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authorLeo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>2017-07-08 11:00:47 -0400
committerLeo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>2017-07-10 13:31:58 -0400
commit625e7cd654418aa8c5af9f49189d67b9d550b8ea (patch)
treee315dc062e1e02dd3361e1d196c199453c34d149
parentef019092b98e1337acac51525e8e4e092267f69c (diff)
downloadguix-625e7cd654418aa8c5af9f49189d67b9d550b8ea.tar
guix-625e7cd654418aa8c5af9f49189d67b9d550b8ea.tar.gz
gnu: ncurses: Fix CVE-2017-10684 and CVE-2017-10685.
* gnu/packages/patches/ncurses-CVE-2017-10684-10685.patch: New file. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add it. * gnu/packages/ncurses.scm (ncurses)[replacement]: New field. (ncurses/fixed): New variable.
-rw-r--r--gnu/local.mk1
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/ncurses.scm14
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/ncurses-CVE-2017-10684-10685.patch200
3 files changed, 214 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index d792ff701a..e405372699 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -845,6 +845,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/mupen64plus-ui-console-notice.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/musl-CVE-2016-8859.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/mutt-store-references.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/ncurses-CVE-2017-10684-10685.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/net-tools-bitrot.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/netcdf-date-time.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/netcdf-tst_h_par.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/ncurses.scm b/gnu/packages/ncurses.scm
index 44a79e7186..0b23baf129 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/ncurses.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/ncurses.scm
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
;;; GNU Guix --- Functional package management for GNU
;;; Copyright © 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>
;;; Copyright © 2014, 2016 Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org>
-;;; Copyright © 2015 Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>
+;;; Copyright © 2015, 2017 Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>
;;; Copyright © 2016 ng0 <ng0@we.make.ritual.n0.is>
;;; Copyright © 2016 Efraim Flashner <efraim@flashner.co.il>
;;; Copyright © 2016 Jan Nieuwenhuizen <janneke@gnu.org>
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
(define-public ncurses
(package
(name "ncurses")
+ (replacement ncurses/fixed)
(version "6.0")
(source (origin
(method url-fetch)
@@ -188,6 +189,17 @@ ncursesw library provides wide character support.")
(license x11)
(home-page "https://www.gnu.org/software/ncurses/")))
+(define ncurses/fixed
+ (package
+ (inherit ncurses)
+ (source
+ (origin
+ (inherit (package-source ncurses))
+ (patches
+ (append
+ (origin-patches (package-source ncurses))
+ (search-patches "ncurses-CVE-2017-10684-10685.patch")))))))
+
(define-public dialog
(package
(name "dialog")
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/ncurses-CVE-2017-10684-10685.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/ncurses-CVE-2017-10684-10685.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1f1b26801d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/ncurses-CVE-2017-10684-10685.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+Fix CVE-2017-10684 and CVE-2017-10685:
+
+http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-10684
+http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-10685
+
+Bug reports included proof of concept reproducer inputs:
+
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464684
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464685
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464686
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464687
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464688
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464691
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1464692
+
+Patches copied from ncurses patch release 20170701:
+
+ftp://invisible-island.net/ncurses/6.0/ncurses-6.0-20170701.patch.gz
+
+Excerpt from patch release announcement:
+
+ + add/improve checks in tic's parser to address invalid input
+ (Redhat #1464684, #1464685, #1464686, #1464691).
+ + alloc_entry.c, add a check for a null-pointer.
+ + parse_entry.c, add several checks for valid pointers as well as
+ one check to ensure that a single character on a line is not
+ treated as the 2-character termcap short-name.
+ + the fixes for Redhat #1464685 obscured a problem subsequently
+ reported in Redhat #1464687; the given test-case was no longer
+ reproducible. Testing without the fixes for the earlier reports
+ showed a problem with buffer overflow in dump_entry.c, which is
+ addressed by reducing the use of a fixed-size buffer.
+
+https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-ncurses/2017-07/msg00001.html
+
+--- ncurses-6.0-20170624+/ncurses/tinfo/alloc_entry.c 2017-04-09 23:33:51.000000000 +0000
++++ ncurses-6.0-20170701/ncurses/tinfo/alloc_entry.c 2017-06-27 23:48:55.000000000 +0000
+@@ -96,7 +96,11 @@
+ {
+ char *result = 0;
+ size_t old_next_free = next_free;
+- size_t len = strlen(string) + 1;
++ size_t len;
++
++ if (string == 0)
++ return _nc_save_str("");
++ len = strlen(string) + 1;
+
+ if (len == 1 && next_free != 0) {
+ /*
+--- ncurses-6.0-20170624+/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c 2017-06-24 22:59:46.000000000 +0000
++++ ncurses-6.0-20170701/ncurses/tinfo/parse_entry.c 2017-06-28 00:53:12.000000000 +0000
+@@ -236,13 +236,14 @@
+ * implemented it. Note that the resulting terminal type was never the
+ * 2-character name, but was instead the first alias after that.
