| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Having very long single lines with lots and lots of things in them
tends to make files hard to diff and hard to merge. Since our tools
are one-line-at-a-time, we should try to construct lists that way too,
within reason.
This incidentally turned up a few headers in configure.in that we were
for some reason searching for twice.
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Conflicts:
src/or/config.c
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We would never actually enforce multiplicity rules when parsing
annotations, since the counts array never got entries added to it for
annotations in the token list that got added by earlier calls to
tokenize_string.
Found by piebeer.
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does not block them
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We need filtering bufferevent_openssl so that we can wrap around
IOCP bufferevents on Windows. This patch adds a temporary option to
turn on filtering mode, so that we can test it out on non-IOCP
systems to make sure it hasn't got any surprising bugs.
It also fixes some allocation/teardown errors in using
bufferevent_openssl as a filter.
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Instead of rejecting a value that doesn't divide into 1 second, round to
the nearest divisor of 1 second and warn.
Document that the option only controls the granularity written by Tor to a
file or console log. It does not (for example) "batch up" log messages to
affect times logged by a controller, times attached to syslog messages, or
the mtime fields on log files.
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Implements enhancement 1668.
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Found by Ian Goldberg and Mashael AlSabah.
Bugfix on 0.2.3.0-alpha dev.
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In a2bb0bf we started using a separate client identity key. When we are
in "public server mode" (that means not a bridge) we will use the same
key. Reusing the key without doing the proper refcounting leads to a
segfault on cleanup during shutdown. Fix that.
Also introduce an assert that triggers if our refcount falls below 0.
That should never happen.
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Conflicts:
src/common/tortls.c
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We now require that:
- Only actual servers should ever call get_server_identity_key
- If you're being a client or bridge, the client and server keys should
differ.
- If you're being a public relay, the client and server keys
should be the same.
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Fixes a bug described in ticket #988.
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Fixes bug #988.
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* Make tor_tls_context_new internal to tortls.c, and return the new
tor_tls_context_t from it.
* Add a public tor_tls_context_init wrapper function to replace it.
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Bug 1859 shows that the router_get_by_nickname behavior was wrong,
and the node_get_by_nickname is right.
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Some of this is already done in nodelist.
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When intro->extend_info is created for an introduction point, it
only starts out with a nickname, not necessarily an identity digest.
Thus, doing router_get_by_digest isn't necessarily safe.
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https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1859
Use router_get_by_digest() instead of router_get_by_hexdigest()
in circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves() and
rend_client_get_random_intro(), per Nick's comments.
Using router_get_by_digest() in rend_client_get_random_intro() will
break hidden services published by Tor versions pre 0.1.2.18 and
0.2.07-alpha as they only publish by nickname. This is acceptable
however as these versions only publish to authority tor26 and
don't work for versions in the 0.2.2.x series anyway.
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https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1859
There are two problems in this bug:
1. When an OP makes a .exit request specifying itself as the exit, and the exit
is not yet listed, Tor gets all the routerinfos needed for the circuit but
discovers in circuit_is_acceptable() that its own routerinfo is not in the
routerdigest list and cannot be used. Tor then gets locked in a cycle of
repeating these two steps. When gathering the routerinfos for a circuit,
specifically when the exit has been chosen by .exit notation, Tor needs to
apply the same rules it uses later on when deciding if it can build a
circuit with those routerinfos.
2. A different bug arises in the above situation when the Tor instance's
routerinfo *is* listed in the routerlist, it shares its nickname with a
number of other Tor nodes, and it does not have 'Named' rights to its
nickname.
So for example, if (i) there are five nodes named Bob in the network, (ii) I
am running one of them but am flagged as 'Unnamed' because someone else
claimed the 'Bob' nickname first, and (iii) I run my Tor as both client
and exit the following can happen to me:
- I go to www.evil.com
- I click on a link www.evil.com.bob.exit
- My request will exit through my own Tor node rather than the 'Named'
node Bob or any of the others.
- www.evil.com now knows I am actually browsing from the same computer
that is running my 'Bob' node
So to solve both issues we need to ensure:
- When fulfilling a .exit request we only choose a routerinfo if it exists in
the routerlist, even when that routerinfo is ours.
- When getting a router by nickname we only return our own router information
if it is not going to be used for building a circuit.
We ensure this by removing the special treatment afforded our own router in
router_get_by_nickname(). This means the function will only return the
routerinfo of our own router if it is in the routerlist built from authority
info and has a unique nickname or is bound to a non-unique nickname.
There are some uses of router_get_by_nickname() where we are looking for the
router by name because of a configuration directive, specifically local
declaration of NodeFamilies and EntryNodes and other routers' declaration of
MyFamily. In these cases it is not at first clear if we need to continue
returning our own routerinfo even if our router is not listed and/or has a
non-unique nickname with the Unnamed flag.
The patch treats each of these cases as follows:
Other Routers' Declaration of MyFamily
This happens in routerlist_add_family(). If another router declares our router
in its family and our router has the Unnamed flag or is not in the routerlist
yet, should we take advantage of the fact that we know our own routerinfo to
add us in anyway? This patch says 'no, treat our own router just like any
other'. This is a safe choice because it ensures our client has the same view
of the network as other clients. We also have no good way of knowing if our
router is Named or not independently of the authorities, so we have to rely on
them in this.
Local declaration of NodeFamilies
Again, we have no way of knowing if the declaration 'NodeFamilies
Bob,Alice,Ringo' refers to our router Bob or the Named router Bob, so we have
to defer to the authorities and treat our own router like any other.
Local declaration of NodeFamilies
Again, same as above. There's also no good reason we would want our client to
choose it's own router as an entry guard if it does not meet the requirements
expected of any other router on the network.
In order to reduce the possibility of error, the patch also replaces two
instances where we were using router_get_by_nickname() with calls to
router_get_by_hexdigest() where the identity digest of the router
is available.
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There are no relay left that run version 0.2.1.3 through 0.2.1.18, so
changing this behaviour should be safe now.
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Conflicts:
src/or/networkstatus.c
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Conflicts:
src/or/networkstatus.c
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We want to fetch directory info more aggressively if we need it to
refuseunknownexits. Thus, we'll want it if our exit policy is _NOT_
reject *.
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Found by rransom while working on issue #988. Bugfix on
0.2.2.17-alpha. Fixes bug 2097.
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Clarify documentation, rename a local, and fix a memory leak.
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but don't refactor the ones that look messy
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