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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2008-07-11 17:08:08 +0000 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2008-07-11 17:08:08 +0000 |
commit | 75301cb906465e93c388aeaea087103ace7def80 (patch) | |
tree | 600de9fcec4b4565c445e44f875d9a9ab6eb6d29 /doc/spec/proposals | |
parent | 787c66b70fa050300cb88d9f636b27b44e5fd113 (diff) | |
download | tor-75301cb906465e93c388aeaea087103ace7def80.tar tor-75301cb906465e93c388aeaea087103ace7def80.tar.gz |
r16918@tombo: nickm | 2008-07-11 13:04:01 -0400
Update proposal 110 based on discussions with arma and implementation status.
svn:r15842
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/spec/proposals')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/spec/proposals/110-avoid-infinite-circuits.txt | 67 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/doc/spec/proposals/110-avoid-infinite-circuits.txt b/doc/spec/proposals/110-avoid-infinite-circuits.txt index 9a7566d89..f25225682 100644 --- a/doc/spec/proposals/110-avoid-infinite-circuits.txt +++ b/doc/spec/proposals/110-avoid-infinite-circuits.txt @@ -4,7 +4,13 @@ Version: $Revision$ Last-Modified: $Date$ Author: Roger Dingledine Created: 13-Mar-2007 -Status: Needs-Revision +Status: Accepted + +History: + + Revised 3 July 2008 by nickm: rename from relay_extend to + relay_early. Revise to current migration plan. Allow K cells + over circuit lifetime, not just at start. Overview: @@ -36,25 +42,25 @@ Motivation: Design: - We should split RELAY cells into two types: RELAY and RELAY_EXTEND. + We should split RELAY cells into two types: RELAY and RELAY_EARLY. - Relay_extend cells can only be sent in the first K (say, 10) data - cells sent across a circuit, and only relay_extend cells are allowed - to contain extend requests. We still support obscuring the length of - the circuit (if more research shows us what to do), because Alice can - choose how many of the K to mark as relay_extend. Note that relay_extend - cells *can* contain any sort of data cell; so in effect it's actually - the relay type cells that are restricted. By default, she would just - send the first K data cells over the stream as relay_extend cells, - regardless of their actual type. + Only K (say, 10) Relay_early cells can be sent across a circuit, and + only relay_early cells are allowed to contain extend requests. We + still support obscuring the length of the circuit (if more research + shows us what to do), because Alice can choose how many of the K to + mark as relay_early. Note that relay_early cells *can* contain any + sort of data cell; so in effect it's actually the relay type cells + that are restricted. By default, she would just send the first K + data cells over the stream as relay_early cells, regardless of their + actual type. Each intermediate server would pass on the same type of cell that it - received (either relay or relay_extend), and the cell's destination + received (either relay or relay_early), and the cell's destination will be able to learn whether it's allowed to contain an Extend request. - If an intermediate server receives a relay_extend cell after it has - already seen k data cells, or if it sees a relay cell that contains an - extend request, then it tears down the circuit (protocol violation). + If an intermediate server receives more than K relay_early cells, or + if it sees a relay cell that contains an extend request, then it + tears down the circuit (protocol violation). Security implications: @@ -73,33 +79,26 @@ Security implications: Migration: - Phase one: servers should recognize relay_extend cells and pass them - on just like relay cells. Don't do any enforcement of the protocol - yet. We could do this phase in the 0.2.0 timeline. + In 0.2.0, servers speaking v2 or later of the link protocol accept + RELAY_EARLY cells, and pass them on. If the next OR in the circuit + is not speaking the v2 link protocol, the server relays the cell as + a RELAY cell. - Phase two: once support in phase one is pervasive, clients could start - using relay_extend cells when all nodes currently in the circuit would - recognize them. We could conceivably do this phase during 0.2.0 too. + In 0.2.1.x, clients begin using RELAY_EARLY cells on v2 connections. + This functionality can be safely backported to 0.2.0.x. Clients + should pick a random number betweeen (say) 8 and 10 to send. - Phase three: once clients that don't use relay_extend cells are - obsolete, servers should start enforcing the protocol. + In 0.2.1.x, servers close any circuit in which more than K + relay_early cells are sent. - (Another migration plan would be to coordinate this with proposal - 105's new link versions. Would that be better/worse? Can somebody - sketch out what it might look like?) + Once all versions the do not send RELAY_EARLY cells are obsolete, + servers can begin to reject any EXTEND requests not sent in a + RELAY_EARLY cell. Spec: [We can formalize this part once we think the design is a good one.] -Additional complexity: - - Rather than limiting the relay_extend cells to being in the first K - data cells seen, we could instead permit up to K relay_extend cells - in the lifetime of the circuit. This would let us extend the circuit - later on in its life if we decided it was worth doing, though we would - reveal our intent to each node in the circuit when we do. - Acknowledgements: This design has been kicking around since Christian Grothoff and I came |