diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/local.mk | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/admin.scm | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch | 32 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch | 51 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch | 54 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch | 34 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch | 82 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch | 51 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch | 82 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch | 62 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch | 50 |
11 files changed, 2 insertions, 519 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk index 292f5ff45d..526756f08e 100644 --- a/gnu/local.mk +++ b/gnu/local.mk @@ -896,15 +896,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \ %D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-2149.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-3908-pt1.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-3908-pt2.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch \ - %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/xdotool-fix-makefile.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/xf86-video-ark-remove-mibstore.patch \ %D%/packages/patches/xf86-video-ast-remove-mibstore.patch \ diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm index cfb33c40c3..d9b08efc4c 100644 --- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm +++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm @@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ commands and their arguments.") (define-public wpa-supplicant-minimal (package (name "wpa-supplicant-minimal") - (version "2.5") + (version "2.6") (source (origin (method url-fetch) (uri (string-append @@ -871,17 +871,7 @@ commands and their arguments.") ".tar.gz")) (sha256 (base32 - "05mkp5bx1c3z7h5biddsv0p49gkrq9ksany3anp4wdiv92p5prfc")) - (patches - (search-patches "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch" - "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch" - "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch" - "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch" - "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch" - "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch" - "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch" - "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch" - "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch")))) + "0l0l5gz3d5j9bqjsbjlfcv4w4jwndllp9fmyai4x9kg6qhs6v4xl")))) (build-system gnu-build-system) (arguments '(#:phases (alist-replace diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 00e5b7c771..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no - PMF in use - -WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is -enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station -side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -index 954de67..7d79499 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c -@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, - end = ptr + key_len_total; - wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total); - -+ if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) { -+ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, -+ "WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled"); -+ return; -+ } -+ - while (ptr + 1 < end) { - if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element " diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch deleted file mode 100644 index bfc4c74e95..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation - -All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining -room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last -fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. -The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual -buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process -termination. (CVE-2015-5314) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++--- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644 ---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - /* - * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set - */ -- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { - if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow " - "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)", -@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - } - wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); - data->in_frag_pos += len; -+ } -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment", - (int) len); - return; -@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, - * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last) - */ - if (data->in_frag_pos) { -- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); -- data->in_frag_pos += len; - pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); - len = data->in_frag_pos; - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 82c26398b6..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation - -All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining -room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last -fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer. -The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual -buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process -termination. (CVE-2015-5315) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++---- - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - /* - * buffer and ACK the fragment - */ -- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) { - data->in_frag_pos += len; - if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) { - wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack " -@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - return NULL; - } - wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); -- -+ } -+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) { - resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD, - EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE, - EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData)); -@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret, - * we're buffering and this is the last fragment - */ - if (data->in_frag_pos) { -- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len); - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes", - (int) len); -- data->in_frag_pos += len; - pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf); - len = data->in_frag_pos; - } --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 3088f6a6dc..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ -From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message - -If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity -exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and -data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange() -did not take this corner case into account and could end up -dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid -message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316) - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -index 75ceef1..892b590 100644 ---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c -@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN); - - fin: -- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); -+ if (data->grp) -+ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime)); - BN_clear_free(x); - BN_clear_free(y); - if (data->outbuf == NULL) { --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch deleted file mode 100644 index acad6be0a4..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> -Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase - -WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control -characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as -STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or -WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase. - -This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated -the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from -an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should -such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file -could become invalid and fail to be parsed. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> ---- - src/utils/common.c | 12 ++++++++++++ - src/utils/common.h | 1 + - src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++ - 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c -index 450e2c6..27b7c02 100644 ---- a/src/utils/common.c -+++ b/src/utils/common.c -@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len) - } - - -+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) -+{ -+ size_t i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { -+ if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127) -+ return 1; -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+ - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) -diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h -index 701dbb2..a972240 100644 ---- a/src/utils/common.h -+++ b/src/utils/common.h -@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); - - char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); - int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); -+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); -diff --git a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c -index eadb22f..e8c4579 100644 ---- a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c -+++ b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c -@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred) - cred->key_len--; - #endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */ - } -+ -+ -+ if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) && -+ (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase"); -+ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key", -+ cred->key, cred->key_len); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - return 0; - } - --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 507a96e47c..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,51 +0,0 @@ -From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> -Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase - character - -WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control -characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase -includes an invalid passphrase. - -This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the -configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control -interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be -accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that -an untrusted user has access to a management software component that -does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to -wpa_supplicant. - -This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of -almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration -file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., -opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, -load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again. -This would allow code from that library to be executed under the -wpa_supplicant process privileges. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> ---- - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -index b1c7870..fdd9643 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data, - } - wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)", - (u8 *) value, len); -+ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, -+ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character", -+ line); -+ return -1; -+ } - if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len && - os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) { - /* No change to the previously configured value */ --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 684d25de96..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com> -Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800 -Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network - output - -Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the -wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block -parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have -been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control -characters in the psk parameter. - -Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com> ---- - src/utils/common.c | 11 +++++++++++ - src/utils/common.h | 1 + - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- - 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c -index 27b7c02..9856463 100644 ---- a/src/utils/common.c -+++ b/src/utils/common.c -@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len) - } - - -+int has_newline(const char *str) -+{ -+ while (*str) { -+ if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r') -+ return 1; -+ str++; -+ } -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+ - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len) -diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h -index a972240..d19927b 100644 ---- a/src/utils/common.h -+++ b/src/utils/common.h -@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len); - char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len); - int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len); - int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len); -+int has_newline(const char *str); - size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len, - const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len, - const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len); -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -index fdd9643..eb97cd5 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var) - - for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) { - const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i]; -- if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) -- return field->writer(field, ssid); -+ if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) { -+ char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid); -+ -+ if (ret && has_newline(ret)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, -+ "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it", -+ var); -+ os_free(ret); -+ ret = NULL; -+ } -+ -+ return ret; -+ } - } - - return NULL; --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2dd38fee31..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> -Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the - string values - -Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without -filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value, -unexpected configuration file data might be written. - -This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the -configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control -interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be -accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that -an untrusted user has access to a management software component that -does not validate the credential value before passing it to -wpa_supplicant. - -This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data -into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in -wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, -pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user -controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that -library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> ---- - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++- - 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -index eb97cd5..69152ef 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, - - if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 && - os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) { -+ if (has_newline(value)) -+ return -1; - str_clear_free(cred->password); - cred->password = os_strdup(value); - cred->ext_password = 1; -@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var, - } - - val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len); -- if (val == NULL) { -+ if (val == NULL || -+ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 && -+ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 && -+ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 && -+ has_newline(val))) { - wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string " - "value '%s'.", line, var, value); -+ os_free(val); - return -1; - } - --- -1.9.1 - diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 5f42aa9219..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@ -From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> -Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the - string values - -Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings -without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the -value, unexpected configuration file data might be written. - -This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the -configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control -interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be -accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that -an untrusted user has access to a management software component that -does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to -wpa_supplicant. - -This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data -into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in -wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, -pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user -controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that -library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> ---- - wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -index 69152ef..d9a1603 100644 ---- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c -+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c -@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data, - return -1; - } - -+ if (has_newline(pos)) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline", -+ line, data->name); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ - tmp = os_strdup(pos); - if (tmp == NULL) - return -1; --- -1.9.1 - |