,8 @@ int find_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
int validate_pluggable_transports_config(void);
-double pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *gaurd);
-double pathbias_get_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
+double pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
+double pathbias_get_use_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
#endif
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index a6f3d3e88..409a60387 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -2838,6 +2838,15 @@ typedef enum {
PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED = 1,
/** This circuit has been completely built */
PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED = 2,
+ /** Did we try to attach any SOCKS streams or hidserv introductions to
+ * this circuit?
+ *
+ * Note: If we ever implement end-to-end stream timing through test
+ * stream probes (#5707), we must *not* set this for those probes
+ * (or any other automatic streams) because the adversary could
+ * just tag at a later point.
+ */
+ PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED = 3,
/** Did any SOCKS streams or hidserv introductions actually succeed on
* this circuit?
*
@@ -2846,13 +2855,20 @@ typedef enum {
* (or any other automatic streams) because the adversary could
* just tag at a later point.
*/
- PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED = 3,
+ PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED = 4,
/**
* This is a special state to indicate that we got a corrupted
* relay cell on a circuit and we don't intend to probe it.
*/
- PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED = 4,
+ PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED = 5,
+
+ /**
+ * This is a special state to indicate that we already counted
+ * the circuit. Used to guard against potential state machine
+ * violations.
+ */
+ PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED = 6,
} path_state_t;
/** An origin_circuit_t holds data necessary to build and use a circuit.
@@ -2997,7 +3013,6 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t {
* ISO_STREAM. */
uint64_t associated_isolated_stream_global_id;
/**@}*/
-
} origin_circuit_t;
/** An or_circuit_t holds information needed to implement a circuit at an
@@ -3909,7 +3924,16 @@ typedef struct {
int PathBiasScaleThreshold;
int PathBiasScaleFactor;
int PathBiasMultFactor;
- int PathBiasUseCloseCounts;
+ /** @} */
+
+ /**
+ * Parameters for path-bias use detection
+ * @{
+ */
+ int PathBiasUseThreshold;
+ double PathBiasNoticeUseRate;
+ double PathBiasExtremeUseRate;
+ int PathBiasScaleUseThreshold;
/** @} */
int IPv6Exit; /**< Do we support exiting to IPv6 addresses? */
diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c
index bb3a83544..f711eae92 100644
--- a/src/or/relay.c
+++ b/src/or/relay.c
@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open(
* We rely on recognized+digest being strong enough to make
* tags unlikely to allow us to get tagged, yet 'recognized'
* reason codes here. */
- circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
+ pathbias_mark_use_success(circ);
}
}
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 32623c3f4..61e3b917e 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ)
* and the rend cookie also means we've used the circ. */
circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+ /* We've attempted to use this circuit. Probe it if we fail */
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ);
+
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS,
circ->rend_data->rend_cookie,
@@ -316,6 +319,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
* state. */
introcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(introcirc);
+
goto cleanup;
perm_err:
@@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
/* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully. Valid
* nacks and acks count. */
- circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
+ pathbias_mark_use_success(circ);
if (request_len == 0) {
/* It's an ACK; the introduction point relayed our introduction request. */
@@ -902,7 +907,7 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
* Waiting any longer opens us up to attacks from Bob. He could induce
* Alice to attempt to connect to his hidden service and never reply
* to her rend requests */
- circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
+ pathbias_mark_use_success(circ);
/* XXXX This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to
* attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index 6ffa4f8f9..3b2eeb4ad 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -1384,9 +1384,6 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
goto err;
memcpy(cpath->rend_circ_nonce, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
- /* For path bias: This intro circuit was used successfully */
- circuit->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
-
goto done;
log_error:
@@ -2511,6 +2508,9 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
goto err;
}
+ /* We've attempted to use this circuit */
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(circuit);
+
goto done;
err:
@@ -2558,6 +2558,10 @@ rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
"Received INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on circuit %d for service %s",
circuit->base_.n_circ_id, serviceid);
+ /* Getting a valid INTRODUCE_ESTABLISHED means we've successfully
+ * used the circ */
+ pathbias_mark_use_success(circuit);
+
return 0;
err:
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
@@ -2589,6 +2593,9 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
if (!circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty)
circuit->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+ /* This may be redundant */
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(circuit);
+
hop = circuit->build_state->service_pending_final_cpath_ref->cpath;
base16_encode(hexcookie,9,circuit->rend_data->rend_cookie,4);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.4) at 2024-06-24 17:32:31 +0000