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| author | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2011-11-16 20:55:33 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2011-11-21 18:22:10 -0500 |
| commit | c0ec4eafc54d84089536caf51b1367e8d9ddacef (patch) | |
| tree | 2b487a5b8ba33bb66e0b9ded5561e47028ed70db /src/or/dirserv.c | |
| parent | f4e053d6dff0b868449a8c225c2062b42083733f (diff) | |
| download | tor-c0ec4eafc54d84089536caf51b1367e8d9ddacef.tar tor-c0ec4eafc54d84089536caf51b1367e8d9ddacef.tar.gz | |
parameterize bw cutoffs to guarantee Fast and Guard flags
Now it will be easier for researchers to simulate Tor networks with
different values. Resolves ticket 4484.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/dirserv.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/dirserv.c | 24 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index c427fe2ef..19d9702a9 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -1692,12 +1692,6 @@ should_generate_v2_networkstatus(void) /** If a router's MTBF is at least this value, then it is always stable. * See above. (Corresponds to about 7 days for current decay rates.) */ #define MTBF_TO_GUARANTEE_STABLE (60*60*24*5) -/** Similarly, we protect sufficiently fast nodes from being pushed - * out of the set of Fast nodes. */ -#define BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_FAST ROUTER_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH -/** Similarly, every node with sufficient bandwidth can be considered - * for Guard status. */ -#define BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_GUARD (250*1024) /** Similarly, every node with at least this much weighted time known can be * considered familiar enough to be a guard. Corresponds to about 20 days for * current decay rates. @@ -1841,6 +1835,7 @@ dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds(routerlist_t *rl) long *tks; double *mtbfs, *wfus; time_t now = time(NULL); + or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* initialize these all here, in case there are no routers */ stable_uptime = 0; @@ -1910,8 +1905,11 @@ dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds(routerlist_t *rl) if (guard_tk > TIME_KNOWN_TO_GUARANTEE_FAMILIAR) guard_tk = TIME_KNOWN_TO_GUARANTEE_FAMILIAR; - if (fast_bandwidth > BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_FAST) - fast_bandwidth = BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_FAST; + /* Protect sufficiently fast nodes from being pushed out of the set + * of Fast nodes. */ + if (options->AuthDirFastGuarantee && + fast_bandwidth > options->AuthDirFastGuarantee) + fast_bandwidth = options->AuthDirFastGuarantee; /* Now that we have a time-known that 7/8 routers are known longer than, * fill wfus with the wfu of every such "familiar" router. */ @@ -2335,6 +2333,8 @@ set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs, const or_options_t *options = get_options(); int unstable_version = !tor_version_as_new_as(ri->platform,"0.1.1.16-rc-cvs"); + uint32_t routerbw = router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri); + memset(rs, 0, sizeof(routerstatus_t)); rs->is_authority = @@ -2360,10 +2360,10 @@ set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs, rs->is_valid = ri->is_valid; if (rs->is_fast && - (router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri) >= BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_GUARD || - router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri) >= - MIN(guard_bandwidth_including_exits, - guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits)) && + ((options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee && + routerbw >= options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee) || + routerbw >= MIN(guard_bandwidth_including_exits, + guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits)) && (options->GiveGuardFlagTo_CVE_2011_2768_VulnerableRelays || is_router_version_good_for_possible_guard(ri->platform))) { long tk = rep_hist_get_weighted_time_known( |