From 8743080a289a20bfaf0a67d6382ba0c2a6d6534d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nick Mathewson Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2012 19:57:27 -0400 Subject: Disable TLS Session Tickets, which we were apparently getting for free OpenSSL 1.0.0 added an implementation of TLS session tickets, a "feature" that let session resumption occur without server-side state by giving clients an encrypted "ticket" that the client could present later to get the session going again with the same keys as before. OpenSSL was giving the keys to decrypt these tickets the lifetime of the SSL contexts, which would have been terrible for PFS if we had long-lived SSL contexts. Fortunately, we don't. Still, it's pretty bad. We should also drop these, since our use of the extension stands out with our non-use of session cacheing. Found by nextgens. Bugfix on all versions of Tor when built with openssl 1.0.0 or later. Fixes bug 7139. --- src/common/tortls.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) (limited to 'src') diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index c6316120f..fc0bcb952 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -804,6 +804,14 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime, #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1); #endif + /* Disable TLS tickets if they're supported. We never want to use them; + * using them can make our perfect forward secrecy a little worse, *and* + * create an opportunity to fingerprint us (since it's unusual to use them + * with TLS sessions turned off). + */ +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET + SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET); +#endif if ( #ifdef DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE -- cgit v1.2.3