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Fix CVE-2016-1541 (buffer overflow zip_read_mac_metadata)
Taken from upstream source repository:
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/d0331e8e5b05b475f20b1f3101fe1ad772d7e7e7
When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
the end of the allocated buffer.
This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
handling this type of entry:
1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
data sizes do not match.
2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
size is larger than 4MB.
3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
entry size.
---
libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c
index 0f8262c..0a0be96 100644
--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c
+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_zip.c
@@ -2778,6 +2778,11 @@ zip_read_mac_metadata(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
switch(rsrc->compression) {
case 0: /* No compression. */
+ if (rsrc->uncompressed_size != rsrc->compressed_size) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
+ "Malformed OS X metadata entry: inconsistent size");
+ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
+ }
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
case 8: /* Deflate compression. */
#endif
@@ -2798,6 +2803,12 @@ zip_read_mac_metadata(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
(intmax_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size);
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
+ if (rsrc->compressed_size > (4 * 1024 * 1024)) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
+ "Mac metadata is too large: %jd > 4M bytes",
+ (intmax_t)rsrc->compressed_size);
+ return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
+ }
metadata = malloc((size_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size);
if (metadata == NULL) {
@@ -2836,6 +2847,8 @@ zip_read_mac_metadata(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
bytes_avail = remaining_bytes;
switch(rsrc->compression) {
case 0: /* No compression. */
+ if ((size_t)bytes_avail > metadata_bytes)
+ bytes_avail = metadata_bytes;
memcpy(mp, p, bytes_avail);
bytes_used = (size_t)bytes_avail;
metadata_bytes -= bytes_used;
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