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$Id$
Legend:
SPEC!! - Not specified
SPEC - Spec not finalized
NICK - nick claims
ARMA - arma claims
PHOBOS - phobos claims
- Not done
* Top priority
. Partially done
o Done
D Deferred
X Abandoned
Non-Coding, Soon:
N - contact umass folks
N - Mention controller libs someplace.
D FAQ entry: why gnutls is bad/not good for tor
P - flesh out the rest of the section 6 of the faq
P - gather pointers to livecd distros that include tor
- put the logo on the website, in source form, so people can put it on
stickers directly, etc.
- more pictures from ren. he wants to describe the tor handshake, i want to
talk about hidden services.
* clean up the places where our docs are redundant (or worse, obsolete in
one file and correct elsewhere). agl has a start on a global
list-of-tor-docs.
P - update windows docs to clarify which versions of windows, and why a
DOS window, how it's used, for the less technical users
NR- write a spec appendix for 'being nice with tor'
- tor-in-the-media page
- Ask schanzle@cas.homelinux.org about a patch for rpm spec fixes against
tor-0.1.0.7.rc
- Remove need for HACKING file.
for 0.1.1.x:
R - are dirservers auto-verifying duplicate nicknames?
o tor should auto-sort the recommended-versions strings
(with the new smartlist sort stuff maybe)
o setconf SocksBindAddress kills tor if it fails to bind
N - controller libs should support resetconf command.
N . Additional controller features
- Find a way to make event info more extensible
- change circuit status events to give more details, like purpose,
whether they're internal, etc.
. Expose more information via getinfo:
- import and export rendezvous descriptors
- Review all static fields for additional candidates
- Allow EXTENDCIRCUIT to unknown server.
- We need some way to adjust server status, and to tell tor not to
download directories/network-status, and a way to force a download.
- It would be nice to request address lookups from the controller
without using SOCKS.
. Helper nodes
. More testing and debugging
- On sighup, if usehelpernodes changed to 1, use new circuits?
- If your helper nodes are unavailable, don't abandon them unless
other nodes *are* reachable.
R - If you think an OR conn is open but you can never establish a circuit
to it, reconsider whether it's actually open.
- Miscellaneous cleanups
- switch accountingmax to count total in+out, not either in or
out. it's easy to move in this direction (not risky), but hard to
back, out if we decide we prefer it the way it already is. hm.
. Come up with a coherent strategy for bandwidth buckets and TLS. (The
logic for reading from TLS sockets is likely to overrun the bandwidth
buckets under heavy load. (Really, the logic was never right in the
first place.) Also, we should audit all users of get_pending_bytes().)
- Make it harder to circumvent bandwidth caps: look at number of bytes
sent across sockets, not number sent inside TLS stream.
R o remove the warnings from rendezvous stuff that shouldn't be warnings.
N . Handle rendezvousing with unverified nodes.
o Implement everything
. Enable the new code
. Verify that new code works.
- Christian Grothoff's attack of infinite-length circuit.
the solution is to have a separate 'extend-data' cell type
which is used for the first N data cells, and only
extend-data cells can be extend requests.
- Specify, including thought about
- Implement
N - Destroy and truncated cells should have reasons.
N - Add private:* alias in exit policies to make it easier to ban all the
fiddly little 192.168.foo addresses.
(AGL had a patch; consider applying it.)
N - warn if listening for SOCKS on public IP.
- cpu fixes:
- see if we should make use of truncate to retry
o hardware accelerator support (configure engines.)
- hardware accelerator support (use instead of aes.c when reasonable)
R - kill dns workers more slowly
. Directory changes
o recommended-versions for client / server ?
- Some back-out mechanism for auto-approval
- dirservers have blacklist of IPs they hate
- a way of rolling back approvals to before a timestamp
- have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness
before we approve them
- other?
R . Dirservers verify reachability claims
o basic reachability testing, influencing network-status list.
