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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2011-04-27 14:36:30 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2011-04-27 14:36:30 -0400
commit8b686d98c47226dfc4d7c87d6a472b592135ae07 (patch)
tree06df10f204230dc1be42abec946430b8d20f084f /src/or
parent3256627a4548c4977b834cc724689e0e9a960f06 (diff)
parent99621bc5a629a81a5a823ce21ac3d967443d0e12 (diff)
downloadtor-8b686d98c47226dfc4d7c87d6a472b592135ae07.tar
tor-8b686d98c47226dfc4d7c87d6a472b592135ae07.tar.gz
Merge maint-0.2.2 for the bug1090-part1-squashed branch
Resolved conflicts in: doc/tor.1.txt src/or/circuitbuild.c src/or/circuituse.c src/or/connection_edge.c src/or/connection_edge.h src/or/directory.c src/or/rendclient.c src/or/routerlist.c src/or/routerlist.h These were mostly releated to the routerinfo_t->node_t conversion.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or')
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitbuild.c187
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitlist.c70
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuitlist.h1
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuituse.c76
-rw-r--r--src/or/circuituse.h2
-rw-r--r--src/or/config.c24
-rw-r--r--src/or/connection_edge.c117
-rw-r--r--src/or/connection_edge.h4
-rw-r--r--src/or/directory.c31
-rw-r--r--src/or/or.h11
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendclient.c85
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendclient.h1
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendcommon.c2
-rw-r--r--src/or/rendservice.c40
-rw-r--r--src/or/router.c20
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerlist.c73
-rw-r--r--src/or/routerlist.h8
17 files changed, 569 insertions, 183 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index ff656fdad..cc78d9993 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -2046,8 +2046,9 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ)
*/
if (timediff < 0 || timediff > 2*circ_times.close_ms+1000) {
log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Strange value for circuit build time: %ldmsec. "
- "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d", timediff,
- circ->_base.purpose);
+ "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", timediff,
+ circ->_base.purpose,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->_base.purpose));
} else if (!circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
/* Only count circuit times if the network is live */
if (circuit_build_times_network_check_live(&circ_times)) {
@@ -2673,16 +2674,23 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
n_supported[i] = -1;
continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down or bad exits */
}
- if (node_is_unreliable(node, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0) &&
- (!options->ExitNodes ||
- !routerset_contains_node(options->ExitNodes, node))) {
- /* FFFF Someday, differentiate between a routerset that names
- * routers, and a routerset that names countries, and only do this
- * check if they've asked for specific exit relays. Or if the country
- * they ask for is rare. Or something. */
+ if (options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion &&
+ routerset_contains_node(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, node)) {
n_supported[i] = -1;
- continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable, unless we have
- * ExitNodes set, in which case we asked for it */
+ continue; /* user asked us not to use it, no matter what */
+ }
+ if (options->ExitNodes &&
+ !routerset_contains_node(options->ExitNodes, node)) {
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
+ continue; /* not one of our chosen exit nodes */
+ }
+
+ if (node_is_unreliable(node, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) {
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
+ continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable. Don't worry if
+ * this makes us reject all the possible routers: if so,
+ * we'll retry later in this function with need_update and
+ * need_capacity set to 0. */
}
if (!(node->is_valid || options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_EXIT)) {
/* if it's invalid and we don't want it */
@@ -2707,7 +2715,7 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(connections, connection_t *, conn) {
if (!ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(conn))
continue; /* Skip everything but APs in CIRCUIT_WAIT */
- if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), node, 1)) {
+ if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), node)) {
++n_supported[i];
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is supported. n_supported[%d] now %d.",
// router->nickname, i, n_supported[i]);
@@ -2741,22 +2749,14 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
/* If any routers definitely support any pending connections, choose one
* at random. */
if (best_support > 0) {
- smartlist_t *supporting = smartlist_create(), *use = smartlist_create();
+ smartlist_t *supporting = smartlist_create();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(the_nodes, const node_t *, node, {
if (n_supported[node_sl_idx] == best_support)
smartlist_add(supporting, (void*)node);
});
- routersets_get_node_disjunction(use, supporting, options->ExitNodes,
- options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1);
- if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && options->ExitNodes &&
- !options->StrictNodes) { /* give up on exitnodes and try again */
- routersets_get_node_disjunction(use, supporting, NULL,
- options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1);
- }
- node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(use, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
- smartlist_free(use);
+ node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
smartlist_free(supporting);
} else {
/* Either there are no pending connections, or no routers even seem to
@@ -2764,7 +2764,7 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
* at least one predicted exit port. */
int attempt;
- smartlist_t *needed_ports, *supporting, *use;
+ smartlist_t *needed_ports, *supporting;
if (best_support == -1) {
if (need_uptime || need_capacity) {
@@ -2781,7 +2781,6 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion ? " or are Excluded" : "");
}
supporting = smartlist_create();
- use = smartlist_create();
needed_ports = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time(NULL));
for (attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
/* try once to pick only from routers that satisfy a needed port,
@@ -2797,25 +2796,13 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
- routersets_get_node_disjunction(use, supporting, options->ExitNodes,
- options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1);
- if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && options->ExitNodes &&
- !options->StrictNodes) { /* give up on exitnodes and try again */
- routersets_get_node_disjunction(use, supporting, NULL,
- options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1);
- }
- /* FFF sometimes the above results in null, when the requested
- * exit node is considered down by the consensus. we should pick
- * it anyway, since the user asked for it. */
- node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(use, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
+ node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
if (node)
break;
smartlist_clear(supporting);
- smartlist_clear(use);
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(needed_ports, uint16_t *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(needed_ports);
- smartlist_free(use);
smartlist_free(supporting);
}
@@ -2824,10 +2811,11 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose exit server '%s'", node_get_nickname(node));
return node;
}
- if (options->ExitNodes && options->StrictNodes) {
+ if (options->ExitNodes) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
- "No specified exit routers seem to be running, and "
- "StrictNodes is set: can't choose an exit.");
+ "No specified %sexit routers seem to be running: "
+ "can't choose an exit.",
+ options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion ? "non-excluded " : "");
}
return NULL;
}
@@ -2879,7 +2867,6 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit)
