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author | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-10-08 10:59:39 -0400 |
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committer | Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org> | 2015-10-08 10:59:39 -0400 |
commit | b81378251c629615aff0d62ca686bb53a10367de (patch) | |
tree | 4c15f2be58d665cf0eed1e00c84f70764890c3b8 /gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch | |
parent | 319fe79dd01e03c4ef61311c336bcd77e1133f02 (diff) | |
parent | b5881775ac2db345bf5826d6351366346ff03275 (diff) | |
download | guix-b81378251c629615aff0d62ca686bb53a10367de.tar guix-b81378251c629615aff0d62ca686bb53a10367de.tar.gz |
Merge branch 'master' into core-updates
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch | 42 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 42 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch deleted file mode 100644 index de1964ca76..0000000000 --- a/gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-1863.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ -From 9ed4eee345f85e3025c33c6e20aa25696e341ccd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> -Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 11:32:11 +0300 -Subject: [PATCH] P2P: Validate SSID element length before copying it - (CVE-2015-1863) - -This fixes a possible memcpy overflow for P2P dev->oper_ssid in -p2p_add_device(). The length provided by the peer device (0..255 bytes) -was used without proper bounds checking and that could have resulted in -arbitrary data of up to 223 bytes being written beyond the end of the -dev->oper_ssid[] array (of which about 150 bytes would be beyond the -heap allocation) when processing a corrupted management frame for P2P -peer discovery purposes. - -This could result in corrupted state in heap, unexpected program -behavior due to corrupted P2P peer device information, denial of service -due to process crash, exposure of memory contents during GO Negotiation, -and potentially arbitrary code execution. - -Thanks to Google security team for reporting this issue and smart -hardware research group of Alibaba security team for discovering it. - -Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> ---- - src/p2p/p2p.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/src/p2p/p2p.c b/src/p2p/p2p.c -index f584fae..a45fe73 100644 ---- a/src/p2p/p2p.c -+++ b/src/p2p/p2p.c -@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ int p2p_add_device(struct p2p_data *p2p, const u8 *addr, int freq, - if (os_memcmp(addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN) != 0) - os_memcpy(dev->interface_addr, addr, ETH_ALEN); - if (msg.ssid && -+ msg.ssid[1] <= sizeof(dev->oper_ssid) && - (msg.ssid[1] != P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN || - os_memcmp(msg.ssid + 2, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID, P2P_WILDCARD_SSID_LEN) - != 0)) { --- -1.9.1 - |