diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch | 68 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 68 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c11e4175d9..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-2015-4-fix-pt2.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-4/ - -From e28a58be26184c2a23f80b410e0997ef1bd5d578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> -Date: Fri, 1 May 2015 16:40:44 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH 2/5] EAP-pwd server: Fix payload length validation for Commit - and Confirm - -The length of the received Commit and Confirm message payloads was not -checked before reading them. This could result in a buffer read -overflow when processing an invalid message. - -Fix this by verifying that the payload is of expected length before -processing it. In addition, enforce correct state transition sequence to -make sure there is no unexpected behavior if receiving a Commit/Confirm -message before the previous exchanges have been completed. - -Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and -reporting this issue. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> ---- - src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ - 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -index 66bd5d2..3189105 100644 ---- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c -@@ -656,9 +656,21 @@ eap_pwd_process_commit_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *cofactor = NULL; - EC_POINT *K = NULL, *point = NULL; - int res = 0; -+ size_t prime_len, order_len; - - wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Received commit response"); - -+ prime_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime); -+ order_len = BN_num_bytes(data->grp->order); -+ -+ if (payload_len != 2 * prime_len + order_len) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Commit payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, -+ (unsigned int) (2 * prime_len + order_len)); -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ - if (((data->peer_scalar = BN_new()) == NULL) || - ((data->k = BN_new()) == NULL) || - ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) || -@@ -774,6 +786,13 @@ eap_pwd_process_confirm_resp(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data, - u8 conf[SHA256_MAC_LEN], *cruft = NULL, *ptr; - int offset; - -+ if (payload_len != SHA256_MAC_LEN) { -+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, -+ "EAP-pwd: Unexpected Confirm payload length %u (expected %u)", -+ (unsigned int) payload_len, SHA256_MAC_LEN); -+ goto fin; -+ } -+ - /* build up the ciphersuite: group | random_function | prf */ - grp = htons(data->group_num); - ptr = (u8 *) &cs; --- -1.9.1 - |