gnu: wpa-supplicant-minimal: Fix CVE-2021-30004.

* gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch: New patch.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Register it.
* gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal): Apply patch.

3 files changed, 118 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 1269bf0e47..1a767a6c89 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -1803,6 +1803,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA =						\
   %D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-3908-pt1.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-3908-pt2.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-27803.patch	\
+  %D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch	\
   %D%/packages/patches/x265-arm-flags.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/xf86-video-ark-remove-mibstore.patch	\
   %D%/packages/patches/xf86-video-mach64-glibc-2.20.patch	\
diff --git a/gnu/packages/admin.scm b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
index d5b4d34323..2b12b5d5e4 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/admin.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/admin.scm
@@ -1658,7 +1658,8 @@ features of sudo with a fraction of the codebase.")
                      (string-append "#" line)))
                   #t))
               (patches
-               (search-patches "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-27803.patch"))))
+               (search-patches "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-27803.patch"
+                               "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch"))))
     (build-system gnu-build-system)
     (arguments
      `(#:phases
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c8ba93355
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2021-30004.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+From a0541334a6394f8237a4393b7372693cd7e96f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sat, 13 Mar 2021 18:19:31 +0200
+Subject: ASN.1: Validate DigestAlgorithmIdentifier parameters
+
+The supported hash algorithms do not use AlgorithmIdentifier parameters.
+However, there are implementations that include NULL parameters in
+addition to ones that omit the parameters. Previous implementation did
+not check the parameters value at all which supported both these cases,
+but did not reject any other unexpected information.
+
+Use strict validation of digest algorithm parameters and reject any
+unexpected value when validating a signature. This is needed to prevent
+potential forging attacks.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/tls/pkcs1.c  | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ src/tls/x509v3.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
+index bbdb0d7..5761dfe 100644
+--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c
++++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c
+@@ -244,6 +244,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
+ 		os_free(decrypted);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestInfo",
++		    hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+ 
+ 	pos = hdr.payload;
+ 	end = pos + hdr.length;
+@@ -265,6 +267,8 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
+ 		os_free(decrypted);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier",
++		    hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+ 	da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length;
+ 
+ 	if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) {
+@@ -273,6 +277,23 @@ int pkcs1_v15_sig_ver(struct crypto_public_key *pk,
+ 		os_free(decrypted);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PKCS #1: Digest algorithm parameters",
++		    next, da_end - next);
++
++	/*
++	 * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to
++	 * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these
++	 * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else.
++	 */
++	if (da_end > next &&
++	    (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 ||
++	     !asn1_is_null(&hdr) ||
++	     hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "PKCS #1: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters");
++		os_free(decrypted);
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (!asn1_oid_equal(&oid, hash_alg)) {
+ 		char txt[100], txt2[100];
+diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c
+index a8944dd..df337ec 100644
+--- a/src/tls/x509v3.c
++++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c
+@@ -1964,6 +1964,7 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
+ 		os_free(data);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestInfo", hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+ 
+ 	pos = hdr.payload;
+ 	end = pos + hdr.length;
+@@ -1985,6 +1986,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
+ 		os_free(data);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: DigestAlgorithmIdentifier",
++		    hdr.payload, hdr.length);
+ 	da_end = hdr.payload + hdr.length;
+ 
+ 	if (asn1_get_oid(hdr.payload, hdr.length, &oid, &next)) {
+@@ -1992,6 +1995,23 @@ int x509_check_signature(struct x509_certificate *issuer,
+ 		os_free(data);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++	wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "X509: Digest algorithm parameters",
++		    next, da_end - next);
++
++	/*
++	 * RFC 5754: The correct encoding for the SHA2 algorithms would be to
++	 * omit the parameters, but there are implementation that encode these
++	 * as a NULL element. Allow these two cases and reject anything else.
++	 */
++	if (da_end > next &&
++	    (asn1_get_next(next, da_end - next, &hdr) < 0 ||
++	     !asn1_is_null(&hdr) ||
++	     hdr.payload + hdr.length != da_end)) {
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
++			   "X509: Unexpected digest algorithm parameters");
++		os_free(data);
++		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (x509_sha1_oid(&oid)) {
+ 		if (signature->oid.oid[6] != 5 /* sha-1WithRSAEncryption */) {
+-- 
+cgit v0.12
+