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authorLudovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>2022-01-26 12:52:59 +0100
committerLudovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>2022-01-26 17:54:59 +0100
commit3993d33d1c0129b1ca6f0fd122fe2bbe48e4f093 (patch)
tree182bbe63da023c76e743cbda553bf315bc4ea579 /gnu/packages/patches/polkit-CVE-2021-4034.patch
parent73d775f518e8bf9c658cb0a161b22209c71e75aa (diff)
downloadguix-3993d33d1c0129b1ca6f0fd122fe2bbe48e4f093.tar
guix-3993d33d1c0129b1ca6f0fd122fe2bbe48e4f093.tar.gz
gnu: polkit: Fix CVE-2021-4034.
* gnu/packages/patches/polkit-CVE-2021-4034.patch: New file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it. * gnu/packages/polkit.scm (polkit-mozjs)[replacement]: New field. * gnu/packages/polkit.scm (polkit-mozjs/fixed): New variable.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/polkit-CVE-2021-4034.patch')
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/polkit-CVE-2021-4034.patch82
1 files changed, 82 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/polkit-CVE-2021-4034.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/polkit-CVE-2021-4034.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ca766cb3be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/polkit-CVE-2021-4034.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+Fixes CVE-2021-4034, local privilege escalation with 'pkexec':
+
+ https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/01/25/11
+
+Patch from <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/polkit/polkit/-/commit/a2bf5c9c83b6ae46cbd5c779d3055bff81ded683>.
+
+From a2bf5c9c83b6ae46cbd5c779d3055bff81ded683 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Rybar <jrybar@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 17:21:46 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] pkexec: local privilege escalation (CVE-2021-4034)
+
+---
+ src/programs/pkcheck.c | 5 +++++
+ src/programs/pkexec.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/programs/pkcheck.c b/src/programs/pkcheck.c
+index f1bb4e1..768525c 100644
+--- a/src/programs/pkcheck.c
++++ b/src/programs/pkcheck.c
+@@ -363,6 +363,11 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ local_agent_handle = NULL;
+ ret = 126;
+
++ if (argc < 1)
++ {
++ exit(126);
++ }
++
+ /* Disable remote file access from GIO. */
+ setenv ("GIO_USE_VFS", "local", 1);
+
+diff --git a/src/programs/pkexec.c b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+index 7698c5c..84e5ef6 100644
+--- a/src/programs/pkexec.c
++++ b/src/programs/pkexec.c
+@@ -488,6 +488,15 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ pid_t pid_of_caller;
+ gpointer local_agent_handle;
+
++
++ /*
++ * If 'pkexec' is called THIS wrong, someone's probably evil-doing. Don't be nice, just bail out.
++ */
++ if (argc<1)
++ {
++ exit(127);
++ }
++
+ ret = 127;
+ authority = NULL;
+ subject = NULL;
+@@ -614,10 +623,10 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+
+ path = g_strdup (pwstruct.pw_shell);
+ if (!path)
+- {
++ {
+ g_printerr ("No shell configured or error retrieving pw_shell\n");
+ goto out;
+- }
++ }
+ /* If you change this, be sure to change the if (!command_line)
+ case below too */
+ command_line = g_strdup (path);
+@@ -636,7 +645,15 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ goto out;
+ }
+ g_free (path);
+- argv[n] = path = s;
++ path = s;
++
++ /* argc<2 and pkexec runs just shell, argv is guaranteed to be null-terminated.
++ * /-less shell shouldn't happen, but let's be defensive and don't write to null-termination
++ */
++ if (argv[n] != NULL)
++ {
++ argv[n] = path;
++ }
+ }
+ if (access (path, F_OK) != 0)
+ {