| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
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svn:r3353
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consider it handled if there's a circ that fits but isn't high-uptime.
svn:r3349
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high capacity nodes. When building circuits, choose appropriate nodes.
New config option LongLivedPorts to indicate application streams
that will want high uptime circuits.
When attaching a stream to a circuit, pay attention to its requirements.
This means that every single node in an intro rend circuit, not just
the last one, will have a minimum uptime.
Boost the min uptime from an hour to 24 hours.
svn:r3339
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tried they were all unreachable, assume we are not connected to
the network.
when an application request comes in during this state, be
optimistic and assume we just reconnected. fetch a new directory
and if it works, begin making circuits.
svn:r3327
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make it clearer which warns are bugs,
make the control log event match its specification,
point out a bug in how we deal with failure when renewing the tls context.
svn:r3138
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Stop treating the uint16_t's as null-terminated strings,
and stop looking at the byte after them to see if it's null,
because sometimes you're not allowed to look there.
svn:r3108
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svn:r3095
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the past 6 hours, and always try to have 2 circuits open or on the way
that will handle each such port. (We can extend this to include addresses
if exit policies shift to require that.) Seed us with port 80 so web
browsers won't complain that Tor is "slow to start up".
This was necessary because our old circuit building strategy just involved
counting circuits, and as time went by we would build up a big pile of
circuits that had peculiar exit policies (e.g. only exit to 9001-9100)
which would take up space in the circuit pile but never get used.
Fix router_compare_addr_to_addr_policy: it was not treating a port of *
as always matching, so we were picking reject *:* nodes as exit nodes too.
If you haven't used a clean circuit in an hour, throw it away, just to
be on the safe side.
This means after 6 hours a totally unused Tor client will have no
circuits open.
svn:r3078
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Stop keeping track of num_retries for apconns, since they expire
after 60 seconds anyway.
When warning about retrying or giving up, print the address, so
the user knows which one it's talking about.
svn:r3073
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waiting for its connected cell, we were calculating time from when the
ap_conn was created. So if it waited say 20 seconds before being attached,
then we would immediately decide that the circuit had timed out.
Also, make circuit_dump_by_conn() display actual circuit progress,
including circuits that haven't been attached to the conn yet but
hope to when it finishes connecting.
svn:r3072
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svn:r3052
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Put the check-if-requested-exitrouter-will-reject-us code in the
circuit_attach loop, so it gets checked periodically and not just
once at the beginning. This is useful in case the routerlist changes,
but also in case the address gets resolved into something that we learn
we'll reject.
svn:r3039
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svn:r3025
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every file.
svn:r3019
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decide what exit node to use; based on a patch by geoff goodell.
needs more work: e.g. it goes bananas building new circuits when the
chosen exit node's exit policy rejects the connection.
svn:r3015
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totally unacceptable to me.
svn:r3005
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svn:r3003
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svn:r2989
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svn:r2901
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svn:r2793
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Break connection_consider_empty_buckets() out of
connection_read_bucket_decrement().
svn:r2698
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Now we can try setting an option but back out if it fails to parse, or
if it's disallowed (e.g. changing RunAsDaemon from 1 to 0).
Use parse_line_from_str rather than parse_line_from_file.
svn:r2692
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and actually making the sockets.
- Make sure that identity-based nicknames start with $.
- Use new string_join interface.
svn:r2661
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svn:r2610
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svn:r2565
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svn:r2544
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sometimes circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch() can return 0 but not
return a circuit, e.g. because too many circuits have failed recently
so the new one didn't launch. we need to tolerate that.
svn:r2438
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svn:r2436
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svn:r2416
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files have really old descriptors for the authdirservers, so we're
asking them in the new format because they're too old.
now we actually compare the version to a cutoff version, and act
appropriately.
also take this chance to use only >=0.0.8 servers for dns resolves,
because of the recent bugs. we'll bump to >=0.0.9pre1 once there are
some servers running that.
svn:r2380
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svn:r2372
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open circuits
svn:r2290
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try once a second for 30 seconds, and only when the entire previous
period has failed do we pause after MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES failures.
svn:r2281
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svn:r2276
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a given AP stream was being handled or not.
(how did this work?)
svn:r2077
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clique_mode(), etc. Dont change underlying comments.
svn:r2054
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this will prevent a few of the 'couldn't decrypt onionskin' errors, maybe
svn:r2036
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svn:r2000
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svn:r1998
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svn:r1978
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bugfix: we were retrying the same circuit after getting a resolve
failure. so of course the next two tries would fail too. now we try
a new circuit each time (at most three times).
svn:r1867
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* \file circuitbuild.c
* \brief The actual details of building circuits.
* \file circuitlist.c
* \brief Manage the global circuit list.
* \file circuituse.c
* \brief Launch the right sort of circuits, attach streams to them.
* \file connection_edge.c
* \brief Handle edge streams.
* \file onion.c
* \brief Functions to queue create cells, and handle onionskin
* parsing and creation.
* \file relay.c
* \brief Handle relay cell encryption/decryption, plus packaging and
* receiving from circuits.
svn:r1863
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