+ */
++#define ok_TC2(s) (isgraph(UChar(s)) && (s) != '|')
+ ptr = _nc_curr_token.tk_name;
+ if (_nc_syntax == SYN_TERMCAP
+ #if NCURSES_XNAMES
+ && !_nc_user_definable
+ #endif
+ ) {
+- if (ptr[2] == '|') {
++ if (ok_TC2(ptr[0]) && ok_TC2(ptr[1]) && (ptr[2] == '|')) {
+ ptr += 3;
+ _nc_curr_token.tk_name[2] = '\0';
+ }
+@@ -284,9 +285,11 @@
+ if (is_use || is_tc) {
+ entryp->uses[entryp->nuses].name = _nc_save_str(_nc_curr_token.tk_valstring);
+ entryp->uses[entryp->nuses].line = _nc_curr_line;
+- entryp->nuses++;
+- if (entryp->nuses > 1 && is_tc) {
+- BAD_TC_USAGE
++ if (VALID_STRING(entryp->uses[entryp->nuses].name)) {
++ entryp->nuses++;
++ if (entryp->nuses > 1 && is_tc) {
++ BAD_TC_USAGE
++ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* normal token lookup */
+@@ -588,7 +591,7 @@
+ static void
+ append_acs(string_desc * dst, int code, char *src)
+ {
+- if (src != 0 && strlen(src) == 1) {
++ if (VALID_STRING(src) && strlen(src) == 1) {
+ append_acs0(dst, code, *src);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -849,15 +852,14 @@
+ }
+
+ if (tp->Strings[to_ptr->nte_index]) {
++ const char *s = tp->Strings[from_ptr->nte_index];
++ const char *t = tp->Strings[to_ptr->nte_index];
+ /* There's no point in warning about it if it's the same
+ * string; that's just an inefficiency.
+ */
+- if (strcmp(
+- tp->Strings[from_ptr->nte_index],
+- tp->Strings[to_ptr->nte_index]) != 0)
++ if (VALID_STRING(s) && VALID_STRING(t) && strcmp(s, t) != 0)
+ _nc_warning("%s (%s) already has an explicit value %s, ignoring ko",
+- ap->to, ap->from,
+- _nc_visbuf(tp->Strings[to_ptr->nte_index]));
++ ap->to, ap->from, t);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+--- ncurses-6.0-20170624+/progs/dump_entry.c 2017-06-23 22:47:43.000000000 +0000
++++ ncurses-6.0-20170701/progs/dump_entry.c 2017-07-01 11:27:29.000000000 +0000
+@@ -841,9 +841,10 @@
+ PredIdx num_strings = 0;
+ bool outcount = 0;
+
+-#define WRAP_CONCAT \
+- wrap_concat(buffer); \
+- outcount = TRUE
++#define WRAP_CONCAT1(s) wrap_concat(s); outcount = TRUE
++#define WRAP_CONCAT2(a,b) wrap_concat(a); WRAP_CONCAT1(b)
++#define WRAP_CONCAT3(a,b,c) wrap_concat(a); WRAP_CONCAT2(b,c)
++#define WRAP_CONCAT WRAP_CONCAT1(buffer)
+
+ len = 12; /* terminfo file-header */
+
+@@ -1007,9 +1008,9 @@
+ set_attributes = save_sgr;
+
+ trimmed_sgr0 = _nc_trim_sgr0(tterm);
+- if (strcmp(capability, trimmed_sgr0))
++ if (strcmp(capability, trimmed_sgr0)) {
+ capability = trimmed_sgr0;
+- else {
++ } else {
+ if (trimmed_sgr0 != exit_attribute_mode)
+ free(trimmed_sgr0);
+ }
+@@ -1046,13 +1047,21 @@
+ _nc_SPRINTF(buffer, _nc_SLIMIT(sizeof(buffer))
+ "%s=!!! %s WILL NOT CONVERT !!!",
+ name, srccap);
++ WRAP_CONCAT;
+ } else if (suppress_untranslatable) {
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ char *s = srccap, *d = buffer;
+- _nc_SPRINTF(d, _nc_SLIMIT(sizeof(buffer)) "..%s=", name);
+- d += strlen(d);
++ WRAP_CONCAT3("..", name, "=");
+ while ((*d = *s++) != 0) {
++ if ((d - buffer - 1) >= (int) sizeof(buffer)) {
++ fprintf(stderr,
++ "%s: value for %s is too long\n",
++ _nc_progname,
++ name);
++ *d = '\0';
++ break;
++ }
+ if (*d == ':') {
+ *d++ = '\\';
+ *d = ':';
+@@ -1061,13 +1070,12 @@
+ }
+ d++;
+ }
++ WRAP_CONCAT;
+ }
+ } else {
+- _nc_SPRINTF(buffer, _nc_SLIMIT(sizeof(buffer))
+- "%s=%s", name, cv);
++ WRAP_CONCAT3(name, "=", cv);
+ }
+ len += (int) strlen(capability) + 1;
+- WRAP_CONCAT;
+ } else {
+ char *src = _nc_tic_expand(capability,
+ outform == F_TERMINFO, numbers);
+@@ -1083,8 +1091,7 @@
+ strcpy_DYN(&tmpbuf, src);
+ }
+ len += (int) strlen(capability) + 1;
+- wrap_concat(tmpbuf.text);
+- outcount = TRUE;
++ WRAP_CONCAT1(tmpbuf.text);
+ }
+ }
+ /* e.g., trimmed_sgr0 */
+@@ -1526,7 +1533,8 @@
+ }
+ if (len > critlen) {
+ (void) fprintf(stderr,
+- "warning: %s entry is %d bytes long\n",
++ "%s: %s entry is %d bytes long\n",
++ _nc_progname,
+ _nc_first_name(tterm->term_names),
+ len);
+ SHOW_WHY("# WARNING: this entry, %d bytes long, may core-dump %s libraries!\n",