or_options_t *options = get_options();
routerset_t *rs = options->ExcludeNodes;
const char *description;
- int domain = LD_CIRC;
uint8_t purpose = circ->_base.purpose;
if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel)
@@ -2892,13 +2879,14 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit)
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT:
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING:
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED:
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-origin circuit (purpose %d)",
- (int)purpose);
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-origin circuit (purpose %d, %s)",
+ (int)purpose,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
return;
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
if (circ->build_state->is_internal)
return;
- description = "Requested exit node";
+ description = "requested exit node";
rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion;
break;
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
@@ -2913,22 +2901,34 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit)
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY:
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED:
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED:
- description = "Chosen rendezvous point";
- domain = LD_BUG;
+ description = "chosen rendezvous point";
break;
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER:
rs = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion;
- description = "Controller-selected circuit target";
+ description = "controller-selected circuit target";
break;
}
if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(rs, exit)) {
- log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain, "%s '%s' is in ExcludeNodes%s. Using anyway "
- "(circuit purpose %d).",
- description,exit->nickname,
- rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes",
- (int)purpose);
- circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ);
+ /* We should never get here if StrictNodes is set to 1. */
+ if (options->StrictNodes) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in ExcludeNodes%s, "
+ "even though StrictNodes is set. Please report. "
+ "(Circuit purpose: %s)",
+ description, exit->nickname,
+ rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes",
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in "
+ "ExcludeNodes%s, because no better options were available. To "
+ "prevent this (and possibly break your Tor functionality), "
+ "set the StrictNodes configuration option. "
+ "(Circuit purpose: %s)",
+ description, exit->nickname,
+ rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes",
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
+ }
+ circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, LD_CIRC, circ);
}
return;
@@ -3990,12 +3990,14 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options)
/* Split entry guards into those on the list and those not. */
- /* Now that we allow countries and IP ranges in EntryNodes, this is
- * potentially an enormous list. It's not so bad though because we
- * only call this function when a) we're making a new circuit, and b)
- * we've called directory_info_has_arrived() or changed our EntryNodes
- * since the last time we made a circuit. */
- routerset_get_all_nodes(entry_nodes, options->EntryNodes, 0);
+ /* XXXX023 Now that we allow countries and IP ranges in EntryNodes, this is
+ * potentially an enormous list. For now, we disable such values for
+ * EntryNodes in options_validate(); really, this wants a better solution.
+ * Perhaps we should do this calculation once whenever the list of routers
+ * changes or the entrynodes setting changes.
+ */
+ routerset_get_all_nodes(entry_nodes, options->EntryNodes,
+ options->ExcludeNodes, 0);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *,node,
smartlist_add(entry_fps, (void*)node->identity));
@@ -4021,14 +4023,10 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options)
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node, {
add_an_entry_guard(node, 0);
});
- /* Finally, the remaining previously configured guards that are not in
- * EntryNodes, unless we're strict in which case we drop them */
- if (options->StrictNodes) {
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e,
- entry_guard_free(e));
- } else {
- smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_not_on_list);
- }
+ /* Finally, free the remaining previously configured guards that are not in
+ * EntryNodes. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e,
+ entry_guard_free(e));
smartlist_free(entry_nodes);
smartlist_free(entry_fps);
@@ -4039,7 +4037,7 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options)
/** Return 0 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the
* directory to our entry guard list, or return 1 if we have a
- * list already and we'd prefer to stick to it.
+ * list already and we must stick to it.
*/
int
entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options)
@@ -4051,18 +4049,6 @@ entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options)
return 0;
}
-/* Are we dead set against changing our entry guard list, or would we
- * change it if it means keeping Tor usable? */
-static int
-entry_list_is_totally_static(or_options_t *options)
-{
- if (options->EntryNodes && options->StrictNodes)
- return 1;
- if (options->UseBridges)
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
/** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards. If
* <b>state</b> is non-NULL, this is for a specific circuit --
* make sure not to pick this circuit's exit or any node in the
@@ -4107,6 +4093,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
continue; /* don't pick the same node for entry and exit */
if (consider_exit_family && smartlist_isin(exit_family, node))
continue; /* avoid relays that are family members of our exit */
+#if 0 /* since EntryNodes is always strict now, this clause is moot */
if (options->EntryNodes &&
!routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes, node)) {
/* We've come to the end of our preferred entry nodes. */
@@ -4121,6 +4108,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
"No relays from EntryNodes available. Using others.");
}
}
+#endif
smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, (void*)node);
if (!entry->made_contact) {
/* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry
@@ -4146,7 +4134,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
}
if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < preferred_min) {
- if (!entry_list_is_totally_static(options)) {
+ if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
/* still no? try adding a new entry then */
/* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need
* to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might
@@ -4171,6 +4159,10 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
need_capacity = 0;
goto retry;
}
+#if 0
+ /* Removing this retry logic: if we only allow one exit, and it is in the
+ same family as all our entries, then we are just plain not going to win
+ here. */
if (!node && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) {
/* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes
* set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our
@@ -4178,6 +4170,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
consider_exit_family = 0;
goto retry;
}
+#endif
/* live_entry_guards may be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */
}
@@ -4578,6 +4571,24 @@ bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, char *digest)
smartlist_add(bridge_list, b);
}
+/** Return true iff <b>routerset</b> contains the bridge <b>bridge</b>. */
+static int
+routerset_contains_bridge(const routerset_t *routerset,
+ const bridge_info_t *bridge)
+{
+ int result;
+ extend_info_t *extinfo;
+ tor_assert(bridge);
+ if (!routerset)
+ return 0;
+
+ extinfo = extend_info_alloc(
+ NULL, bridge->identity, NULL, &bridge->addr, bridge->port);
+ result = routerset_contains_extendinfo(routerset, extinfo);
+ extend_info_free(extinfo);
+ return result;
+}
+
/** If <b>digest</b> is one of our known bridges, return it. */
static bridge_info_t *
find_bridge_by_digest(const char *digest)
@@ -4596,6 +4607,7 @@ static void
launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge)
