| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Using strncpy meant that if listenaddress were ever >=
sizeof(sockaddr_un.sun_path), we would fail to nul-terminate
sun_path. This isn't a big deal: we never read sun_path, and the
kernel is smart enough to reject the sockaddr_un if it isn't
nul-terminated. Nonetheless, it's a dumb failure mode. Instead, we
should reject addresses that don't fit in sockaddr_un.sun_path.
Coverity found this; it's CID 428. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
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When we rejected a descriptor for not being the one we wanted, we
were letting the parsed descriptor go out of scope.
Found by Coverity; CID # 30.
Bugfix on 0.2.1.26.
(No changes file yet, since this is not in any 0.2.1.x release.)
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We had all the code in place to handle this right... except that we
were unconditionally opening a PF_INET socket instead of looking at
sa_family. Ow.
Fixes bug 2574; not a bugfix on any particular version, since this
never worked before.
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Rename crypto_pk_check_key_public_exponent to crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok:
it's nice to name predicates s.t. you can tell how to interpret true
and false.
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Here I looked at the results of the automated conversion and cleaned
them up as follows:
If there was a tor_memcmp or tor_memeq that was in fact "safe"[*] I
changed it to a fast_memcmp or fast_memeq.
Otherwise if there was a tor_memcmp that could turn into a
tor_memneq or tor_memeq, I converted it.
This wants close attention.
[*] I'm erring on the side of caution here, and leaving some things
as tor_memcmp that could in my opinion use the data-dependent
fast_memcmp variant.
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This commit is _exactly_ the result of
perl -i -pe 's/\bmemcmp\(/tor_memcmp\(/g' src/*/*.[ch]
perl -i -pe 's/\!\s*tor_memcmp\(/tor_memeq\(/g' src/*/*.[ch]
perl -i -pe 's/0\s*==\s*tor_memcmp\(/tor_memeq\(/g' src/*/*.[ch]
perl -i -pe 's/0\s*!=\s*tor_memcmp\(/tor_memneq\(/g' src/*/*.[ch]
git checkout src/common/di_ops.[ch]
git checkout src/or/test.c
git checkout src/common/test.h
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The tor_memcmp code is by Robert Ransom, and the tor_memeq code is
by me. Both incorporate some ideas from DJB's stuff.
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The new behavior is to try to rename the old file if there is one there
that we can't read. In all likelihood, that will fail too, but at least
we tried, and at least it won't crash.
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tor_fragile_assert() might be a no-op, so we have to return something
here to indicate failure to the caller.
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If the user sent a SIGNAL NEWNYM command after we fetched a rendezvous
descriptor, while we were building the introduction-point circuit, we
would give up entirely on trying to connect to the hidden service.
Original patch by rransom slightly edited to go into 0.2.1
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i.e. without closing the AP connection.
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None of the comparisons were _broken_ previously, but avoiding
signed/unsigned comparisons makes everybody happier.
Fixes bug2475.
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Under heavy load, this could result in an assertion failure. Fix for
bug 2933; bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha.
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Partial backport of daa0326aaaa85a760be94ee2360cfa61a9fb5be2 .
Resolves bug 2402. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15 (for the part where we switched to
git) and on 0.2.1.30 (for the part where we dumped micro-revisions.)
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This reverts commit a1073ee956021ead19d30c2151510dbaced416a8.
Apparently, we totally misunderstood how the debian packages were using
microrevisions. Better fix that!
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Issue noticed by Steven Murdoch; fixes bug 2689. The cast didn't do
anything, and we don't need to look at the return value of the function
here.
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This is based on shitlei's fix for bug2629, with extra parens removed.
Fixes bug 2629, bugfix on 0.2.1.2-alpha.
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We need to _REJECT_ descriptors with accept6/reject6 lines. If we
let them onto the network , other un-upgraded tors will crash.
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This reverts commit b3918b3bbbfa9097246d63746c8b540eff2ec8e8.
