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-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/nettle-3.5-CVE-2021-3580-pt1.patch276
1 files changed, 276 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/nettle-3.5-CVE-2021-3580-pt1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/nettle-3.5-CVE-2021-3580-pt1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4343c87795
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/nettle-3.5-CVE-2021-3580-pt1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+Copied from upstream nettle git repository.
+Removed changes to ChangeLog, to allow this patch to apply to nettle-3.5.
+
+From 485b5e2820a057e873b1ba812fdb39cae4adf98c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
+Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 20:55:26 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Change _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr to take a fix input size.
+
+Improves consistency with _rsa_sec_compute_root, and fixes zero-input bug.
+---
+ ChangeLog | 15 +++++++++
+ rsa-decrypt-tr.c | 7 ++---
+ rsa-internal.h | 4 +--
+ rsa-sec-decrypt.c | 9 ++++--
+ rsa-sign-tr.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c | 14 ++++++++-
+ 6 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+index 0224c0b7..927a8915 100644
+--- a/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
++++ b/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
+@@ -52,14 +52,13 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ mp_size_t key_limb_size;
+ int res;
+
+- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
++ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
+
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size);
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
++ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, key_limb_size);
+
+- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
+- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
+- mpz_size(gibberish));
++ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
+
+ mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, key_limb_size);
+
+diff --git a/rsa-internal.h b/rsa-internal.h
+index b828e451..f66a7df0 100644
+--- a/rsa-internal.h
++++ b/rsa-internal.h
+@@ -78,11 +78,11 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+ mp_limb_t *scratch);
+
+ /* Safe side-channel silent variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the
+- * result after CRT. */
++ * result after CRT. In-place calls, with x == m, is allowed. */
+ int
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+ void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn);
++ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m);
+
+ #endif /* NETTLE_RSA_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED */
+diff --git a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+index 6866e7c8..fc4757a0 100644
+--- a/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
++++ b/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
+@@ -58,9 +58,12 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n));
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
+
+- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
+- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
+- mpz_size(gibberish));
++ /* We need a copy because m can be shorter than key_size,
++ * but _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr expect all inputs to be
++ * normalized to a key_size long buffer length */
++ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, mpz_size(pub->n));
++
++ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
+
+ mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, mpz_size(pub->n));
+
+diff --git a/rsa-sign-tr.c b/rsa-sign-tr.c
+index f824c4ca..9e137c7a 100644
+--- a/rsa-sign-tr.c
++++ b/rsa-sign-tr.c
+@@ -131,35 +131,34 @@ int
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+ void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
++ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
+ {
++ mp_size_t nn;
+ mpz_t mz;
+ mpz_t xz;
+ int res;
+
+- mpz_init(mz);
+ mpz_init(xz);
+
+- mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(mz, mn), m, mn);
+- mpz_limbs_finish(mz, mn);
++ nn = mpz_size (pub->n);
+
+- res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz, mz);
++ res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz,
++ mpz_roinit_n(mz, m, nn));
+
+ if (res)
+- mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, mpz_size(pub->n));
++ mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, nn);
+
+- mpz_clear(mz);
+ mpz_clear(xz);
+ return res;
+ }
+ #else
+ /* Blinds m, by computing c = m r^e (mod n), for a random r. Also
+- returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. */
++ returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. Must have c != m,
++ no in-place operation.*/
+ static void
+ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+- mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m,
+- mp_size_t mn)
++ mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m)
+ {
+ const mp_limb_t *ep = mpz_limbs_read (pub->e);
+ const mp_limb_t *np = mpz_limbs_read (pub->n);
+@@ -177,15 +176,15 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+
+ /* c = m*(r^e) mod n */
+ itch = mpn_sec_powm_itch(nn, ebn, nn);
+- i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, mn);