{
char *address;
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose(
CONN_TYPE_DIR, &bridge->addr, bridge->port,
@@ -4603,6 +4615,13 @@ launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge)
return; /* it's already on the way */
address = tor_dup_addr(&bridge->addr);
+ if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) {
+ download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status);
+ log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.",
+ safe_str_client(fmt_addr(&bridge->addr)));
+ return;
+ }
+
directory_initiate_command(address, &bridge->addr,
bridge->port, 0,
0, /* does not matter */
@@ -4643,6 +4662,12 @@ fetch_bridge_descriptors(or_options_t *options, time_t now)
if (!download_status_is_ready(&bridge->fetch_status, now,
IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD))
continue; /* don't bother, no need to retry yet */
+ if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) {
+ download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status);
+ log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.",
+ safe_str_client(fmt_addr(&bridge->addr)));
+ continue;
+ }
/* schedule another fetch as if this one will fail, in case it does */
download_status_failed(&bridge->fetch_status, 0);
diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c
index 8949e9773..0aadcbfa0 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitlist.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c
@@ -376,6 +376,62 @@ circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose)
}
}
+/** Return a human-readable string for the circuit purpose <b>purpose</b>. */
+const char *
+circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose)
+{
+ static char buf[32];
+
+ switch (purpose)
+ {
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR:
+ return "Circuit at relay";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT:
+ return "Acting as intro point";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING:
+ return "Acting as rendevous (pending)";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED:
+ return "Acting as rendevous (established)";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
+ return "General-purpose client";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
+ return "Hidden service client: Connecting to intro point";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
+ return "Hidden service client: Waiting for ack from intro point";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED:
+ return "Hidden service client: Received ack from intro point";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
+ return "Hidden service client: Establishing rendezvous point";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY:
+ return "Hidden service client: Pending rendezvous point";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED:
+ return "Hidden service client: Pending rendezvous point (ack received)";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED:
+ return "Hidden service client: Active rendezvous point";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT:
+ return "Measuring circuit timeout";
+
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
+ return "Hidden service: Establishing introduction point";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO:
+ return "Hidden service: Introduction point";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
+ return "Hidden service: Connecting to rendezvous point";
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED:
+ return "Hidden service: Active rendezvous point";
+
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
+ return "Testing circuit";
+
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER:
+ return "Circuit made by controller";
+
+ default:
+ tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "UNKNOWN_%d", (int)purpose);
+ return buf;
+ }
+}
+
/** Pick a reasonable package_window to start out for our circuits.
* Originally this was hard-coded at 1000, but now the consensus votes
* on the answer. See proposal 168. */
@@ -921,6 +977,7 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info,
int need_uptime = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME) != 0;
int need_capacity = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY) != 0;
int internal = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) != 0;
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
/* Make sure we're not trying to create a onehop circ by
* cannibalization. */
@@ -959,6 +1016,19 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info,
hop=hop->next;
} while (hop!=circ->cpath);
}
+ if (options->ExcludeNodes) {
+ /* Make sure no existing nodes in the circuit are excluded for
+ * general use. (This may be possible if StrictNodes is 0, and we
+ * thought we needed to use an otherwise excluded node for, say, a
+ * directory operation.) */
+ crypt_path_t *hop = circ->cpath;
+ do {
+ if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes,
+ hop->extend_info))
+ goto next;
+ hop = hop->next;
+ } while (hop != circ->cpath);
+ }
if (!best || (best->build_state->need_uptime && !need_uptime))
best = circ;
next: ;
diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.h b/src/or/circuitlist.h
index ef6fc3a3d..7b01ca3ae 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitlist.h
+++ b/src/or/circuitlist.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
circuit_t * _circuit_get_global_list(void);
const char *circuit_state_to_string(int state);
const char *circuit_purpose_to_controller_string(uint8_t purpose);
+const char *circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose);
void circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity);
void circuit_set_p_circid_orconn(or_circuit_t *circ, circid_t id,
or_connection_t *conn);
diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c
index e58d5e05b..30fd81839 100644
--- a/src/or/circuituse.c
+++ b/src/or/circuituse.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ circuit_is_acceptable(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn,
return 0;
}
}
- if (exitnode && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitnode, 0)) {
+ if (exitnode && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitnode)) {
/* can't exit from this router */
return 0;
}
@@ -167,6 +167,10 @@ circuit_is_better(circuit_t *a, circuit_t *b, uint8_t purpose)
return 1;
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(b) &&
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(b)->build_state->is_internal)
+ /* XXX023 what the heck is this internal thing doing here. I
+ * think we can get rid of it. circuit_is_acceptable() already
+ * makes sure that is_internal is exactly what we need it to
+ * be. -RD */
return 1;
}
break;
@@ -243,33 +247,34 @@ circuit_get_best(edge_connection_t *conn, int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose,
return best ? TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(best) : NULL;
}
+#if 0
/** Check whether, according to the policies in <b>options</b>, the
* circuit <b>circ</b> makes sense. */
-/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes. It should check more. */
+/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes; it should check more.
+ * Also, it doesn't have the right definition of an exit circuit. Also,
+ * it's never called. */
int
circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
const or_options_t *options)
{
const crypt_path_t *cpath, *cpath_next = NULL;
- for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath && cpath_next != circ->cpath;
- cpath = cpath_next) {
+ /* first check if it includes any excluded nodes */
+ for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath_next != circ->cpath; cpath = cpath_next) {
cpath_next = cpath->next;
-
if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes,
cpath->extend_info))
return 0;
+ }
- if (cpath->next == circ->cpath) {
- /* This is apparently the exit node. */
+ /* then consider the final hop */
+ if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes,
+ circ->cpath->prev->extend_info))
+ return 0;
- if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes,
- cpath->extend_info))
- return 0;
- }
- }
return 1;
}
+#endif
/** Close all circuits that start at us, aren't open, and were born
* at least CircuitBuildTimeout seconds ago.
