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[[!meta title="Distributed Tor Hidden Services"]]

For my third year project, I worked on allowing distribution in Tor hidden
services. My [report](report.pdf) is available (the [design
archive](archive.tar.gz) is also).

# Abstract

Tor is an low latency, onion routing system that anonymizes TCP streams.  One
particular Tor feature is hidden services, these provide responder anonymity,
this means the identity of the server providing the service, is hidden from the
requester (user) of the service.

While modern web services, which can use techniques like anycast and DNS
(domain name system) round robin to distribute clients across many servers, the
main load for a Tor hidden service, will always go through a single node in the
Tor network. This has implications for the availability and scalability of Tor
Hidden Services, which has knock on implications anonymity of the hidden
service, as downtime can possibly reveal information about its real world
location. I aim to modify Tor to allow for distributed hidden services.

This was achieved, however a deterministic property was added to the
introduction points, which can be used to attack the service. A approach to
solve this is discussed.