| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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svn:r18501
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svn:r18497
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explain why it was erroneous.
svn:r18494
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because it was meant to make them more detectable. Change it to change stuff to garbage rather than to 0. If no bugs turn up, we can remove it in 0.2.2.x
svn:r18493
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svn:r18492
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svn:r18480
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svn:r18478
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Bugfix on 0.2.1.8-alpha.
svn:r18477
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svn:r18466
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because they're done will really confuse arma.
svn:r18463
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Doing so could run you out of relay_early cells and give you a
senselessly long circuit. Patch from Karsten; may fix bug 878.
svn:r18459
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svn:r18457
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svn:r18455
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Previously, when we had the chosen_exit set but marked optional, and
we failed because we couldn't find an onion key for it, we'd just give
up on the circuit. But what we really want to do is try again, without
the forced exit node.
Spotted by rovv. Another case of bug 752. I think this might be
unreachable in our current code, but proposal 158 could change that.
svn:r18451
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svn:r18450
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svn:r18449
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svn:r18448
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svn:r18434
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svn:r18429
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svn:r18426
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svn:r18425
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svn:r18423
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svn:r18422
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svn:r18421
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a directory mirror. Bugfix on 0.2.0.9-alpha; reported by lark.
svn:r18420
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(but not in 0.2.1.12-alpha, sorry)
svn:r18417
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svn:r18416
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svn:r18413
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to move stuff into a dir
svn:r18411
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svn:r18404
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we run as root. Do not set it when run as debian-tor as Tor then always
insists on changing users which will fail. (If we run as any other user we
don't set our debian defaults anyway.)
svn:r18397
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to forgive our bridges and try again when we get an application
request. Bugfix on 0.2.0.x.
svn:r18396
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svn:r18395
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svn:r18394
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svn:r18392
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redundant, and is definitely confusing. we should take it out
in 0.2.2.x and see who squeaks.
svn:r18383
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svn:r18365
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bad. Bugfix on 0.2.0.8-alpha.
svn:r18354
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GCC's interpretation of the C99 aliasing rules, to be charitable,
creates a dialect of C intended for a better programmers than I am
certain of my ability to be in all times. I just spent 2 hours
tracking down a platform-hyperspecific libevent bug that turned out to
be because of this, and darned if I ever want to do *that* again.
One of Linus's recent rants will give you a picture of why GCC's
behavior here can lead to fun surprises in your binaries:
http://lwn.net/Articles/316126/
svn:r18351
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merge the 'bridge relay' section into the 'main relay'
section, so people stop getting confused about whether they
should fill out both sections (they shouldn't).
svn:r18348
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svn:r18341
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svn:r18335
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one to slip if something is going to
svn:r18334
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svn:r18327
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svn:r18325
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svn:r18316
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too trivial.
svn:r18307
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This resolves bug 526, wherein we would crash if the following
events occurred in this order:
A: We're an OR, and one of our nameservers goes down.
B: We launch a probe to it to see if it's up again. (We do this hourly
in steady-state.)
C: Before the probe finishes, we reconfigure our nameservers,
usually because we got a SIGHUP and the resolve.conf file changed.
D: The probe reply comes back, or times out. (There is a five-second
window for this, after B has happens).
IOW, if one of our nameservers is down and our nameserver
configuration has changed, there were 5 seconds per hour where HUPing
the server was unsafe.
Bugfix on 0.1.2.1-alpha. Too obscure to backport.
svn:r18306
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This fixes the last known case of bug 891, which could happen if two
hosts, A and B, disagree about how long a circuit has been open,
because of clock drift of some kind. Host A would then mark the
connection as is_bad_for_new_circs when it got too old and open a new
connection. In between when B receives a NETINFO cell on the new
conn, and when B receives a conn cell on the new circuit, the new
circuit will seem worse to B than the old one, and so B will mark it
as is_bad_for_new_circs in the second or third loop of
connection_or_group_set_badness().
Bugfix on 0.1.1.13-alpha. Bug found by rovv.
Not a backport candidate: the bug is too obscure and the fix too tricky.
svn:r18303
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svn:r18302
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