@@ -392,10 +397,11 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->p_streams != NULL) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit %d (purpose %d) has timed out, "
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit %d (purpose %d, %s) has timed out, "
"yet has attached streams!",
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier,
- victim->purpose);
+ victim->purpose,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose));
tor_fragile_assert();
continue;
}
@@ -426,9 +432,10 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_created, &extremely_old_cutoff, <)) {
log_notice(LD_CIRC,
"Extremely large value for circuit build timeout: %lds. "
- "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d",
+ "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)",
(long)(now.tv_sec - victim->timestamp_created.tv_sec),
- victim->purpose);
+ victim->purpose,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose));
} else if (circuit_build_times_count_close(&circ_times,
first_hop_succeeded,
victim->timestamp_created.tv_sec)) {
@@ -509,7 +516,7 @@ circuit_stream_is_being_handled(edge_connection_t *conn,
if (exitnode && (!need_uptime || build_state->need_uptime)) {
int ok;
if (conn) {
- ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitnode, 0);
+ ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitnode);
} else {
addr_policy_result_t r;
r = compare_addr_to_node_policy(0, port, exitnode);
@@ -794,12 +801,11 @@ circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void)
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
log_notice(LD_CIRC,
"Ancient non-dirty circuit %d is still around after "
- "%ld milliseconds. Purpose: %d",
+ "%ld milliseconds. Purpose: %d (%s)",
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier,
tv_mdiff(&circ->timestamp_created, &now),
- circ->purpose);
- /* FFFF implement a new circuit_purpose_to_string() so we don't
- * just print out a number for circ->purpose */
+ circ->purpose,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose));
TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->is_ancient = 1;
}
}
@@ -1128,8 +1134,9 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
* internal circs rather than exit circs? -RD */
circ = circuit_find_to_cannibalize(purpose, extend_info, flags);
if (circ) {
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d",
- build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose);
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d (%s)",
+ build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
circ->_base.purpose = purpose;
/* reset the birth date of this circ, else expire_building
* will see it and think it's been trying to build since it
@@ -1281,9 +1288,10 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn,
* refactor into a single function? */
const node_t *node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
- if (node && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, node, 0)) {
+ if (node && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, node)) {
log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
- "Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. %s.",
+ "Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or "
+ "would refuse request. %s.",
conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
if (opt) {
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
@@ -1394,7 +1402,18 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn,
extend_info_free(extend_info);
- if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
+ if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
+ /* We just caused a circuit to get built because of this stream.
+ * If this stream has caused a _lot_ of circuits to be built, that's
+ * a bad sign: we should tell the user. */
+ if (conn->num_circuits_launched < NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD &&
+ ++conn->num_circuits_launched == NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD)
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "The application request to %s:%d has launched "
+ "%d circuits without finding one it likes.",
+ escaped_safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address),
+ conn->socks_request->port,
+ conn->num_circuits_launched);
+ } else {
/* help predict this next time */
rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1);
if (circ) {
@@ -1601,9 +1620,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(edge_connection_t *conn)
}
return -1;
}
- if (node && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, node, 0)) {
+ if (node && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, node)) {
log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
- "Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. %s.",
+ "Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or "
+ "would refuse request. %s.",
conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
if (opt) {
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.h b/src/or/circuituse.h
index c81d6da23..1fdb19187 100644
--- a/src/or/circuituse.h
+++ b/src/or/circuituse.h
@@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ void circuit_expire_building(void);
void circuit_remove_handled_ports(smartlist_t *needed_ports);
int circuit_stream_is_being_handled(edge_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port,
int min);
+#if 0
int circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
const or_options_t *options);
+#endif
void circuit_build_needed_circs(time_t now);
void circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn);
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index e4c069389..4a72cddf5 100644
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -1289,21 +1289,18 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options)
/* Check for transitions that need action. */
if (old_options) {
if ((options->UseEntryGuards && !old_options->UseEntryGuards) ||
- (options->ExcludeNodes &&
- !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes)) ||
- (options->ExcludeExitNodes &&
- !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeExitNodes,
- options->ExcludeExitNodes)) ||
- (options->EntryNodes &&
- !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes, options->EntryNodes)) ||
- (options->ExitNodes &&
- !routerset_equal(old_options->ExitNodes, options->ExitNodes)) ||
+ !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes) ||
+ !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeExitNodes,
+ options->ExcludeExitNodes) ||
+ !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes, options->EntryNodes) ||
+ !routerset_equal(old_options->ExitNodes, options->ExitNodes) ||
options->StrictNodes != old_options->StrictNodes) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Changed to using entry guards, or changed preferred or "
"excluded node lists. Abandoning previous circuits.");
circuit_mark_all_unused_circs();
circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs();
+ addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(options);
}
/* How long should we delay counting bridge stats after becoming a bridge?
@@ -1454,7 +1451,8 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options)
/* Check if we need to parse and add the EntryNodes config option. */
if (options->EntryNodes &&
(!old_options ||
- (!routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes))))
+ !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes) ||
+ !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes)))
entry_nodes_should_be_added();
/* Since our options changed, we might need to regenerate and upload our
@@ -3253,6 +3251,12 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
REJECT("Servers must be able to freely connect to the rest "
"of the Internet, so they must not set UseBridges.");
+ /* If both of these are set, we'll end up with funny behavior where we
+ * demand enough entrynodes be up and running else we won't build
+ * circuits, yet we never actually use them. */
+ if (options->UseBridges && options->EntryNodes)
+ REJECT("You cannot set both UseBridges and EntryNodes.");
+
options->_AllowInvalid = 0;
if (options->AllowInvalidNodes) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options->AllowInvalidNodes, const char *, cp, {
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c
index 508b06b26..29ab6c5b1 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -799,6 +799,7 @@ clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname)
tor_strlower(suffix);
STRMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(addressmap, address, addressmap_entry_t *, ent) {
