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| author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2014-05-14 13:53:14 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2014-05-14 13:53:14 -0400 |
| commit | 9b4ac986cbe8867c24c8e77654a4b7e75f870738 (patch) | |
| tree | a70f07445bda6a29d21a1cc8619b6cc748813919 /src/or/connection.c | |
| parent | e12af2adb0919d0de6d6ba44462d9255f63fca5b (diff) | |
| download | tor-9b4ac986cbe8867c24c8e77654a4b7e75f870738.tar tor-9b4ac986cbe8867c24c8e77654a4b7e75f870738.tar.gz | |
Use tor_getpw{nam,uid} wrappers to fix bug 11946
When running with User set, we frequently try to look up our
information in the user database (e.g., /etc/passwd). The seccomp2
sandbox setup doesn't let us open /etc/passwd, and probably
shouldn't.
To fix this, we have a pair of wrappers for getpwnam and getpwuid.
When a real call to getpwnam or getpwuid fails, they fall back to a
cached value, if the uid/gid matches.
(Granting access to /etc/passwd isn't possible with the way we
handle opening files through the sandbox. It's not desirable either.)
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/connection.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/connection.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 3cc4e09fb..cef9172ff 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, tor_socket_t s = TOR_INVALID_SOCKET; /* the socket we're going to make */ or_options_t const *options = get_options(); #if defined(HAVE_PWD_H) && defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) - struct passwd *pw = NULL; + const struct passwd *pw = NULL; #endif uint16_t usePort = 0, gotPort = 0; int start_reading = 0; @@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ connection_listener_new(const struct sockaddr *listensockaddr, } #ifdef HAVE_PWD_H if (options->User) { - pw = getpwnam(options->User); + pw = tor_getpwnam(options->User); if (pw == NULL) { log_warn(LD_NET,"Unable to chown() %s socket: user %s not found.", address, options->User); |