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authorMark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org>2015-10-22 14:54:43 -0400
committerMark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org>2015-10-23 15:35:46 -0400
commit71eb843837c7ad2f8dfff8b07092e379ab547bb8 (patch)
treef9eecd64cd7dc4df803a3455c807db4b37a0d14d
parentb747a9db1ebcd6383a2555f5acb933fcd204a81c (diff)
downloadguix-71eb843837c7ad2f8dfff8b07092e379ab547bb8.tar
guix-71eb843837c7ad2f8dfff8b07092e379ab547bb8.tar.gz
gnu: unzip: Reorganize security fixes for improved clarity.
* gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch: Delete file. Its contents are now split into the following new files: * gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7696.patch, gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7697.patch, gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-on-invalid-input.patch: New files. * gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Adjust accordingly. * gnu/packages/zip.scm (unzip)[source]: Adjust patches accordingly.
-rw-r--r--gnu-system.am4
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7696.patch35
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7697.patch28
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch108
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-on-invalid-input.patch40
-rw-r--r--gnu/packages/zip.scm4
6 files changed, 109 insertions, 110 deletions
diff --git a/gnu-system.am b/gnu-system.am
index e62fe18c97..c4810661a2 100644
--- a/gnu-system.am
+++ b/gnu-system.am
@@ -647,9 +647,11 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8140.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch \
+ gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7696.patch \
+ gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7697.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-allow-greater-hostver-values.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-attribs-overflow.patch \
- gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch \
+ gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-on-invalid-input.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-format-secure.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-initialize-symlink-flag.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7696.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7696.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d6a4072673
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7696.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+Copied from Debian.
+
+From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:23:17 +0200
+Subject: Upstream fix for heap overflow
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/802162
+Bug-RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1260944
+Origin: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073002
+Forwarded: yes
+
+---
+ crypt.c | 12 +++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/crypt.c
++++ b/crypt.c
+@@ -465,7 +465,17 @@
+ GLOBAL(pInfo->encrypted) = FALSE;
+ defer_leftover_input(__G);
+ for (n = 0; n < RAND_HEAD_LEN; n++) {
+- b = NEXTBYTE;
++ /* 2012-11-23 SMS. (OUSPG report.)
++ * Quit early if compressed size < HEAD_LEN. The resulting
++ * error message ("unable to get password") could be improved,
++ * but it's better than trying to read nonexistent data, and
++ * then continuing with a negative G.csize. (See
++ * fileio.c:readbyte()).
++ */
++ if ((b = NEXTBYTE) == (ush)EOF)
++ {
++ return PK_ERR;
++ }
+ h[n] = (uch)b;
+ Trace((stdout, " (%02x)", h[n]));
+ }
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7697.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7697.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d688b42495
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-CVE-2015-7697.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+Copied from Debian.
+
+From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:24:56 +0200
+Subject: fix infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/802160
+Bug-RedHat: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1260944
+Origin: other, https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073339
+
+---
+ extract.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -2728,6 +2728,12 @@
+ int repeated_buf_err;
+ bz_stream bstrm;
+
++ if (G.incnt <= 0 && G.csize <= 0L) {
++ /* avoid an infinite loop */
++ Trace((stderr, "UZbunzip2() got empty input\n"));
++ return 2;
++ }
++
+ #if (defined(DLL) && !defined(NO_SLIDE_REDIR))
+ if (G.redirect_slide)
+ wsize = G.redirect_size, redirSlide = G.redirect_buffer;
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 33498db95e..0000000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-Copied from Fedora.
-
-http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/tree/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch?id=d18f821e
-
-From bdd4a0cecd745cb4825e4508b5bdf2579731086a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Petr Stodulka <pstodulk@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:23:17 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] upstream fix for heap overflow
-
-https://bugzilla.redhat.com/attachment.cgi?id=1073002
----
- crypt.c | 12 +++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypt.c b/crypt.c
-index 784e411..a8975f2 100644
---- a/crypt.c
-+++ b/crypt.c
-@@ -465,7 +465,17 @@ int decrypt(__G__ passwrd)
- GLOBAL(pInfo->encrypted) = FALSE;
- defer_leftover_input(__G);
- for (n = 0; n < RAND_HEAD_LEN; n++) {
-- b = NEXTBYTE;
-+ /* 2012-11-23 SMS. (OUSPG report.)
-+ * Quit early if compressed size < HEAD_LEN. The resulting
-+ * error message ("unable to get password") could be improved,
-+ * but it's better than trying to read nonexistent data, and
-+ * then continuing with a negative G.csize. (See
-+ * fileio.c:readbyte()).
