gnu: spice: Fix CVE-2016-9577 and CVE-2016-9578.

* gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch: New files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Register them.
* gnu/packages/spice.scm (spice)[source]: Use them.

3 files changed, 104 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a2cb558cd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+Prevent buffer overflow when reading large messages.
+
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1401603
+https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9577
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9577
+https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9577
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=5f96b596353d73bdf4bb3cd2de61e48a7fd5b4c3
+
+From 5f96b596353d73bdf4bb3cd2de61e48a7fd5b4c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 16:46:56 +0000
+Subject: main-channel: Prevent overflow reading messages from client
+
+diff --git a/server/main_channel.c b/server/main_channel.c
+index 0ecc9df..1fc3915 100644
+--- a/server/main_channel.c
++++ b/server/main_channel.c
+@@ -1026,6 +1026,9 @@ static uint8_t *main_channel_alloc_msg_rcv_buf(RedChannelClient *rcc,
+ 
+     if (type == SPICE_MSGC_MAIN_AGENT_DATA) {
+         return reds_get_agent_data_buffer(mcc, size);
++    } else if (size > sizeof(main_chan->recv_buf)) {
++        /* message too large, caller will log a message and close the connection */
++        return NULL;
+     } else {
+         return main_chan->recv_buf;
+     }
+-- 
+cgit v0.10.2
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f86cdb4eb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+Prevent possible DoS during protocol handshake.
+
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1399566
+https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9578
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9578
+https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9578
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a
+
+From 1c6517973095a67c8cb57f3550fc1298404ab556 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:39:48 +0000
+Subject: Prevent possible DoS attempts during protocol handshake
+
+diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
+index f40b65c..86a33d5 100644
+--- a/server/reds.c
++++ b/server/reds.c
+@@ -2202,7 +2202,8 @@ static void reds_handle_read_header_done(void *opaque)
+ 
+     reds->peer_minor_version = header->minor_version;
+ 
+-    if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess)) {
++    /* the check for 4096 is to avoid clients to cause arbitrary big memory allocations */
++    if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess) || header->size > 4096) {
+         reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
+         spice_warning("bad size %u", header->size);
+         reds_link_free(link);
+-- 
+cgit v0.10.2
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..76f7ec7ffb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+Fixes a potential buffer overflow in the protocol handling.
+
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1399566
+https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9578
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9578
+https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9578
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a
+
+From f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:40:10 +0000
+Subject: Prevent integer overflows in capability checks
+
+diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
+index 86a33d5..9150454 100644
+--- a/server/reds.c
++++ b/server/reds.c
+@@ -2110,6 +2110,14 @@ static void reds_handle_read_link_done(void *opaque)
+     link_mess->num_channel_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_channel_caps);
+     link_mess->num_common_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_common_caps);
+ 
++    /* Prevent DoS. Currently we defined only 13 capabilities,
++     * I expect 1024 to be valid for quite a lot time */
++    if (link_mess->num_channel_caps > 1024 || link_mess->num_common_caps > 1024) {
++        reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
++        reds_link_free(link);
++        return;
++    }
++
+     num_caps = link_mess->num_common_caps + link_mess->num_channel_caps;
+     caps = (uint32_t *)((uint8_t *)link_mess + link_mess->caps_offset);
+ 
+-- 
+cgit v0.10.2
+