gnu: libvnc: Update to 0.9.13.

* gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2018-20750.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2019-15681.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Adjust accordingly.
* gnu/packages/vnc.scm (libvnc): Update to 0.9.13.
[source](patches): Remove.
[arguments]: Add phase to patch 'cc' invocation.

2 files changed, 0 insertions, 67 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2018-20750.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2018-20750.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 146243670a..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2018-20750.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 09e8fc02f59f16e2583b34fe1a270c238bd9ffec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20P=C3=ADsa=C5=99?= <ppisar@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 10:40:01 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Limit lenght to INT_MAX bytes in
- rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer()
-
-This ammends 15bb719c03cc70f14c36a843dcb16ed69b405707 fix for a heap
-out-of-bound write access in rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer() when
-reading a transfered file content in a server. The former fix did not
-work on platforms with a 32-bit int type (expected by rfbReadExact()).
-
-CVE-2018-15127
-<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/243>
-<https://github.com/LibVNC/libvncserver/issues/273>
----
- libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-index 7af84906..f2edbeea 100644
---- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-+++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@
- #include <errno.h>
- /* strftime() */
- #include <time.h>
-+/* INT_MAX */
-+#include <limits.h>
- 
- #ifdef LIBVNCSERVER_WITH_WEBSOCKETS
- #include "rfbssl.h"
-@@ -1472,8 +1474,11 @@ char *rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer(rfbClientPtr cl, uint32_t length)
-        0XFFFFFFFF, i.e. SIZE_MAX for 32-bit systems. On 64-bit systems, a length of 0XFFFFFFFF
-        will safely be allocated since this check will never trigger and malloc() can digest length+1
-        without problems as length is a uint32_t.
-+       We also later pass length to rfbReadExact() that expects a signed int type and
-+       that might wrap on platforms with a 32-bit int type if length is bigger
-+       than 0X7FFFFFFF.
-     */
--    if(length == SIZE_MAX) {
-+    if(length == SIZE_MAX || length > INT_MAX) {
- 	rfbErr("rfbProcessFileTransferReadBuffer: too big file transfer length requested: %u", (unsigned int)length);
- 	rfbCloseClient(cl);
- 	return NULL;
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2019-15681.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2019-15681.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e328d87920..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/libvnc-CVE-2019-15681.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-From d01e1bb4246323ba6fcee3b82ef1faa9b1dac82a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Christian Beier <dontmind@freeshell.org>
-Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2019 22:32:25 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] rfbserver: don't leak stack memory to the remote
-
-Thanks go to Pavel Cheremushkin of Kaspersky for reporting.
----
- libvncserver/rfbserver.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-index 3bacc891..310e5487 100644
---- a/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-+++ b/libvncserver/rfbserver.c
-@@ -3724,6 +3724,8 @@ rfbSendServerCutText(rfbScreenInfoPtr rfbScreen,char *str, int len)
-     rfbServerCutTextMsg sct;
-     rfbClientIteratorPtr iterator;
- 
-+    memset((char *)&sct, 0, sizeof(sct));
-+
-     iterator = rfbGetClientIterator(rfbScreen);
-     while ((cl = rfbClientIteratorNext(iterator)) != NULL) {
-         sct.type = rfbServerCutText;