-+ */
-+ if ((b = NEXTBYTE) == (ush)EOF)
-+ {
-+ return PK_ERR;
-+ }
- h[n] = (uch)b;
- Trace((stdout, " (%02x)", h[n]));
- }
---
-2.4.6
-
-
-From 4b48844661ff9569f2ecf582a387d46a5775b5d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2015 18:24:56 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] fix infinite loop when extracting empty bzip2 data
-
-Bug: https://sourceforge.net/p/infozip/patches/23/
----
- extract.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
-index 7134bfe..29db027 100644
---- a/extract.c
-+++ b/extract.c
-@@ -2733,6 +2733,12 @@ __GDEF
- int repeated_buf_err;
- bz_stream bstrm;
-
-+ if (G.incnt <= 0 && G.csize <= 0L) {
-+ /* avoid an infinite loop */
-+ Trace((stderr, "UZbunzip2() got empty input\n"));
-+ return 2;
-+ }
-+
- #if (defined(DLL) && !defined(NO_SLIDE_REDIR))
- if (G.redirect_slide)
- wsize = G.redirect_size, redirSlide = G.redirect_buffer;
---
-2.4.6
-
-
-From bd150334fb4084f5555a6be26b015a0671cb5b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:52:23 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] extract: prevent unsigned overflow on invalid input
-
-Suggested-by: Stefan Cornelius
----
- extract.c | 11 ++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
-index 29db027..b9ae667 100644
---- a/extract.c
-+++ b/extract.c
-@@ -1257,8 +1257,17 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
- if (G.lrec.compression_method == STORED) {
- zusz_t csiz_decrypted = G.lrec.csize;
-
-- if (G.pInfo->encrypted)
-+ if (G.pInfo->encrypted) {
-+ if (csiz_decrypted <= 12) {
-+ /* handle the error now to prevent unsigned overflow */
-+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
-+ LoadFarStringSmall(ErrUnzipNoFile),
-+ LoadFarString(InvalidComprData),
-+ LoadFarStringSmall2(Inflate)));
-+ return PK_ERR;
-+ }
- csiz_decrypted -= 12;
-+ }
- if (G.lrec.ucsize != csiz_decrypted) {
- Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
- LoadFarStringSmall2(WrnStorUCSizCSizDiff),
---
-2.5.2
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-on-invalid-input.patch b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-on-invalid-input.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..013002a88c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/unzip-overflow-on-invalid-input.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+Extracted from a patch in Fedora.
+
+http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/unzip.git/tree/unzip-6.0-heap-overflow-infloop.patch?id=d18f821e
+
+From bd150334fb4084f5555a6be26b015a0671cb5b74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kamil Dudka <kdudka@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 18:52:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] extract: prevent unsigned overflow on invalid input
+
+Suggested-by: Stefan Cornelius
+---
+ extract.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/extract.c b/extract.c
+index 29db027..b9ae667 100644
+--- a/extract.c
++++ b/extract.c
+@@ -1257,8 +1257,17 @@ static int extract_or_test_entrylist(__G__ numchunk,
+ if (G.lrec.compression_method == STORED) {
+ zusz_t csiz_decrypted = G.lrec.csize;
+
+- if (G.pInfo->encrypted)
++ if (G.pInfo->encrypted) {
++ if (csiz_decrypted <= 12) {
++ /* handle the error now to prevent unsigned overflow */
++ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
++ LoadFarStringSmall(ErrUnzipNoFile),
++ LoadFarString(InvalidComprData),
++ LoadFarStringSmall2(Inflate)));
++ return PK_ERR;
++ }
+ csiz_decrypted -= 12;
++ }
+ if (G.lrec.ucsize != csiz_decrypted) {
+ Info(slide, 0x401, ((char *)slide,
+ LoadFarStringSmall2(WrnStorUCSizCSizDiff),
+--
+2.5.2
+
diff --git a/gnu/packages/zip.scm b/gnu/packages/zip.scm
index 83c452778c..b7bed0e86d 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/zip.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/zip.scm
@@ -85,11 +85,13 @@ Compression ratios of 2:1 to 3:1 are common for text files.")
"unzip-CVE-2014-8140.patch"
"unzip-CVE-2014-8141.patch"
"unzip-CVE-2014-9636.patch"
+ "unzip-CVE-2015-7696.patch"
+ "unzip-CVE-2015-7697.patch"
"unzip-allow-greater-hostver-values.patch"
"unzip-initialize-symlink-flag.patch"
"unzip-remove-build-date.patch"
"unzip-attribs-overflow.patch"
- "unzip-fix-overflows-and-infloop.patch"
+ "unzip-overflow-on-invalid-input.patch"
"unzip-format-secure.patch"
"unzip-overflow-long-fsize.patch")))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)