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-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch286
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 286 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f6465aeaa7..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/openssl-CVE-2016-2177.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,286 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2016-2177.
-
-<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-2177>
-
-Source:
-<https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7>
-
-From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
-
-A common idiom in the codebase is:
-
-if (p + len > limit)
-{
- return; /* Too long */
-}
-
-Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
-limit == p + SIZE
-
-"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
-message).
-
-The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
-defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
-undefined behaviour.
-
-For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
-provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
-values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
-
-Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
-
-CVE-2016-2177
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
----
- ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++-------
- ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +-
- ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
- 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
---- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
-@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-
- session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
-
-- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
-+ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
-@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- /* get the session-id */
- j = *(p++);
-
-- if (p + j > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < j) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
-@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* cookie stuff */
-- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- cookie_len = *(p++);
-
-- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
-@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- }
- }
-
-- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
-@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- }
-
- /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
-- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-
- /* compression */
- i = *(p++);
-- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
-+ if ((d + n) - p < i) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
-index b182998..54ee783 100644
---- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
-+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
-@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- int r;
- #endif
-
-- if (session_id + len > limit) {
-+ if (limit - session_id < len) {
- fatal = 1;
- goto err;
- }
-diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
-index fb64607..cdac011 100644
---- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
-+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
-@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
- };
-
-- if (data >= (limit - 2))
-+ if (limit - data <= 2)
- return;
- data += 2;
-
-- if (data > (limit - 4))
-+ if (limit - data < 4)
- return;
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
-@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- return;
-
-- if (data + size > limit)
-+ if (limit - data < size)
- return;
- data += size;
-
-@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
-
-- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
-+ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
- return;
- if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
- return;
-@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
- } else {
- const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-
-- if (data + len != limit)
-+ if (limit - data != (int)(len))
- return;
- if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
- return;
-@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
- if (data == limit)
- goto ri_check;
-
-- if (data > (limit - 2))
-+ if (limit - data < 2)
- goto err;
-
- n2s(data, len);
-
-- if (data + len != limit)
-+ if (limit - data != len)
- goto err;
-
-- while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
-+ while (limit - data >= 4) {
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
-
-- if (data + size > (limit))
-+ if (limit - data < size)
- goto err;
- # if 0
- fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
-@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
- if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
- return 1;
-
-- if (data >= limit - 2)
-+ if (limit - data <= 2)
- return 1;
- n2s(data, len);
-
-- if (data > limit - len)
-+ if (limit - data < len)
- return 1;
-
-- while (data <= limit - 4) {
-+ while (limit - data >= 4) {
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
-
-- if (data + size > limit)
-+ if (limit - data < size)
- return 1;
- if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
- return 0;
-@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
- SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
- # endif
-
-- if (data >= (d + n - 2))
-+ if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
- goto ri_check;
-
- n2s(data, length);
-- if (data + length != d + n) {
-+ if ((d + n) - data != length) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
-- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
-+ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
- n2s(data, type);
- n2s(data, size);
-
-- if (data + size > (d + n))
-+ if ((d + n) - data < size)
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
-@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
- /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- i = *(p++);
-- p += i;
-- if (p >= limit)
-+
-+ if (limit - p <= i)
- return -1;
-+
-+ p += i;
- }
- /* Skip past cipher list */
- n2s(p, i);
-- p += i;
-- if (p >= limit)
-+ if (limit - p <= i)
- return -1;
-+ p += i;
-+
- /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
- i = *(p++);
-- p += i;
-- if (p > limit)
-+ if (limit - p < i)
- return -1;
-+ p += i;
-+
- /* Now at start of extensions */
-- if ((p + 2) >= limit)
-+ if (limit - p <= 2)
- return 0;
- n2s(p, i);
-- while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
-+ while (limit - p >= 4) {
- unsigned short type, size;
- n2s(p, type);
- n2s(p, size);
-- if (p + size > limit)
-+ if (limit - p < size)
- return 0;
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- int r;
---
-2.8.4
-
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.4) at 2024-11-08 15:03:17 +0000