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-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch112
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 112 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 37cf2763af..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2178.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2016-2178.
-
-<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-2178>
-
-Source:
-<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534>
-<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b>
-
-From 621eaf49a289bfac26d4cbcdb7396e796784c534 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Cesar Pereida <cesar.pereida@aalto.fi>
-Date: Mon, 23 May 2016 12:45:25 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
-
-Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
-order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
-implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
-certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
-attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
-
-CVE-2016-2178
-
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-index efc4f1b..b29eb4b 100644
---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
- if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
- goto err;
- while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
-- if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-- }
-
- if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
-@@ -279,9 +276,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
- }
-
- K = &kq;
-+
-+ BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else {
- K = &k;
- }
-+
- DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
- dsa->method_mont_p);
- if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
---
-2.8.4
-
-From b7d0f2834e139a20560d64c73e2565e93715ce2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2016 09:12:51 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] More fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
-
-The previous "fix" still left "k" exposed to constant time problems in
-the later BN_mod_inverse() call. Ensure both k and kq have the
-BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set at the earliest opportunity after creation.
-
-CVE-2016-2178
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c | 11 ++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-index b29eb4b..58013a4 100644
---- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
-@@ -247,7 +247,12 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
- do
- if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
- goto err;
-- while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
-+ while (BN_is_zero(&k));
-+
-+ if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-+ BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+ }
-+
-
- if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
-@@ -261,6 +266,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
- if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k))
- goto err;
-
-+ BN_set_flags(&kq, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+
- /*
- * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we
- * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This
-@@ -276,8 +283,6 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
- }
-
- K = &kq;
--
-- BN_set_flags(K, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- } else {
- K = &k;
- }
---
-2.8.4
-