| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Thanks, Coverity! (CID 1171414, 1171415, 1171416)
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(This was a squash commit, but I forgot to squash it. Sorry! --Nick)
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The remaining vestige is that we continue to publish the V2dir flag,
and that, for the controller, we continue to emit v2 directory
formats when requested.
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In proposal 157, we added a cross-certification element for
directory authority certificates. We implemented it in
0.2.1.9-alpha. All Tor directory authorities now generate it.
Here, as planned, make it required, so that we can finally close
proposal 157.
The biggest change in the code is in the unit test data, where some
old hardcoded certs that we made long ago have become no longer
valid and now need to be replaced.
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(In practice they don't exist, but so long as we're making changes for
standards compliance...)
Also add several more unit tests for good and bad URL types.
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Conflicts:
src/or/dirserv.c
src/or/dirserv.h
src/test/test_dir.c
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Looks like I turned this off in 6ac42f5e back in 2003 and never got
around to making it work again. There has been no small amount of
code drift.
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It sure is a good thing we can run each test in its own process, or
else the amount of setup I needed to do to make this thing work
would have broken all the other tests.
Test mocking would have made this easier to write too.
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consensuses.
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Unmeasured=1 issue
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Fixes bug 6887. There are opportunities to remove more functions if
authorities can stop serving dummy v1 directory documents
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Conflicts:
configure.ac
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The smart part of this is based on an approach and a suggestion by
rransom. The unsmart part is my own fault.
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This eliminates duplicated code, and lets us test a hairy piece of
functionality.
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Define new new consensus method 14 adding "a" lines to vote and
consensus documents.
From proposal 186:
As with other data in the vote derived from the descriptor, the
consensus will include whichever set of "a" lines are given by the
most authorities who voted for the descriptor digest that will be
used for the router.
This patch implements this.
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Fix for bug 5124.
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Fixes bug 4893.
These changes are pure mechanical, and were generated with this
perl script:
/usr/bin/perl -w -i.bak -p
s/crypto_pk_env_t/crypto_pk_t/g;
s/crypto_dh_env_t/crypto_dh_t/g;
s/crypto_cipher_env_t/crypto_cipher_t/g;
s/crypto_digest_env_t/crypto_digest_t/g;
s/aes_free_cipher/aes_cipher_free/g;
s/crypto_free_cipher_env/crypto_cipher_free/g;
s/crypto_free_digest_env/crypto_digest_free/g;
s/crypto_free_pk_env/crypto_pk_free/g;
s/_crypto_dh_env_get_dh/_crypto_dh_get_dh/g;
s/_crypto_new_pk_env_rsa/_crypto_new_pk_from_rsa/g;
s/_crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey/_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey/g;
s/_crypto_pk_env_get_rsa/_crypto_pk_get_rsa/g;
s/crypto_new_cipher_env/crypto_cipher_new/g;
s/crypto_new_digest_env/crypto_digest_new/g;
s/crypto_new_digest256_env/crypto_digest256_new/g;
s/crypto_new_pk_env/crypto_pk_new/g;
s/crypto_create_crypto_env/crypto_cipher_new/g;
s/connection_create_listener/connection_listener_new/g;
s/smartlist_create/smartlist_new/g;
s/transport_create/transport_new/g;
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This lets a routerinfo_t have a single IPv6 or-address, and adds
support for formatting and parsing those lines.
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Conflicts:
src/common/crypto.c
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We need to make sure that the worst thing that a weird consensus param
can do to us is to break our Tor (and only if the other Tors are
reliably broken in the same way) so that the majority of directory
authorities can't pull any attacks that are worse than the DoS that
they can trigger by simply shutting down.
One of these worse things was the cbtnummodes parameter, which could
lead to heap corruption on some systems if the value was sufficiently
large.
This commit fixes this particular issue and also introduces sanity
checking for all consensus parameters.
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