+ /* XXXX022 HEY! Shouldn't this look at ent->new_address? */
if (ent->source == ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT && !strcmpend(address, suffix)) {
addressmap_ent_remove(address, ent);
MAP_DEL_CURRENT(address);
@@ -808,6 +809,56 @@ clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname)
tor_free(suffix);
}
+/** Remove all TRACKEXIT mappings from the addressmap for which the target
+ * host is unknown or no longer allowed. */
+void
+addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(or_options_t *options)
+{
+ const routerset_t *allow_nodes = options->ExitNodes;
+ const routerset_t *exclude_nodes = options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion;
+
+ if (!addressmap)
+ return;
+ if (routerset_is_empty(allow_nodes))
+ allow_nodes = NULL;
+ if (allow_nodes == NULL && routerset_is_empty(exclude_nodes))
+ return;
+
+ STRMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(addressmap, address, addressmap_entry_t *, ent) {
+ size_t len;
+ const char *target = ent->new_address, *dot;
+ char *nodename;
+ const node_t *node;
+
+ if (strcmpend(target, ".exit")) {
+ /* Not a .exit mapping */
+ continue;
+ } else if (ent->source != ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT) {
+ /* Not a trackexit mapping. */
+ continue;
+ }
+ len = strlen(target);
+ if (len < 6)
+ continue; /* malformed. */
+ dot = target + len - 6; /* dot now points to just before .exit */
+ dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit or NULL */
+ if (!dot) {
+ nodename = tor_strndup(target, len-5);
+ } else {
+ nodename = tor_strndup(dot+1, strlen(dot+1)-5);
+ }
+ node = node_get_by_nickname(nodename, 0);
+ tor_free(nodename);
+ if (!node ||
+ (allow_nodes && !routerset_contains_node(allow_nodes, node)) ||
+ routerset_contains_node(exclude_nodes, node)) {
+ /* We don't know this one, or we want to be rid of it. */
+ addressmap_ent_remove(address, ent);
+ MAP_DEL_CURRENT(address);
+ }
+ } STRMAP_FOREACH_END;
+}
+
/** Remove all entries from the addressmap that were set via the
* configuration file or the command line. */
void
@@ -1494,9 +1545,13 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn,
hostname_type_t addresstype;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
struct in_addr addr_tmp;
+ /* We set this to true if this is an address we should automatically
+ * remap to a local address in VirtualAddrNetwork */
int automap = 0;
char orig_address[MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN];
time_t map_expires = TIME_MAX;
+ /* This will be set to true iff the address starts out as a non-.exit
+ address, and we remap it to one because of an entry in the addressmap. */
int remapped_to_exit = 0;
time_t now = time(NULL);
@@ -1607,14 +1662,23 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn,
/* foo.exit -- modify conn->chosen_exit_node to specify the exit
* node, and conn->address to hold only the address portion. */
char *s = strrchr(socks->address,'.');
+
+ /* If StrictNodes is not set, then .exit overrides ExcludeNodes. */
+ routerset_t *excludeset = options->StrictNodes ?
+ options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion : options->ExcludeExitNodes;
+ const node_t *node;
+
tor_assert(!automap);
if (s) {
+ /* The address was of the form "(stuff).(name).exit */
if (s[1] != '\0') {
conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(s+1);
+ node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
if (remapped_to_exit) /* 5 tries before it expires the addressmap */
conn->chosen_exit_retries = TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES;
*s = 0;
} else {
+ /* Oops, the address was (stuff)..exit. That's not okay. */
log_warn(LD_APP,"Malformed exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
safe_str_client(socks->address));
control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s",
@@ -1623,20 +1687,34 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn,
return -1;
}
} else {
- const node_t *r;
+ /* It looks like they just asked for "foo.exit". */
+
conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(socks->address);
- r = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
- *socks->address = 0;
- if (r) {
- node_get_address_string(r, socks->address, sizeof(socks->address));
- } else {
- log_warn(LD_APP,
- "Unrecognized server in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
- safe_str_client(socks->address));
- connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
- return -1;
+ node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
+ if (node) {
+ *socks->address = 0;
+ node_get_address_string(node, socks->address, sizeof(socks->address));
}
}
+ /* Now make sure that the chosen exit exists... */
+ if (!node) {
+ log_warn(LD_APP,
+ "Unrecognized relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
+ safe_str_client(socks->address));
+ connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* ...and make sure that it isn't excluded. */
+ if (routerset_contains_node(excludeset, node)) {
+ log_warn(LD_APP,
+ "Excluded relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.",
+ safe_str_client(socks->address));
+ connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* XXXX022-1090 Should we also allow foo.bar.exit if ExitNodes is set and
+ Bar is not listed in it? I say yes, but our revised manpage branch
+ implies no. */
}
if (addresstype != ONION_HOSTNAME) {
@@ -2977,13 +3055,9 @@ connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn)
* to exit from it, or 0 if it probably will not allow it.
* (We might be uncertain if conn's destination address has not yet been
* resolved.)
- *
- * If <b>excluded_means_no</b> is 1 and Exclude*Nodes is set and excludes
- * this relay, return 0.
*/
int
-connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit,
- int excluded_means_no)
+connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit)
{
or_options_t *options = get_options();
@@ -3027,17 +3101,8 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit,
return 0;
}
if (options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion &&
- (options->StrictNodes || excluded_means_no) &&
routerset_contains_node(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, exit)) {
- /* If we are trying to avoid this node as exit, and we have StrictNodes
- * set, then this is not a suitable exit. Refuse it.
- *
- * If we don't have StrictNodes set, then this function gets called in
- * two contexts. First, we've got a circuit open and we want to know
- * whether we can use it. In that case, we somehow built this circuit
- * despite having the last hop in ExcludeExitNodes, so we should be
- * willing to use it. Second, we are evaluating whether this is an
- * acceptable exit for a new circuit. In that case, skip it. */
+ /* Not a suitable exit. Refuse it. */
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.h b/src/or/connection_edge.h
index 62a79db9e..562db5b68 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.h
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.h
@@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ int connection_exit_begin_resolve(cell_t *cell, or_circuit_t *circ);
void connection_exit_connect(edge_connection_t *conn);
int connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn);
int connection_ap_can_use_exit(edge_connection_t *conn,
- const node_t *exit,
- int excluded_means_no);
+ const node_t *exit);
void connection_ap_expire_beginning(void);
void connection_ap_attach_pending(void);
void connection_ap_fail_onehop(const char *failed_digest,
@@ -64,6 +63,7 @@ int connection_ap_process_transparent(edge_connection_t *conn);
int address_is_invalid_destination(const char *address, int client);
void addressmap_init(void);
+void addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(or_options_t *options);
void addressmap_clean(time_t now);
void addressmap_clear_configured(void);
void addressmap_clear_transient(void);
diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c
index 6bef58149..33ebf5263 100644
--- a/src/or/directory.c
+++ b/src/or/directory.c
@@ -262,10 +262,13 @@ directories_have_accepted_server_descriptor(void)
}
/** Start a connection to every suitable directory authority, using
- * connection purpose 'purpose' and uploading the payload 'payload'
- * (length 'payload_len'). dir_purpose should be one of
+ * connection purpose <b>dir_purpose</b> and uploading <b>payload</b>
+ * (of length <b>payload_len</b>). The dir_purpose should be one of
* 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR' or 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC'.
