diff options
author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2013-07-31 12:31:26 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2013-08-15 12:03:36 -0400 |
commit | b64351ed17f3d30425e1e007de50ef66c2b6c789 (patch) | |
tree | 5e93d9e123908ba0badf8a7182e3339ffdbd0b93 /src | |
parent | e1d1d7a8dabf37043cdabc11432116cf08792f22 (diff) | |
download | tor-b64351ed17f3d30425e1e007de50ef66c2b6c789.tar tor-b64351ed17f3d30425e1e007de50ef66c2b6c789.tar.gz |
Split the cryptographic part of handle_client_auth_nonce into new fn
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/ext_orport.c | 91 |
1 files changed, 60 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/ext_orport.c b/src/or/ext_orport.c index 9b4db73c3..f4df1b748 100644 --- a/src/or/ext_orport.c +++ b/src/or/ext_orport.c @@ -197,40 +197,19 @@ connection_ext_or_auth_neg_auth_type(connection_t *conn) return 1; } -/** Read the client's nonce out of <b>conn</b>, setup the safe-cookie - * crypto, and then send our own hash and nonce to the client - * - * Return -1 if there was an error; return 0 if we need more data in - * <b>conn</b>, and return 1 if we successfully retrieved the - * client's nonce and sent our own. */ +/** DOCDOC */ static int -connection_ext_or_auth_handle_client_nonce(connection_t *conn) +handle_client_auth_nonce(const char *client_nonce, size_t client_nonce_len, + char **client_hash_out, + char**reply_out, size_t *reply_len_out) { char server_hash[EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN] = {0}; - char client_nonce[EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN] = {0}; char server_nonce[EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN] = {0}; - char reply[EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_COOKIE_LEN+EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN] = {0}; + char *reply; + size_t reply_len; - if (!ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set) { /* this should not happen */ - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Extended ORPort authentication cookie was not set. " - "That's weird since we should have done that on startup. " - "This might be a Tor bug, please file a bug report. "); + if (client_nonce_len != EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) return -1; - } - - if (connection_get_inbuf_len(conn) < EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) - return 0; - - if (connection_fetch_from_buf(client_nonce, - EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN, conn) < 0) - return -1; - - /* We extract the ClientNonce from the received data, and use it to - calculate ServerHash and ServerNonce according to proposal 217. - - We also calculate our own ClientHash value and save it in the - connection state. We validate it later against the ClientHash - sent by the client. */ /* Get our nonce */ if (crypto_rand(server_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) < 0) @@ -278,7 +257,7 @@ connection_ext_or_auth_handle_client_nonce(connection_t *conn) /* Store the client hash we generated. We will need to compare it with the hash sent by the client. */ - TO_OR_CONN(conn)->ext_or_auth_correct_client_hash = correct_client_hash; + *client_hash_out = correct_client_hash; memwipe(hmac_s_msg, 0, hmac_s_msg_len); memwipe(hmac_c_msg, 0, hmac_c_msg_len); @@ -309,13 +288,63 @@ connection_ext_or_auth_handle_client_nonce(connection_t *conn) } { /* write reply: (server_hash, server_nonce) */ + + reply_len = EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_COOKIE_LEN+EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN; + reply = tor_malloc_zero(reply_len); memcpy(reply, server_hash, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN); memcpy(reply + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_HASH_LEN, server_nonce, EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN); - connection_write_to_buf(reply, sizeof(reply), conn); - memwipe(reply, 0, sizeof(reply)); } + *reply_out = reply; + *reply_len_out = reply_len; + + return 0; +} + +/** Read the client's nonce out of <b>conn</b>, setup the safe-cookie + * crypto, and then send our own hash and nonce to the client + * + * Return -1 if there was an error; return 0 if we need more data in + * <b>conn</b>, and return 1 if we successfully retrieved the + * client's nonce and sent our own. */ +static int +connection_ext_or_auth_handle_client_nonce(connection_t *conn) +{ + char client_nonce[EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN]; + char *reply=NULL; + size_t reply_len=0; + + if (!ext_or_auth_cookie_is_set) { /* this should not happen */ + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Extended ORPort authentication cookie was not set. " + "That's weird since we should have done that on startup. " + "This might be a Tor bug, please file a bug report. "); + return -1; + } + + if (connection_get_inbuf_len(conn) < EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) + return 0; + + if (connection_fetch_from_buf(client_nonce, + EXT_OR_PORT_AUTH_NONCE_LEN, conn) < 0) + return -1; + + /* We extract the ClientNonce from the received data, and use it to + calculate ServerHash and ServerNonce according to proposal 217. + + We also calculate our own ClientHash value and save it in the + connection state. We validate it later against the ClientHash + sent by the client. */ + if (handle_client_auth_nonce(client_nonce, sizeof(client_nonce), + &TO_OR_CONN(conn)->ext_or_auth_correct_client_hash, + &reply, &reply_len) < 0) + return -1; + + connection_write_to_buf(reply, reply_len, conn); + + memwipe(reply, 0, reply_len); + tor_free(reply); + log_debug(LD_GENERAL, "Got client nonce, and sent our own nonce and hash."); conn->state = EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_HASH; |