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| author | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2008-03-27 10:27:04 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org> | 2008-03-27 10:27:04 +0000 |
| commit | 03078f7f7a9aec4aa94b05f71d92458ec865b9a0 (patch) | |
| tree | f04c4e00f240ee93988ff41be5f6f055e1d4965f /doc | |
| parent | 398815307a0c2d3850087d14e9db3be7fa99f864 (diff) | |
| download | tor-03078f7f7a9aec4aa94b05f71d92458ec865b9a0.tar tor-03078f7f7a9aec4aa94b05f71d92458ec865b9a0.tar.gz | |
clarify, add one, mark one done
svn:r14211
Diffstat (limited to 'doc')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/TODO | 12 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ Things Roger would be excited to see: Nick - Finish buffer stuff in libevent; start using it in Tor. - - Tors start believing the contents of NETINFO docs. + - Tors start believing the contents of NETINFO cells. - Get a "use less buffer ram" patch into openssl. Matt @@ -163,6 +163,10 @@ Karsten - Make a hidden services explanation page with the hidden service diagrams. See img/THS-[1-6].png. These need some text to go along with them though, so people can follow what's going on. + - We should consider a single config option TorPrivateNetwork that + turns on all the config options for running a private test tor + network. having to keep updating all the tools, and the docs, + just isn't working. ======================================================================= @@ -354,16 +358,12 @@ N - router_choose_random_node() has a big pile of args. make it "flags". - enforce a lower limit on MaxCircuitDirtiness and CircuitBuildTimeout. - configurable timestamp granularity. defaults to 'seconds'. - consider making 'safelogging' extend to info-level logs too. - - we should consider a single config option TorPrivateNetwork that - turns on all the config options for running a private test tor - network. having to keep updating all the tools, and the docs, - just isn't working. - consider whether a single Guard flag lets us distinguish between "was good enough to be a guard when we picked it" and "is still adequate to be used as a guard even after we've picked it". We should write a real proposal for this. - make the new tls handshake blocking-resistant. - - figure out some way to collect feedback about what countries are using + o figure out some way to collect feedback about what countries are using bridges, in a way that doesn't screw anonymity too much. - let tor dir mirrors proxy connections to the tor download site, so if you know a bridge you can fetch the tor software. |