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author | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2014-04-14 18:00:38 -0400 |
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committer | Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> | 2014-04-14 18:00:38 -0400 |
commit | 149931571a4c5ad9ec24eb6d4306e8965a454211 (patch) | |
tree | cf2b4d83a7a5028526e19cf3f3641d813d9c06ba | |
parent | 47f7085de7a496b6bfa79de9e1b22ca4a28b0f27 (diff) | |
parent | 75b4975d7722d9497847fdab8dcfb2ac10f58fdb (diff) | |
download | tor-149931571a4c5ad9ec24eb6d4306e8965a454211.tar tor-149931571a4c5ad9ec24eb6d4306e8965a454211.tar.gz |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.3' into maint-0.2.4
Conflicts:
src/or/routerlist.h
-rw-r--r-- | changes/bug11464_023 | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/networkstatus.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/routerlist.c | 33 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/routerlist.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | src/or/routerparse.c | 8 |
5 files changed, 58 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/changes/bug11464_023 b/changes/bug11464_023 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..80c04b21e --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug11464_023 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Major features (security): + - Block authority signing keys that were used on an authorities + vulnerable to the "heartbleed" bug in openssl (CVE-2014-0160). + (We don't have any evidence that these keys _were_ compromised; + we're doing this to be prudent.) Resolves ticket 11464. diff --git a/src/or/networkstatus.c b/src/or/networkstatus.c index 1b5c6dbb3..23b7304b3 100644 --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c @@ -436,6 +436,17 @@ networkstatus_check_document_signature(const networkstatus_t *consensus, DIGEST_LEN)) return -1; + if (authority_cert_is_blacklisted(cert)) { + /* We implement blacklisting for authority signing keys by treating + * all their signatures as always bad. That way we don't get into + * crazy loops of dropping and re-fetching signatures. */ + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ignoring a consensus signature made with deprecated" + " signing key %s", + hex_str(cert->signing_key_digest, DIGEST_LEN)); + sig->bad_signature = 1; + return 0; + } + signed_digest_len = crypto_pk_keysize(cert->signing_key); signed_digest = tor_malloc(signed_digest_len); if (crypto_pk_public_checksig(cert->signing_key, diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index cb39729ff..b49dc1ac0 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -633,6 +633,39 @@ authority_cert_dl_failed(const char *id_digest, } } +static const char *BAD_SIGNING_KEYS[] = { + "09CD84F751FD6E955E0F8ADB497D5401470D697E", // Expires 2015-01-11 16:26:31 +// dizum still needs to rotate as of 2014-04-14 +//"0E7E9C07F0969D0468AD741E172A6109DC289F3C", // Expires 2014-08-12 10:18:26 +// dannenberg still needs to rotate as of 2014-04-14 +//"57B85409891D3FB32137F642FDEDF8B7F8CDFDCD", // Expires 2015-02-11 17:19:09 + "87326329007AF781F587AF5B594E540B2B6C7630", // Expires 2014-07-17 11:10:09 + "98CC82342DE8D298CF99D3F1A396475901E0D38E", // Expires 2014-11-10 13:18:56 + "9904B52336713A5ADCB13E4FB14DC919E0D45571", // Expires 2014-04-20 20:01:01 + "9DCD8E3F1DD1597E2AD476BBA28A1A89F3095227", // Expires 2015-01-16 03:52:30 + "A61682F34B9BB9694AC98491FE1ABBFE61923941", // Expires 2014-06-11 09:25:09 + "B59F6E99C575113650C99F1C425BA7B20A8C071D", // Expires 2014-07-31 13:22:10 + "D27178388FA75B96D37FA36E0B015227DDDBDA51", // Expires 2014-08-04 04:01:57 + NULL, +}; + +/** DOCDOC */ +int +authority_cert_is_blacklisted(const authority_cert_t *cert) +{ + char hex_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; + int i; + base16_encode(hex_digest, sizeof(hex_digest), + cert->signing_key_digest, sizeof(cert->signing_key_digest)); + + for (i = 0; BAD_SIGNING_KEYS[i]; ++i) { + if (!strcasecmp(hex_digest, BAD_SIGNING_KEYS[i])) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + /** Return true iff when we've been getting enough failures when trying to * download the certificate with ID digest <b>id_digest</b> that we're willing * to start bugging the user about it. */ diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index ce0f0f2e3..505685897 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int router_reload_router_list(void); int authority_cert_dl_looks_uncertain(const char *id_digest); const smartlist_t *router_get_trusted_dir_servers(void); const smartlist_t *router_get_fallback_dir_servers(void); +int authority_cert_is_blacklisted(const authority_cert_t *cert); const routerstatus_t *router_pick_directory_server(dirinfo_type_t type, int flags); diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 3aa4bdf8a..a9c711be0 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -2932,6 +2932,14 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, log_warn(LD_DIR,"Mismatch between identities in certificate and vote"); goto err; } + if (ns->type != NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS) { + if (authority_cert_is_blacklisted(ns->cert)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Rejecting vote signature made with blacklisted " + "signing key %s", + hex_str(ns->cert->signing_key_digest, DIGEST_LEN)); + goto err; + } + } voter->address = tor_strdup(tok->args[2]); if (!tor_inet_aton(tok->args[3], &in)) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error decoding IP address %s in network-status.", |