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| author | Efraim Flashner <efraim@flashner.co.il> | 2017-02-20 12:56:14 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Efraim Flashner <efraim@flashner.co.il> | 2017-02-20 12:56:14 +0200 |
| commit | d15432ca9e9359b865aac63ae47863e94bbce0e4 (patch) | |
| tree | be4e6f52cb8e31f5b5fad637c95c0a730ea76081 /gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch | |
| parent | def971689052ebc3e0a68684328c28cac35b8596 (diff) | |
| parent | 3b254d76132627ff62ac5571f4175669164624c5 (diff) | |
| download | guix-d15432ca9e9359b865aac63ae47863e94bbce0e4.tar guix-d15432ca9e9359b865aac63ae47863e94bbce0e4.tar.gz | |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into core-updates
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch | 38 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..76f7ec7ffb --- /dev/null +++ b/gnu/packages/patches/spice-CVE-2016-9578-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +Fixes a potential buffer overflow in the protocol handling. + +https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1399566 +https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2016-9578 +https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-9578 +https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2016-9578 + +Patch copied from upstream source repository: + +https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?h=0.12&id=f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a + +From f66dc643635518e53dfbe5262f814a64eec54e4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> +Date: Tue, 13 Dec 2016 14:40:10 +0000 +Subject: Prevent integer overflows in capability checks + +diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c +index 86a33d5..9150454 100644 +--- a/server/reds.c ++++ b/server/reds.c +@@ -2110,6 +2110,14 @@ static void reds_handle_read_link_done(void *opaque) + link_mess->num_channel_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_channel_caps); + link_mess->num_common_caps = GUINT32_FROM_LE(link_mess->num_common_caps); + ++ /* Prevent DoS. Currently we defined only 13 capabilities, ++ * I expect 1024 to be valid for quite a lot time */ ++ if (link_mess->num_channel_caps > 1024 || link_mess->num_common_caps > 1024) { ++ reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA); ++ reds_link_free(link); ++ return; ++ } ++ + num_caps = link_mess->num_common_caps + link_mess->num_channel_caps; + caps = (uint32_t *)((uint8_t *)link_mess + link_mess->caps_offset); + +-- +cgit v0.10.2 + |