*
+ * <b>router_purpose</b> describes the type of descriptor we're
+ * publishing, if we're publishing a descriptor -- e.g. general or bridge.
+ *
* <b>type</b> specifies what sort of dir authorities (V1, V2,
* HIDSERV, BRIDGE) we should upload to.
*
@@ -281,6 +284,7 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose,
const char *payload,
size_t payload_len, size_t extrainfo_len)
{
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
int post_via_tor;
smartlist_t *dirservers = router_get_trusted_dir_servers();
int found = 0;
@@ -296,6 +300,16 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose,
if ((type & ds->type) == 0)
continue;
+ if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes &&
+ routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, rs, -1)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact authority '%s' for %s, but "
+ "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. "
+ "Skipping.",
+ ds->nickname,
+ dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose));
+ continue;
+ }
+
found = 1; /* at least one authority of this type was listed */
if (dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR)
ds->has_accepted_serverdesc = 0;
@@ -527,12 +541,14 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(const routerstatus_t *status,
time_t if_modified_since,
const rend_data_t *rend_query)
{
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
const node_t *node;
char address_buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN+1];
struct in_addr in;
const char *address;
tor_addr_t addr;
node = node_get_by_id(status->identity_digest);
+
if (!node && anonymized_connection) {
log_info(LD_DIR, "Not sending anonymized request to directory '%s'; we "
"don't have its router descriptor.", status->nickname);
@@ -546,6 +562,17 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(const routerstatus_t *status,
address = address_buf;
}
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr);
+
+ if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes &&
+ routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status, -1)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact directory mirror '%s' for %s, but "
+ "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. "
+ "Skipping. This choice might make your Tor not work.",
+ status->nickname,
+ dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose));
+ return;
+ }
+
directory_initiate_command_rend(address, &addr,
status->or_port, status->dir_port,
status->version_supports_conditional_consensus,
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index 9ba8163c8..9b5150ae2 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -1175,6 +1175,13 @@ typedef struct edge_connection_t {
* already retried several times. */
uint8_t num_socks_retries;
+#define NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD 10
+ /** Number of times we've launched a circuit to handle this stream. If
+ * it gets too high, that could indicate an inconsistency between our
+ * "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our "attach our
+ * stream to one of the available circuits" logic. */
+ unsigned int num_circuits_launched:4;
+
/** True iff this connection is for a DNS request only. */
unsigned int is_dns_request:1;
@@ -2544,7 +2551,7 @@ typedef struct {
* ORs not to consider as exits. */
/** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */
- struct routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion;
+ routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion;
int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our
* process for all current and future memory. */
@@ -3661,7 +3668,7 @@ typedef struct trusted_dir_server_t {
#define ROUTER_MAX_DECLARED_BANDWIDTH INT32_MAX
-/* Flags for pick_directory_server and pick_trusteddirserver. */
+/* Flags for pick_directory_server() and pick_trusteddirserver(). */
/** Flag to indicate that we should not automatically be willing to use
* ourself to answer a directory request.
* Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 47161ebfa..da6cfa376 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
#include "rephist.h"
#include "routerlist.h"
+static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(
+ const rend_cache_entry_t *rend_query,
+ const int strict, const int warnings);
+
/** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point:
* send the introduction request. */
void
@@ -562,7 +566,7 @@ rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro,
}
}
- if (smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) {
+ if (! rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(ent)) {
log_info(LD_REND,
"No more intro points remain for %s. Re-fetching descriptor.",
escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address));
@@ -708,7 +712,7 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query)
assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn), now);
if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_data->onion_address, -1,
&entry) == 1 &&
- smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) > 0) {
+ rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(entry)) {
/* either this fetch worked, or it failed but there was a
* valid entry from before which we should reuse */
log_info(LD_REND,"Rend desc is usable. Launching circuits.");
@@ -742,23 +746,62 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query)
extend_info_t *
rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
{
- int i;
+ extend_info_t *result;
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
- rend_intro_point_t *intro;
if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) {
- log_warn(LD_REND,
- "Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
- safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address));
+ log_warn(LD_REND,
+ "Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
+ safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address));
return NULL;
}
+ /* See if we can get a node that complies with ExcludeNodes */
+ if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(entry, 1, 1)))
+ return result;
+ /* If not, and StrictNodes is not set, see if we can return any old node
+ */
+ if (!get_options()->StrictNodes)
+ return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(entry, 0, 1);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set
+ * iff <b>strict</b> is true. If <b>warnings</b> is false, don't complain
+ * to the user when we're out of nodes, even if StrictNodes is true.
+ */
+static extend_info_t *
+rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry,
+ const int strict,
+ const int warnings)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ rend_intro_point_t *intro;
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ smartlist_t *usable_nodes;
+ int n_excluded = 0;
+
+ /* We'll keep a separate list of the usable nodes. If this becomes empty,
+ * no nodes are usable. */
+ usable_nodes = smartlist_create();
+ smartlist_add_all(usable_nodes, entry->parsed->intro_nodes);
+
again:
- if (smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0)
+ if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) {
+ if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes && warnings) {
+ /* We only want to warn if StrictNodes is really set. Otherwise
+ * we're just about to retry anyways.
