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authorMarius Bakke <marius@gnu.org>2020-06-02 23:40:19 +0200
committerMarius Bakke <marius@gnu.org>2020-06-02 23:41:35 +0200
commit9a46e0dd843a2f4c832f74e9a503e7200c934eb7 (patch)
treebdd1a84911e1bf91686ea99a3aa2410a6a62cf53 /gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch
parent395659d86d98afaba4d311ca5618f49a4548f6ae (diff)
downloadguix-9a46e0dd843a2f4c832f74e9a503e7200c934eb7.tar
guix-9a46e0dd843a2f4c832f74e9a503e7200c934eb7.tar.gz
gnu: dbus: Fix CVE-2020-12049.
* gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch: New file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Adjust accordingly. * gnu/packages/glib.scm (dbus/fixed): New variable. (dbus)[replacement]: New field.
Diffstat (limited to 'gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch')
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch58
1 files changed, 58 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..71280144a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/dbus-CVE-2020-12049.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+Fix CVE-2020-12049:
+
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-12049
+https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/ftp-release/2020-June/000753.html
+
+Taken from upstream:
+
+https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/-/commit/272d484283883fa9ff95b69d924fff6cd34842f5
+
+diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c
+--- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c
++++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c
+@@ -435,18 +435,6 @@ _dbus_read_socket_with_unix_fds (DBusSocket fd,
+ struct cmsghdr *cm;
+ dbus_bool_t found = FALSE;
+
+- if (m.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
+- {
+- /* Hmm, apparently the control data was truncated. The bad
+- thing is that we might have completely lost a couple of fds
+- without chance to recover them. Hence let's treat this as a
+- serious error. */
+-
+- errno = ENOSPC;
+- _dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start);
+- return -1;
+- }
+-
+ for (cm = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&m); cm; cm = CMSG_NXTHDR(&m, cm))
+ if (cm->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cm->cmsg_type == SCM_RIGHTS)
+ {
+@@ -501,6 +489,26 @@ _dbus_read_socket_with_unix_fds (DBusSocket fd,
+ if (!found)
+ *n_fds = 0;
+
++ if (m.msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
++ {
++ unsigned int i;
++
++ /* Hmm, apparently the control data was truncated. The bad
++ thing is that we might have completely lost a couple of fds
++ without chance to recover them. Hence let's treat this as a
++ serious error. */
++
++ /* We still need to close whatever fds we *did* receive,
++ * otherwise they'll never get closed. (CVE-2020-12049) */
++ for (i = 0; i < *n_fds; i++)
++ close (fds[i]);
++
++ *n_fds = 0;
++ errno = ENOSPC;
++ _dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start);
++ return -1;
++ }
++
+ /* put length back (doesn't actually realloc) */
+ _dbus_string_set_length (buffer, start + bytes_read);
+