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| author | Mike Perry <mikeperry-git@fscked.org> | 2013-01-18 19:37:16 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mike Perry <mikeperry-git@fscked.org> | 2013-01-18 19:46:21 -0800 |
| commit | e13e30221ef6715cafa93bbffc156583c8b58ecf (patch) | |
| tree | 09b12822e6f3b3dafbe610a35617e8c8c2f4777c /src/or/rendclient.c | |
| parent | ee421e68d5231e3962b45f8bbfc6505c8e6f3315 (diff) | |
| download | tor-e13e30221ef6715cafa93bbffc156583c8b58ecf.tar tor-e13e30221ef6715cafa93bbffc156583c8b58ecf.tar.gz | |
Implement Path use bias accounting.
Path use bias measures how often we can actually succeed using the circuits we
actually try to use. It is a subset of path bias accounting, but it is
computed as a separate statistic because the rate of client circuit use may
vary depending on use case.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/or/rendclient.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/or/rendclient.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 32623c3f4..61e3b917e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ rend_client_send_establish_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ) * and the rend cookie also means we've used the circ. */ circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); + /* We've attempted to use this circuit. Probe it if we fail */ + pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ); + if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ), RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS, circ->rend_data->rend_cookie, @@ -316,6 +319,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, * state. */ introcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); + pathbias_count_use_attempt(introcirc); + goto cleanup; perm_err: @@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, /* For path bias: This circuit was used successfully. Valid * nacks and acks count. */ - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED; + pathbias_mark_use_success(circ); if (request_len == 0) { /* It's an ACK; the introduction point relayed our introduction request. */ @@ -902,7 +907,7 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, * Waiting any longer opens us up to attacks from Bob. He could induce * Alice to attempt to connect to his hidden service and never reply * to her rend requests */ - circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED; + pathbias_mark_use_success(circ); /* XXXX This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to * attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather |