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| author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2012-01-09 17:40:11 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2012-01-10 11:15:35 -0500 |
| commit | d29a3907338bd012ce5707e0e052747da87b3ba4 (patch) | |
| tree | 25d027ada04ec74bac40609ab9b2321a971b593e /src/common/aes.h | |
| parent | b443d6a4fbfaac8d4a944d8b2a763666d1683ada (diff) | |
| download | tor-d29a3907338bd012ce5707e0e052747da87b3ba4.tar tor-d29a3907338bd012ce5707e0e052747da87b3ba4.tar.gz | |
Test for broken counter-mode at runtime
To solve bug 4779, we want to avoid OpenSSL 1.0.0's counter mode.
But Fedora (and maybe others) lie about the actual OpenSSL version,
so we can't trust the header to tell us if it's safe.
Instead, let's do a run-time test to see whether it's safe, and if
not, use our built-in version.
fermenthor contributed a pretty essential fixup to this patch. Thanks!
Diffstat (limited to 'src/common/aes.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/common/aes.h | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/common/aes.h b/src/common/aes.h index 221e84615..f7f031918 100644 --- a/src/common/aes.h +++ b/src/common/aes.h @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ void aes_crypt_inplace(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, char *data, size_t len); void aes_set_iv(aes_cnt_cipher_t *cipher, const char *iv); int evaluate_evp_for_aes(int force_value); +int evaluate_ctr_for_aes(void); #endif |