gnu: spice: Update to 0.14.0.

This is a follow-up to commit 9a187b39b7991463aa6985f5b746fccf69789525.

* gnu/packages/spice.scm (spice): Update to 0.14.0.
[source]: Remove obsolete patches. Use HTTPS URL.
[inputs]: Add orc.
[home-page]: Update to use https.
* gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.

4 files changed, 0 insertions, 262 deletions

diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a2cb558cd3..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9577.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-Prevent buffer overflow when reading large messages.
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1401603
-https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9577
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9577
-https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9577
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=5f96b596353d73bdf4bb3cd2de61e48a7fd5b4c3
-
-From 5f96b596353d73bdf4bb3cd2de61e48a7fd5b4c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2016 16:46:56 +0000
-Subject: main-channel: Prevent overflow reading messages from client
-
-diff --git a/server/main_channel.c b/server/main_channel.c
-index 0ecc9df..1fc3915 100644
---- a/server/main_channel.c
-+++ b/server/main_channel.c
-@@ -1026,6 +1026,9 @@ static uint8_t *main_channel_alloc_msg_rcv_buf(RedChannelClient *rcc,
- 
-     if (type == SPICE_MSGC_MAIN_AGENT_DATA) {
-         return reds_get_agent_data_buffer(mcc, size);
-+    } else if (size > sizeof(main_chan->recv_buf)) {
-+        /* message too large, caller will log a message and close the connection */
-+        return NULL;
-     } else {
-         return main_chan->recv_buf;
-     }
--- 
-cgit v0.10.2
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f86cdb4eb1..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-Prevent possible DoS during protocol handshake.
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1399566
-https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9578
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9578
-https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9578
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a
-
-From 1c6517973095a67c8cb57f3550fc1298404ab556 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:39:48 +0000
-Subject: Prevent possible DoS attempts during protocol handshake
-
-diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
-index f40b65c..86a33d5 100644
---- a/server/reds.c
-+++ b/server/reds.c
-@@ -2202,7 +2202,8 @@ static void reds_handle_read_header_done(void *opaque)
- 
-     reds->peer_minor_version = header->minor_version;
- 
--    if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess)) {
-+    /* the check for 4096 is to avoid clients to cause arbitrary big memory allocations */
-+    if (header->size < sizeof(SpiceLinkMess) || header->size > 4096) {
-         reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
-         spice_warning("bad size %u", header->size);
-         reds_link_free(link);
--- 
-cgit v0.10.2
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 76f7ec7ffb..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-Fixes a potential buffer overflow in the protocol handling.
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1399566
-https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9578
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9578
-https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9578
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a
-
-From f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:40:10 +0000
-Subject: Prevent integer overflows in capability checks
-
-diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
-index 86a33d5..9150454 100644
---- a/server/reds.c
-+++ b/server/reds.c
-@@ -2110,6 +2110,14 @@ static void reds_handle_read_link_done(void *opaque)
-     link_mess->num_channel_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_channel_caps);
-     link_mess->num_common_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_common_caps);
- 
-+    /* Prevent DoS. Currently we defined only 13 capabilities,
-+     * I expect 1024 to be valid for quite a lot time */
-+    if (link_mess->num_channel_caps > 1024 || link_mess->num_common_caps > 1024) {
-+        reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
-+        reds_link_free(link);
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-     num_caps = link_mess->num_common_caps + link_mess->num_channel_caps;
-     caps = (uint32_t *)((uint8_t *)link_mess + link_mess->caps_offset);
- 
--- 
-cgit v0.10.2
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 37d8f02831..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2017-7506.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2017-7506:
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1452606
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-7506
-
-Patches copied from Debian spice package version
-'spice_0.12.8-2.1+deb9u1.debian.tar.xz':
-http://security.debian.org/debian-security/pool/updates/main/s/spice/spice_0.12.8-2.1+deb9u1.debian.tar.xz
-
-The patches had to be adapted to apply to the latest spice tarball, and
-are based on these upstream commits:
-
-https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=111ab38611cef5012f1565a65fa2d8a8a05cce37
-https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=571cec91e71c2aae0d5f439ea2d8439d0c3d75eb
-https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=fbbcdad773e2791cfb988f4748faa41943551ca6
-
-From 257f69d619fed407493156c8a7b952abc8a51314 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100
-Subject: [spice-server 1/3] reds: Disconnect when receiving overly big
- ClientMonitorsConfig
-