R - rate-limiting the reporting of trouble servers
R - check reachability as soon as you hear about a new server
- Decentralization
- Figure out what to do about hidden service descriptors.
- find 10 dirservers.
- (what are criteria to be a dirserver?)
o Dirservers publish compressed network-status objects.
o Support retrieving several-at-once
o Everyone downloads network-status objects
o Clients: from all directories, round-robin
o Basic implementation: disable until 0.1.1.x is out.
o On failure, mark trusted_dir_server as having failed
o Retry, up to a point.
- Launch retry immediately on failure.
o Parse them
o Cache them, reload on restart
o Serve cached directories
o Directories expose individual descriptors
X By 'if-newer-than' (Does the spec require this??)
o Support compression.
N - Alice acts on network-status objects
- Alice downloads descriptors as needed.
o Figure out what's needed
- Download it
- Store it
o Implement store
- Implement reload-from-store
- Store downloaded descriptors
- Retry descriptors on failure for a while
o Alice sets descriptor status from network-status
o Implement
o Use
- Security
- Alices avoid duplicate class C nodes.
- Analyze how bad the partitioning is or isn't.
N - Naming and validation:
- Separate naming from validation in authdirs.
- Authdirs need to be able to decline to validate based on
IP range and key
- Authdirs need to be able to decline to include baased on
IP range and key.
- Clients choose names based on network-status options.
- Names are remembered in client status.
- packaging and ui stuff:
. multiple sample torrc files
- uninstallers
. for os x
. something, anything, for sys tray on Windows.
. figure out how to make nt service stuff work?
. Document it.
. Add version number to directory.
N - Vet all pending installer patches
- Win32 installer plus privoxy, sockscap/freecap, etc.
- Vet win32 systray helper code
Reach (deferrable) items for 0.1.1.x:
- Start using create-fast cells as clients
o Let more config options (e.g. ORPort) change dynamically.
- start handling server descriptors without a socksport?
o Add TTLs to DNS-related replies, and use them (when present) to adjust
addressmap values.
. Research memory use on Linux: what's happening?
- Is it threading? (Maybe, maybe not)
- Is it the buf_shrink bug? (Quite possibly)
- Instrument the 0.1.1 code to figure out where our memory is going;
apply the results. (all platforms?)
For 0.1.1.x, if we can figure out how:
- rewrite how libevent does select() on win32 so it's not so very slow.
o enclaves (at least preliminary)
- Write limiting; separate token bucket for write
- Audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are just as likely to
be us as not.
- Do something to prevent spurious EXTEND cells from making middleman
nodes connect all over. Rate-limit failed connections, perhaps?
Future version:
- Limit to 2 dir, 2 OR, N SOCKS connections per IP.
- Handle full buffers without totally borking
- Rate-limit OR and directory connections overall and per-IP and
maybe per subnet.
- Hold-open-until-flushed now works by accident; it should work by
design.
- DoS protection: TLS puzzles, public key ops, bandwidth exhaustion.
- Specify?
- tor-resolve script should use socks5 to get better error messages.
- make min uptime a function of the available choices (say, choose 60th
percentile, not 1 day.)
- config option to publish what ports you listen on, beyond ORPort/DirPort
- hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort
* figure out what breaks for this, and do it.
- auth mechanisms to let hidden service midpoint and responder filter
connection requests.
- Relax clique assumptions.
- tor should be able to have a pool of outgoing IP addresses
that it is able to rotate through. (maybe)
Blue-sky:
- Patch privoxy and socks protocol to pass strings to the browser.
- Standby/hotswap/redundant hidden services.
- Robust decentralized storage for hidden service descriptors.
- The "China problem"
- Allow small cells and large cells on the same network?
- Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken
circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow
connection (tls session key) rotation.
- Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity, etc.
- Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own
link crypto, unless we can bully openssl into it.
- Conn key rotation.
- Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends.
(Pending a user who needs this)
- Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP
streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that
we've seen in the wild.
(Pending a user who needs this)
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