+ */
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "All introduction points for hidden service are "
+ "at excluded relays, and StrictNodes is set. Skipping.");
+ }
+ smartlist_free(usable_nodes);
return NULL;
+ }
- i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes));
- intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i);
+ i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_nodes));
+ intro = smartlist_get(usable_nodes, i);
/* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */
if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) {
const node_t *node;
@@ -769,16 +812,34 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
if (!node) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.",
intro->extend_info->nickname);
- rend_intro_point_free(intro);
- smartlist_del(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i);
+ smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
goto again;
}
extend_info_free(intro->extend_info);
intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_node(node);
}
+ /* Check if we should refuse to talk to this router. */
+ if (options->ExcludeNodes && strict &&
+ routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes,
+ intro->extend_info)) {
+ n_excluded++;
+ smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i);
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ smartlist_free(usable_nodes);
return extend_info_dup(intro->extend_info);
}
+/** Return true iff any introduction points still listed in <b>entry</b> are
+ * usable. */
+int
+rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry)
+{
+ return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(
+ entry, get_options()->StrictNodes, 0) != NULL;
+}
+
/** Client-side authorizations for hidden services; map of onion address to
* rend_service_authorization_t*. */
static strmap_t *auth_hid_servs = NULL;
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.h b/src/or/rendclient.h
index 56ccde146..3f2e58e30 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.h
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ,
void rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query);
extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query);
+int rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry);
int rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
origin_circuit_t *rendcirc);
diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c
index 9d2b1b15b..1ed543a39 100644
--- a/src/or/rendcommon.c
+++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c
@@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ rend_cache_lookup_entry(const char *query, int version, rend_cache_entry_t **e)
tor_assert((*e)->parsed && (*e)->parsed->intro_nodes);
/* XXX023 hack for now, to return "not found" if there are no intro
* points remaining. See bug 997. */
- if (smartlist_len((*e)->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0)
+ if (! rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(*e))
return 0;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index 5d65f473d..767712c32 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -849,6 +849,7 @@ clean_accepted_intros(rend_service_t *service, time_t now)
/** Respond to an INTRODUCE2 cell by launching a circuit to the chosen
* rendezvous point.
*/
+ /* XXX022 this function sure could use some organizing. -RD */
int
rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
@@ -876,6 +877,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
time_t now = time(NULL);
char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN];
time_t *access_time;
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
@@ -1048,6 +1051,15 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
goto err;
}
+ /* Check if we'd refuse to talk to this router */
+ if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes &&
+ routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, extend_info)) {
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Client asked to rendezvous at a relay that we "
+ "exclude, and StrictNodes is set. Refusing service.");
+ reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; /* XXX might leak why we refused */
+ goto err;
+ }
+
r_cookie = ptr;
base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4);
@@ -1336,14 +1348,26 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
}
/* If we already have enough introduction circuits for this service,
- * redefine this one as a general circuit. */
+ * redefine this one as a general circuit or close it, depending. */
if (count_established_intro_points(serviceid) > NUM_INTRO_POINTS) {
- log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
- "circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to "
- "general.");
- TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL;
- circuit_has_opened(circuit);
- return;
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ if (options->ExcludeNodes) {
+ /* XXXX in some future version, we can test whether the transition is
+ allowed or not given the actual nodes in the circuit. But for now,
+ this case, we might as well close the thing. */
+ log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
+ "circuit, but we already have enough. Closing it.");
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), END_CIRC_REASON_NONE);
+ return;
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(circuit->build_state->is_internal);
+ log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
+ "circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to "
+ "general; leaving as internal.");
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL;
+ circuit_has_opened(circuit);
+ return;
+ }
}
log_info(LD_REND,
@@ -1395,7 +1419,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
/** Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell; mark the circuit as a
* live introduction point, and note that the service descriptor is
- * now out-of-date.*/
+ * now out-of-date. */
int
rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
const uint8_t *request,
diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c
index eb4d6b5d4..8edbb4705 100644
--- a/src/or/router.c
+++ b/src/or/router.c
@@ -852,9 +852,29 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir)
const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
int orport_reachable = check_whether_orport_reachable();
tor_addr_t addr;
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (!me)
return;
+ if (routerset_contains_router(options->ExcludeNodes, me, -1) &&
+ options->StrictNodes) {
+ /* If we've excluded ourself, and StrictNodes is set, we can't test
+ * ourself. */
+ if (test_or || test_dir) {
+#define SELF_EXCLUDED_WARN_INTERVAL 3600
+ static ratelim_t warning_limit=RATELIM_INIT(SELF_EXCLUDED_WARN_INTERVAL);
+ char *msg;
+ if ((msg = rate_limit_log(&warning_limit, approx_time()))) {
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Can't peform self-tests for this relay: we have "
+ "listed ourself in ExcludeNodes, and StrictNodes is set. "
+ "We cannot learn whether we are usable, and will not "
+ "be able to advertise ourself.%s", msg);
+ tor_free(msg);
+ }
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
if (test_or && (!orport_reachable || !circuit_enough_testing_circs())) {
extend_info_t *ei;
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Testing %s of my ORPort: %s:%d.",
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index 8c68a34cc..d5dc47838 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -1075,6 +1075,7 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver(authority_type_t type, int flags)
static const routerstatus_t *
router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags)
{
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
const node_t *result;
smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel;
smartlist_t *trusted_direct, *trusted_tunnel;
@@ -1084,10 +1085,13 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags)
int requireother = ! (flags & PDS_ALLOW_SELF);
int fascistfirewall = ! (flags & PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL);
int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS);
+ int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0;
if (!consensus)
return NULL;
+ retry_without_exclude:
+
direct = smartlist_create();
tunnel = smartlist_create();
trusted_direct = smartlist_create();
@@ -1101,6 +1105,7 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags)
int is_overloaded;
tor_addr_t addr;
const routerstatus_t *status = node->rs;
+ const country_t country = node->country;
if (!status)
continue;
@@ -1122,6 +1127,12 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags)
if ((type & EXTRAINFO_CACHE) &&
!router_supports_extrainfo(node->identity, 0))
continue;
+ if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes &&
+ routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status,
+ country)) {
+ ++n_excluded;
+ continue;
+ }
/* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, node->rs->addr);
@@ -1165,6 +1176,15 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags)
smartlist_free(trusted_tunnel);
smartlist_free(overloaded_direct);
smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel);
+
+ if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) {
+ /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is
+ * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */
+ try_excluding = 0;
+ n_excluded = 0;
+ goto retry_without_exclude;
+ }
+
return result ? result->rs : NULL;
}
@@ -1175,6 +1195,7 @@ static const routerstatus_t *
router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags,
int *n_busy_out)
{
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel;
smartlist_t *overloaded_direct, *overloaded_tunnel;
const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
@@ -1186,10 +1207,13 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags,
const int no_serverdesc_fetching =(flags & PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH);
const int no_microdesc_fetching =(flags & PDS_NO_EXISTING_MICRODESC_FETCH);
int n_busy = 0;
+ int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0;
if (!trusted_dir_servers)
return NULL;
+ retry_without_exclude:
+
direct = smartlist_create();
tunnel = smartlist_create();
overloaded_direct = smartlist_create();
@@ -1208,6 +1232,12 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags,
continue;
if (requireother && me && router_digest_is_me(d->digest))
continue;
+ if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes &&
+ routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes,
+ &d->fake_status, -1)) {
+ ++n_excluded;
+ continue;
+ }
/* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, d->addr);
@@ -1261,6 +1291,15 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags,
smartlist_free(tunnel);
smartlist_free(overloaded_direct);
smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel);
+
+ if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) {
+ /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is
+ * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */
+ try_excluding = 0;
+ n_excluded = 0;
+ goto retry_without_exclude;
+ }
+
return result;
}
@@ -1367,7 +1406,7 @@ nodelist_add_node_family(smartlist_t *sl, const node_t *node)
if (options->NodeFamilySets) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options->NodeFamilySets, const routerset_t *, rs, {
if (routerset_contains_node(rs, node)) {
- routerset_get_all_nodes(sl, rs, 0);
+ routerset_get_all_nodes(sl, rs, NULL, 0);
}
});
}
@@ -1512,6 +1551,8 @@ routerlist_find_my_routerinfo(void)
/** Find a router that's up, that has this IP address, and
* that allows exit to this address:port, or return NULL if there
* isn't a good one.
+ * Don't exit enclave to excluded relays -- it wouldn't actually
+ * hurt anything, but this way there are fewer confused users.
*/
const node_t *
router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port)
@@ -1519,6 +1560,7 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port)
uint32_t addr;
struct in_addr in;
tor_addr_t a;
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (!tor_inet_aton(address, &in))
return NULL; /* it's not an IP already */
@@ -1530,7 +1572,8 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port)
if (node_get_addr_ipv4h(node) == addr &&
node->is_running &&
compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(&a, port, node) ==
- ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED)
+ ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED &&
+ !routerset_contains_node(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, node))
return node;
});
return NULL;
@@ -5484,7 +5527,7 @@ routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set)
}
/** Return true iff there are no entries in <b>set</b>. */
-static int
+int
routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set)
{
return !set || smartlist_len(set->list) == 0;
@@ -5580,10 +5623,11 @@ routerset_contains_node(const routerset_t *set, const node_t *node)
}
/** Add every known node_t that is a member of <b>routerset</b> to
- * <b>out</b>. If <b>running_only</b>, only add the running ones. */
+ * <b>out</b>, but never add any that are part of <b>excludeset</b>.
+ * If <b>running_only</b>, only add the running ones. */
void
routerset_get_all_nodes(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset,
- int running_only)
+ const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only)
{ /* XXXX MOVE */
tor_assert(out);
if (!routerset || !routerset->list)
@@ -5591,12 +5635,13 @@ routerset_get_all_nodes(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset,
if (routerset_is_list(routerset)) {
/* No routers are specified by type; all are given by name or digest.
- * we can do a lookup in O(len(list)). */
+ * we can do a lookup in O(len(routerset)). */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routerset->list, const char *, name, {
const node_t *node = node_get_by_nickname(name, 1);
if (node) {
if (!running_only || node->is_running)
- smartlist_add(out, (void*)node);
+ if (!routerset_contains_node(excludeset, node))
+ smartlist_add(out, (void*)node);
}
});
} else {
@@ -5606,12 +5651,14 @@ routerset_get_all_nodes(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset,
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nodes, const node_t *, node, {
if (running_only && !node->is_running)
continue;
- if (routerset_contains_node(routerset, node))
+ if (routerset_contains_node(routerset, node) &&
+ !routerset_contains_node(excludeset, node))
smartlist_add(out, (void*)node);
});
}
}
+#if 0
/** Add to <b>target</b> every node_t from <b>source</b> except:
*
* 1) Don't add it if <b>include</b> is non-empty and the relay isn't in
@@ -5642,6 +5689,7 @@ routersets_get_node_disjunction(smartlist_t *target,
}
});
}
+#endif
/** Remove every node_t from <b>lst</b> that is in <b>routerset</b>. */
void
@@ -5673,10 +5721,15 @@ routerset_to_string(const routerset_t *set)
int
routerset_equal(const routerset_t *old, const routerset_t *new)
{
- if (old == NULL && new == NULL)
+ if (routerset_is_empty(old) && routerset_is_empty(new)) {
+ /* Two empty sets are equal */
return 1;
- else if (old == NULL || new == NULL)
+ } else if (routerset_is_empty(old) || routerset_is_empty(new)) {
+ /* An empty set is equal to nothing else. */
return 0;
+ }
+ tor_assert(old != NULL);
+ tor_assert(new != NULL);
if (smartlist_len(old->list) != smartlist_len(new->list))
return 0;
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h
index bb7a098fd..794fc0c9d 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.h
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.h
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ int routerset_parse(routerset_t *target, const char *s,
void routerset_union(routerset_t *target, const routerset_t *source);
int routerset_is_list(const routerset_t *set);
int routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set);
+int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set);
int routerset_contains_router(const routerset_t *set, const routerinfo_t *ri,
country_t country);
int routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set,
@@ -176,15 +177,20 @@ int routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set,
country_t country);
int routerset_contains_extendinfo(const routerset_t *set,
const extend_info_t *ei);
+
int routerset_contains_node(const routerset_t *set, const node_t *node);
void routerset_get_all_nodes(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset,
+ const routerset_t *excludeset,
int running_only);
+#if 0
void routersets_get_node_disjunction(smartlist_t *target,
const smartlist_t *source,
const routerset_t *include,
const routerset_t *exclude, int running_only);
+#endif
void routerset_subtract_nodes(smartlist_t *out,
- const routerset_t *routerset);
+ const routerset_t *routerset);
+
char *routerset_to_string(const routerset_t *routerset);
int routerset_equal(const routerset_t *old, const routerset_t *new);
void routerset_free(routerset_t *routerset);