diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch | 130 |
1 files changed, 130 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fc72e42e03 --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/cyrus-sasl-CVE-2013-4122.patch @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +Fix CVE-2013-4122. + +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-4122 + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: +https://github.com/cyrusimap/cyrus-sasl/commit/dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d + +From dedad73e5e7a75d01a5f3d5a6702ab8ccd2ff40d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: mancha <mancha1@hush.com> +Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2013 10:08:07 +0100 +Subject: Handle NULL returns from glibc 2.17+ crypt() + +Starting with glibc 2.17 (eglibc 2.17), crypt() fails with EINVAL +(w/ NULL return) if the salt violates specifications. Additionally, +on FIPS-140 enabled Linux systems, DES/MD5-encrypted passwords +passed to crypt() fail with EPERM (w/ NULL return). + +When using glibc's crypt(), check return value to avoid a possible +NULL pointer dereference. + +Patch by mancha1@hush.com. +--- + pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c | 3 ++- + pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c | 4 +++- + saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c | 4 +++- + saslauthd/auth_shadow.c | 8 +++----- + 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c +index 4b34222..400289c 100644 +--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c ++++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getpwnam.c +@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ char *userid; + char *password; + { + char* r; ++ char* crpt_passwd; + struct passwd *pwd; + + pwd = getpwnam(userid); +@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ char *password; + else if (pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '*') { + r = "Account disabled"; + } +- else if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) { ++ else if (!(crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->pw_passwd)) || strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) { + r = "Incorrect password"; + } + else { +diff --git a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c +index 2b11286..6d607bb 100644 +--- a/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c ++++ b/pwcheck/pwcheck_getspnam.c +@@ -32,13 +32,15 @@ char *userid; + char *password; + { + struct spwd *pwd; ++ char *crpt_passwd; + + pwd = getspnam(userid); + if (!pwd) { + return "Userid not found"; + } + +- if (strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp)) != 0) { ++ crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pwd->sp_pwdp); ++ if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pwd->sp_pwdp, (const char *)crpt_passwd) != 0) { + return "Incorrect password"; + } + else { +diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c +index fc8029d..d4ebe54 100644 +--- a/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c ++++ b/saslauthd/auth_getpwent.c +@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ auth_getpwent ( + { + /* VARIABLES */ + struct passwd *pw; /* pointer to passwd file entry */ ++ char *crpt_passwd; /* encrypted password */ + int errnum; + /* END VARIABLES */ + +@@ -105,7 +106,8 @@ auth_getpwent ( + } + } + +- if (strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd))) { ++ crpt_passwd = crypt(password, pw->pw_passwd); ++ if (!crpt_passwd || strcmp(pw->pw_passwd, (const char *)crpt_passwd)) { + if (flags & VERBOSE) { + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_getpwent: %s: invalid password", login); + } +diff --git a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c +index 677131b..1988afd 100644 +--- a/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c ++++ b/saslauthd/auth_shadow.c +@@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ auth_shadow ( + RETURN("NO Insufficient permission to access NIS authentication database (saslauthd)"); + } + +- cpw = strdup((const char *)crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp)); +- if (strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, cpw)) { ++ cpw = crypt(password, sp->sp_pwdp); ++ if (!cpw || strcmp(sp->sp_pwdp, (const char *)cpw)) { + if (flags & VERBOSE) { + /* + * This _should_ reveal the SHADOW_PW_LOCKED prefix to an +@@ -221,10 +221,8 @@ auth_shadow ( + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "DEBUG: auth_shadow: pw mismatch: '%s' != '%s'", + sp->sp_pwdp, cpw); + } +- free(cpw); + RETURN("NO Incorrect password"); + } +- free(cpw); + + /* + * The following fields will be set to -1 if: +@@ -286,7 +284,7 @@ auth_shadow ( + RETURN("NO Invalid username"); + } + +- if (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) != 0) { ++ if (!(cpw = crypt(password, upw->upw_passwd)) || (strcmp(upw->upw_passwd, (const char *)cpw) != 0)) { + if (flags & VERBOSE) { + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "auth_shadow: pw mismatch: %s != %s", + password, upw->upw_passwd); +-- +cgit v0.12 + |