| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Check for overflow in one place, and be consistent about type usage.
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There are now four ways that CBT can be disabled:
1. Network-wide, with the cbtdisabled consensus param.
2. Via config, with "LearnCircuitBuildTimeout 0"
3. Via config, with "AuthoritativeDirectory 1"
4. Via a state file write failure.
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This prevents a spurious warning where we have a timeout just after
deciding our network came back online.
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This should prevent some asserts and storage of incorrect build times
for the cases where Tor is suspended during a circuit construction, or
just after completing a circuit. The idea is that if the circuit
build time is much greater than we would have cut it off at, we probably
had a suspend event along this codepath, and we should discard the
value.
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In case we decide that the timeout rate is now too high due to our
change of the max synthetic quantile value, this consensus parameter
will allow us to restore it to the previous value.
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This is for the other issue we saw in Bug 1335. A large number of high
timeouts were causing the timeout calculation to slowly drift upwards,
especially in conditions of load. This fix repeatedly regenerates all of
our synthetic timeouts whenever the timeout changes, to try to prevent
drift.
It also lowers the timeout cap to help for some cases of Bug 1245, where
some timeout values were so large that we ended up allocating a ton of
scratch memory to count the histogram bins.
The downside is that lowering this cap is affecting our timeout rate.
Unfortunately, the buildtimeout quantile is now higher than the actual
completion rate by what appears to be about 7-10%, which probably
represents the skew in the distribution due to lowering this synthetic
cap.
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In my state files, I was seeing several peaks, probably due to different
guards having different latency. This change is meant to better capture
this behavior and generate more reasonable timeouts when it happens. It
is improving the timeout values for my collection of state files.
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what's happening here is that we're fetching certs for obsolete
authorities -- probably legacy signers in this case. but try to
remain general in the log message.
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libevent
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It's natural for the definition of bandwidth_rule_t to be with the functions
that actually care about its values. Unfortunately, this means declaring
bandwidth_rate_rule_to_string() out of sequence. Someday we'll just rename
reasons.c to strings.c, and put it at the end of or.h, and this will all be
better.
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1) mingw doesn't have _vscprintf(); mingw instead has a working snprintf.
2) windows compilers that _do_ have a working _vscprintf spell it so; they do
not spell it _vcsprintf().
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Our code assumed that any version of OpenSSL before 0.9.8l could not
possibly require SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION. This is
so... except that many vendors have backported the flag from later
versions of openssl when they backported the RFC5476 renegotiation
feature.
The new behavior is particularly annoying to detect. Previously,
leaving SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION unset meant that
clients would fail to renegotiate. People noticed that one fast!
Now, OpenSSL's RFC5476 support means that clients will happily talk to
any servers there are, but servers won't accept renegotiation requests
from unpatched clients unless SSL_OP_ALLOW_etc is set. More fun:
servers send back a "no renegotiation for you!" error, which unpatched
clients respond to by stalling, and generally producing no useful
error message.
This might not be _the_ cause of bug 1346, but it is quite likely _a_
cause for bug 1346.
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Works like the --enable-static-openssl/libevent options. Requires
--with-zlib-dir to be set. Note that other dependencies might still
pull in a dynamicly linked zlib, if you don't link them in statically
too.
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Everything that accepted the 'Circ' name handled it wrong, so even now
that we fixed the handling of the parameter, we wouldn't be able to
set it without making all the 0.2.2.7..0.2.2.10 relays act wonky.
This patch makes Tors accept the 'Circuit' name instead, so we can
turn on circuit priorities without confusing the versions that treated
the 'Circ' name as occasion to act weird.
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When you mean (a=b(c,d)) >= 0, you had better not say (a=b(c,d)>=0).
We did the latter, and so whenever CircPriorityHalflife was in the
consensus, it was treated as having a value of 1 msec (that is,
boolean true).
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Conflicts:
src/or/test.c
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I'm adding this because I can never remember what stuff like 'rule 3'
means. That's the one where if somebody goes limp or taps out, the
fight is over, right?
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Conflicts:
ChangeLog
configure.in
contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in
src/win32/orconfig.h
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it's perfect, let's ship it
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