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authorNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2012-08-03 12:04:11 -0400
committerNick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org>2012-08-03 12:04:11 -0400
commit93be3a8822ae791cc8adb78ea7d7e76e4c10db41 (patch)
tree15a55487602f16aa8d6d757ff82958aa4e8357b4 /changes
parent82c5e385cbddec4fd80618d6e96111ad73d5a22e (diff)
parentd48cebc5e498b0ae673635f40fc57cdddab45d5b (diff)
downloadtor-93be3a8822ae791cc8adb78ea7d7e76e4c10db41.tar
tor-93be3a8822ae791cc8adb78ea7d7e76e4c10db41.tar.gz
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' into maint-0.2.3
Conflicts: src/or/routerlist.c
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+ o Security fixes:
+
+ - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
+ choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client
+ would stop iterating through the list of available relays as
+ soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier
+ when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker
+ can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not
+ proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-
+ grained information about which relays a client was picking
+ (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than
+ exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors
+ (see bug #6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to
+ take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.