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piebeer
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This fixes a remotely triggerable assert on directory authorities, who
don't handle descriptors with ipv6 contents well yet. We will want to
revert this once we're ready to handle ipv6.
Issue raised by lorth on #tor, who wasn't able to use Tor anymore.
Analyzed with help from Christian Fromme. Fix suggested by arma. Bugfix
on 0.2.1.3-alpha.
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When intro->extend_info is created for an introduction point, it
only starts out with a nickname, not necessarily an identity digest.
Thus, doing router_get_by_digest isn't necessarily safe.
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https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1859
Use router_get_by_digest() instead of router_get_by_hexdigest()
in circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves() and
rend_client_get_random_intro(), per Nick's comments.
Using router_get_by_digest() in rend_client_get_random_intro() will
break hidden services published by Tor versions pre 0.1.2.18 and
0.2.07-alpha as they only publish by nickname. This is acceptable
however as these versions only publish to authority tor26 and
don't work for versions in the 0.2.2.x series anyway.
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https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1859
There are two problems in this bug:
1. When an OP makes a .exit request specifying itself as the exit, and the exit
is not yet listed, Tor gets all the routerinfos needed for the circuit but
discovers in circuit_is_acceptable() that its own routerinfo is not in the
routerdigest list and cannot be used. Tor then gets locked in a cycle of
repeating these two steps. When gathering the routerinfos for a circuit,
specifically when the exit has been chosen by .exit notation, Tor needs to
apply the same rules it uses later on when deciding if it can build a
circuit with those routerinfos.
2. A different bug arises in the above situation when the Tor instance's
routerinfo *is* listed in the routerlist, it shares its nickname with a
number of other Tor nodes, and it does not have 'Named' rights to its
nickname.
So for example, if (i) there are five nodes named Bob in the network, (ii) I
am running one of them but am flagged as 'Unnamed' because someone else
claimed the 'Bob' nickname first, and (iii) I run my Tor as both client
and exit the following can happen to me:
- I go to www.evil.com
- I click on a link www.evil.com.bob.exit
- My request will exit through my own Tor node rather than the 'Named'
node Bob or any of the others.
- www.evil.com now knows I am actually browsing from the same computer
that is running my 'Bob' node
So to solve both issues we need to ensure:
- When fulfilling a .exit request we only choose a routerinfo if it exists in
the routerlist, even when that routerinfo is ours.
- When getting a router by nickname we only return our own router information
if it is not going to be used for building a circuit.
We ensure this by removing the special treatment afforded our own router in
router_get_by_nickname(). This means the function will only return the
routerinfo of our own router if it is in the routerlist built from authority
info and has a unique nickname or is bound to a non-unique nickname.
There are some uses of router_get_by_nickname() where we are looking for the
router by name because of a configuration directive, specifically local
declaration of NodeFamilies and EntryNodes and other routers' declaration of
MyFamily. In these cases it is not at first clear if we need to continue
returning our own routerinfo even if our router is not listed and/or has a
non-unique nickname with the Unnamed flag.
The patch treats each of these cases as follows:
Other Routers' Declaration of MyFamily
This happens in routerlist_add_family(). If another router declares our router
in its family and our router has the Unnamed flag or is not in the routerlist
yet, should we take advantage of the fact that we know our own routerinfo to
add us in anyway? This patch says 'no, treat our own router just like any
other'. This is a safe choice because it ensures our client has the same view
of the network as other clients. We also have no good way of knowing if our
router is Named or not independently of the authorities, so we have to rely on
them in this.
Local declaration of NodeFamilies
Again, we have no way of knowing if the declaration 'NodeFamilies
Bob,Alice,Ringo' refers to our router Bob or the Named router Bob, so we have
to defer to the authorities and treat our own router like any other.
Local declaration of NodeFamilies
Again, same as above. There's also no good reason we would want our client to
choose it's own router as an entry guard if it does not meet the requirements
expected of any other router on the network.
In order to reduce the possibility of error, the patch also replaces two
instances where we were using router_get_by_nickname() with calls to
router_get_by_hexdigest() where the identity digest of the router
is available.
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