| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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ERR is if something fatal just happened
WARNING is something bad happened, but we're still running. The bad thing
is either a bug in the code, an attack or buggy protocol/implementation
of the remote peer, etc. The operator should examine the bad thing and
try to correct it.
(No error or warning messages should be expected. I expect most people
to run on -l warning eventually.)
NOTICE is never ever used.
INFO means something happened (maybe bad, maybe ok), but there's nothing
you need to (or can) do about it.
DEBUG is for everything louder than INFO.
svn:r486
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redo all the config files for the new format (we'll redo them again soon)
fix (another! yuck) segfault in log_fn when input is too large
tor_tls_context_new() returns -1 for error, not NULL
fix segfault in check_conn_marked() on conn's that die during tls handshake
make ORs also initialize conn from router when we're the receiving node
make non-dirserver ORs upload descriptor to every dirserver on startup
add our local address to the descriptor
add Content-Length field to POST command
revert the Content-Length search in fetch_from_buf_http() to previous code
fix segfault in memmove in fetch_from_buf_http()
raise maximum allowed headers/body size in directory.c
svn:r484
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'buf_t' is now an opaque type defined in buffers.c .
Router descriptors now include all keys; routers generate keys as
needed on startup (in a newly defined "data directory"), and generate
their own descriptors. Descriptors are now self-signed.
Implementation is not complete: descriptors are never published; and
upon receiving a descriptor, the directory doesn't do anything with
it.
At least "routers.or" and orkeygen are now obsolete, BTW.
svn:r483
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Fixed up the assert_*_ok funcs some (more work remains)
Changed config so it reads either /etc/torrc or the -f arg, never both
Finally tracked down a nasty bug with our use of tls:
It turns out that if you ask SSL_read() for no more than n bytes, it
will read the entire record from the network (and maybe part of the next
record, I'm not sure), give you n bytes of it, and keep the remaining
bytes internally. This is fine, except our poll-for-read looks at the
network, and there are no bytes pending on the network, so we never know
to ask SSL_read() for more bytes. Currently I've hacked it so if we ask
for n bytes and it returns n bytes, then it reads again right then. This
will interact poorly with our rate limiting; we need a cleaner solution.
svn:r481
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svn:r479
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svn:r478
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svn:r477
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svn:r476
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deal with content-length headers better when reading http
don't assume struct socks4_info is a packed struct
fail the socks handshake if destip is zero
flesh out conn_state_to_string() for dir conn
fix typo (bug) in connection_handle_read()
directory get is now called fetch, post is now upload
reopen logs on sighup
svn:r475
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svn:r473
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this paves the way for supporting socks5 and other handshakes
it also removes those pesky AP-only variables from connection_t
also hacked a fix for a bug where some streams weren't ending properly --
maybe because marked connections weren't flushing properly?
svn:r472
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svn:r471
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svn:r470
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svn:r468
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svn:r467
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svn:r466
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svn:r465
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svn:r464
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Also optimize logging by formatting messages in memory before sending
them through stdio. (It turns out (according to gprof) that logging
performance matters.)
svn:r463
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svn:r462
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svn:r461
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svn:r460
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bulletproof
svn:r459
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svn:r458
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svn:r457
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and fixed recent memory leak
svn:r456
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svn:r455
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still several (many) tls-related bugs outstanding.
svn:r454
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svn:r452
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svn:r451
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things are still a bit shaky
svn:r450
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svn:r449
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svn:r448
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work now.
svn:r447
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svn:r446
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svn:r445
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svn:r444
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svn:r443
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reasonable ciphers if not everyone has OpenSSL 0.9.7.
svn:r442
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svn:r441
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svn:r440
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svn:r439
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svn:r438
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svn:r437
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valid (if it is present); and to get a public key from a peer
certificate (in order to identify the peer).
svn:r436
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svn:r435
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svn:r434
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svn:r433
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write new certfile if you don't have one already
set up a tls context on startup
svn:r432
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svn:r431
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