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Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/expat-CVE-2012-6702-and-CVE-2016-5300.patch')
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/expat-CVE-2012-6702-and-CVE-2016-5300.patch142
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 142 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/expat-CVE-2012-6702-and-CVE-2016-5300.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/expat-CVE-2012-6702-and-CVE-2016-5300.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index edc43f84f1..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/expat-CVE-2012-6702-and-CVE-2016-5300.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2012-6702 and CVE-2016-5300.
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-6702
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-5300
-
-Patch copied from:
-https://sources.debian.net/src/expat/2.1.0-6%2Bdeb8u3/debian/patches/cve-2012-6702-plus-cve-2016-5300-v1.patch/
-
-From cb31522769d11a375078a073cba94e7176cb48a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
-Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2016 15:30:12 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Resolve call to srand, use more entropy (patch version 1.0)
-
-Squashed backport against vanilla Expat 2.1.1, addressing:
-* CVE-2012-6702 -- unanticipated internal calls to srand
-* CVE-2016-5300 -- use of too little entropy
-
-Since commit e3e81a6d9f0885ea02d3979151c358f314bf3d6d
-(released with Expat 2.1.0) Expat called srand by itself
-from inside generate_hash_secret_salt for an instance
-of XML_Parser if XML_SetHashSalt was either (a) not called
-for that instance or if (b) salt 0 was passed to XML_SetHashSalt
-prior to parsing. That call to srand passed (rather litle)
-entropy extracted from the current time as a seed for srand.
-
-That call to srand (1) broke repeatability for code calling
-srand with a non-random seed prior to parsing with Expat,
-and (2) resulted in a rather small set of hashing salts in
-Expat in total.
-
-For a short- to mid-term fix, the new approach avoids calling
-srand altogether, extracts more entropy out of the clock and
-other sources, too.
-
-For a long term fix, we may want to read sizeof(long) bytes
-from a source like getrandom(..) on Linux, and from similar
-sources on other supported architectures.
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1197087
----
- CMakeLists.txt | 3 +++
- lib/xmlparse.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
-index 353627e..524d514 100755
---- a/CMakeLists.txt
-+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
-@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ include_directories(${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR} ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/lib)
- if(MSVC)
- add_definitions(-D_CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS -wd4996)
- endif(MSVC)
-+if(WIN32)
-+ add_definitions(-DCOMPILED_FROM_DSP)
-+endif(WIN32)
-
- set(expat_SRCS
- lib/xmlparse.c
-diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
-index e308c79..c5f942f 100644
---- a/lib/xmlparse.c
-+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
-@@ -6,7 +6,14 @@
- #include <string.h> /* memset(), memcpy() */
- #include <assert.h>
- #include <limits.h> /* UINT_MAX */
--#include <time.h> /* time() */
-+
-+#ifdef COMPILED_FROM_DSP
-+#define getpid GetCurrentProcessId
-+#else
-+#include <sys/time.h> /* gettimeofday() */
-+#include <sys/types.h> /* getpid() */
-+#include <unistd.h> /* getpid() */
-+#endif
-
- #define XML_BUILDING_EXPAT 1
-
-@@ -432,7 +439,7 @@ static ELEMENT_TYPE *
- getElementType(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc,
- const char *ptr, const char *end);
-
--static unsigned long generate_hash_secret_salt(void);
-+static unsigned long generate_hash_secret_salt(XML_Parser parser);
- static XML_Bool startParsing(XML_Parser parser);
-
- static XML_Parser
-@@ -691,11 +698,38 @@ static const XML_Char implicitContext[] = {
- };
-
- static unsigned long
--generate_hash_secret_salt(void)
-+gather_time_entropy(void)
- {
-- unsigned int seed = time(NULL) % UINT_MAX;
-- srand(seed);
-- return rand();
-+#ifdef COMPILED_FROM_DSP
-+ FILETIME ft;
-+ GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ft); /* never fails */
-+ return ft.dwHighDateTime ^ ft.dwLowDateTime;
-+#else
-+ struct timeval tv;
-+ int gettimeofday_res;
-+
-+ gettimeofday_res = gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
-+ assert (gettimeofday_res == 0);
-+
-+ /* Microseconds time is <20 bits entropy */
-+ return tv.tv_usec;
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+static unsigned long
-+generate_hash_secret_salt(XML_Parser parser)
-+{
-+ /* Process ID is 0 bits entropy if attacker has local access
-+ * XML_Parser address is few bits of entropy if attacker has local access */
-+ const unsigned long entropy =
-+ gather_time_entropy() ^ getpid() ^ (unsigned long)parser;
-+
-+ /* Factors are 2^31-1 and 2^61-1 (Mersenne primes M31 and M61) */
-+ if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 4) {
-+ return entropy * 2147483647;
-+ } else {
-+ return entropy * 2305843009213693951;
-+ }
- }
-
- static XML_Bool /* only valid for root parser */
-@@ -703,7 +737,7 @@ startParsing(XML_Parser parser)
- {
- /* hash functions must be initialized before setContext() is called */
- if (hash_secret_salt == 0)
-- hash_secret_salt = generate_hash_secret_salt();
-+ hash_secret_salt = generate_hash_secret_salt(parser);
- if (ns) {
- /* implicit context only set for root parser, since child
- parsers (i.e. external entity parsers) will inherit it
---
-2.8.2
-