++ i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, nn);
+ itch = MAX(itch, i2);
+- i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(nn + mn, nn);
++ i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(2*nn, nn);
+ itch = MAX(itch, i2);
+ i2 = mpn_sec_invert_itch(nn);
+ itch = MAX(itch, i2);
+
+- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, nn + mn + itch);
+- scratch = tp + nn + mn;
++ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, 2*nn + itch);
++ scratch = tp + 2*nn;
+
+ /* ri = r^(-1) */
+ do
+@@ -198,9 +197,8 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ while (!mpn_sec_invert (ri, tp, np, nn, 2 * nn * GMP_NUMB_BITS, scratch));
+
+ mpn_sec_powm (c, rp, nn, ep, ebn, np, nn, scratch);
+- /* normally mn == nn, but m can be smaller in some cases */
+- mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, mn, scratch);
+- mpn_sec_div_r (tp, nn + mn, np, nn, scratch);
++ mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, nn, scratch);
++ mpn_sec_div_r (tp, 2*nn, np, nn, scratch);
+ mpn_copyi(c, tp, nn);
+
+ TMP_GMP_FREE (r);
+@@ -208,7 +206,7 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ TMP_GMP_FREE (tp);
+ }
+
+-/* m = c ri mod n */
++/* m = c ri mod n. Allows x == c. */
+ static void
+ rsa_sec_unblind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ mp_limb_t *x, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *c)
+@@ -299,7 +297,7 @@ int
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ const struct rsa_private_key *key,
+ void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
+- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
++ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
+ {
+ TMP_GMP_DECL (c, mp_limb_t);
+ TMP_GMP_DECL (ri, mp_limb_t);
+@@ -307,7 +305,7 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ size_t key_limb_size;
+ int ret;
+
+- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
++ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
+
+ /* mpz_powm_sec handles only odd moduli. If p, q or n is even, the
+ key is invalid and rejected by rsa_private_key_prepare. However,
+@@ -321,19 +319,18 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ }
+
+ assert(mpz_size(pub->n) == key_limb_size);
+- assert(mn <= key_limb_size);
+
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (c, key_limb_size);
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (ri, key_limb_size);
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (scratch, _rsa_sec_compute_root_itch(key));
+
+- rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, x, ri, m, mn);
++ rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, c, ri, m);
+
+- _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, c, x, scratch);
++ _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, x, c, scratch);
+
+- ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, c, x);
++ ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, x, c);
+
+- rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, c);
++ rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, x);
+
+ cnd_mpn_zero(1 - ret, x, key_limb_size);
+
+@@ -357,17 +354,17 @@ rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
+ mpz_t x, const mpz_t m)
+ {
+ TMP_GMP_DECL (l, mp_limb_t);
++ mp_size_t nn = mpz_size(pub->n);
+ int res;
+
+- mp_size_t l_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
+- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, l_size);
++ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, nn);
++ mpz_limbs_copy(l, m, nn);
+
+- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l,
+- mpz_limbs_read(m), mpz_size(m));
++ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l, l);
+ if (res) {
+- mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, l_size);
+- mpn_copyi (xp, l, l_size);
+- mpz_limbs_finish (x, l_size);
++ mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, nn);
++ mpn_copyi (xp, l, nn);
++ mpz_limbs_finish (x, nn);
+ }
+
+ TMP_GMP_FREE (l);
+diff --git a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+index 87525f78..d3bc374b 100644
+--- a/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
++++ b/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
+@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ test_main(void)
+ uint8_t after;
+
+ mpz_t gibberish;
++ mpz_t zero;
+
+ rsa_private_key_init(&key);
+ rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
+@@ -101,6 +102,17 @@ test_main(void)
+ ASSERT(decrypted[decrypted_length] == after);
+ ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A');
+
++ /* Test zero input. */
++ mpz_init_set_ui (zero, 0);
++ decrypted_length = msg_length;
++ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
++ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++ &decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
++ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
++ decrypted_length, decrypted, zero));
++ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
+
+ /* Test invalid key. */
+ mpz_add_ui (key.q, key.q, 2);
+@@ -112,6 +124,6 @@ test_main(void)
+ rsa_private_key_clear(&key);
+ rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);
+ mpz_clear(gibberish);
++ mpz_clear(zero);
+ free(decrypted);
+ }
+-
+--
+2.31.1
+
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.45.0) at 2024-12-28 01:49:32 +0000