-Total message size received from the client was unlimited. There is
-a 2kiB size check on individual agent messages, but the MonitorsConfig
-message can be split in multiple chunks, and the size of the
-non-chunked MonitorsConfig message was never checked. This could easily
-lead to memory exhaustion on the host.
-
----
- server/reds.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
-index f439a3668..7be85fdfc 100644
---- a/server/reds.c
-+++ b/server/reds.c
-@@ -993,19 +993,34 @@ static void reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(void)
- static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
-         MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size)
- {
-+    const unsigned int MAX_MONITORS = 256;
-+    const unsigned int MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE =
-+       sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig) + MAX_MONITORS * sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig);
-+
-     VDAgentMessage *msg_header;
-     VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config;
-     RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config;
- 
-+    // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through
-+    // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows
-+    if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) + MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE - cmc->buffer_size < size) {
-+        goto overflow;
-+    }
-     cmc->buffer_size += size;
-     cmc->buffer = realloc(cmc->buffer, cmc->buffer_size);
-     spice_assert(cmc->buffer);
-     cmc->mcc = mcc;
-     memcpy(cmc->buffer + cmc->buffer_pos, message, size);
-     cmc->buffer_pos += size;
-+    if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size) {
-+        spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size);
-+        return;
-+    }
-     msg_header = (VDAgentMessage *)cmc->buffer;
--    if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size ||
--            msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) {
-+    if (msg_header->size > MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE) {
-+        goto overflow;
-+    }
-+    if (msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) {
-         spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size);
-         return;
-     }
-@@ -1013,6 +1028,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
-     spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors);
-     red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config);
-     reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup();
-+    return;
-+
-+overflow:
-+    spice_warning("received invalid MonitorsConfig request from client, disconnecting");
-+    red_channel_client_disconnect(main_channel_client_get_base(mcc));
-+    reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup();
- }
- 
- void reds_on_main_agent_data(MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size)
--- 
-2.13.0
-From ff2b4ef70181087d5abd50bad76d026ec5088a93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100
-Subject: [spice-server 2/3] reds: Avoid integer overflows handling monitor
- configuration
-
-Avoid VDAgentMessage::size integer overflows.
-
----
- server/reds.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
-index 7be85fdfc..e1c8c1086 100644
---- a/server/reds.c
-+++ b/server/reds.c
-@@ -1024,6 +1024,9 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
-         spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size);
-         return;
-     }
-+    if (msg_header->size < sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) {
-+        goto overflow;
-+    }
-     monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header));
-     spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors);
-     red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config);
--- 
-2.13.0
-From 8cc3d7df2792751939cc832f4110c57e2addfca5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100
-Subject: [spice-server 3/3] reds: Avoid buffer overflows handling monitor
- configuration
-
-It was also possible for a malicious client to set
-VDAgentMonitorsConfig::num_of_monitors to a number larger
-than the actual size of VDAgentMOnitorsConfig::monitors.
-This would lead to buffer overflows, which could allow the guest to
-read part of the host memory. This might cause write overflows in the
-host as well, but controlling the content of such buffers seems
-complicated.
-
----
- server/reds.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
-index e1c8c1086..3a42c3755 100644
---- a/server/reds.c
-+++ b/server/reds.c
-@@ -1000,6 +1000,7 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
-     VDAgentMessage *msg_header;
-     VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config;
-     RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config;
-+    uint32_t max_monitors;
- 
-     // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through
-     // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows
-@@ -1028,6 +1029,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config(
-         goto overflow;
-     }
-     monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header));
-+    // limit the monitor number to avoid buffer overflows
-+    max_monitors = (msg_header->size - sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) /
-+                   sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig);
-+    if (monitors_config->num_of_monitors > max_monitors) {
-+        goto overflow;
-+    }
-     spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors);
-     red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config);
-     reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup();
--- 
-2.13.0