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They weren't in sync with reality nor manpage, and only useful to a human
who could simply have checked the manpage.
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...to let us
rate-limit client connections as they enter the network. It's
controlled in the consensus so we can turn it on and off for
experiments. It's starting out off. Based on proposal 163.
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it's wrong, but that's our problem not its problem
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Specifically, there are two cases: a) are we willing to start a new
circuit at a node not in your ExitNodes config option, and b) are we
willing to make use of a circuit that's already established but has an
unsuitable exit.
Now we discard all your circuits when you set ExitNodes, so the only
way you could end up with an exit circuit that ends at an unsuitable
place is if we explicitly ran out of exit nodes, StrictNodes was 0,
and we built this circuit to solve a stream that needs solving.
Fixes bug in dc322931, which would ignore the just-built circuit because
it has an unsuitable exit.
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If ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes changes on a config reload,
mark and discard all our origin circuits.
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Before it would prepend your requested entrynodes to your list of guard
nodes, but feel free to use others after that. Now it chooses only
from your EntryNodes if any of those are available, and only falls back
to others if a) they're all down and b) StrictNodes is not set.
Also, now we refresh your entry guards from EntryNode at each consensus
fetch (rather than just at startup and then they slowly rot as the
network changes).
The goal here is to make users less likely to set StrictNodes, since
it's doing closer to what they expect it should be doing.
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This is step one of handling ExcludedNodes better. This first
step is just to make EntryNodes and ExitNodes do what they did
before.
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The rule is now: take the value from the CircuitPriorityHalflife
config option if it is set. If it zero, disable the cell_ewma
algorithm. If it is set, use it to calculate the scaling factor.
If it is not set, look for a CircPriorityHalflifeMsec parameter in the
consensus networkstatus. If *that* is zero, then disable the cell_ewma
algorithm; if it is set, use it to calculate the scaling factor.
If it is not set at all, disable the algorithm.
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Conflicts:
src/or/relay.c
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When calculating the current tick, cap (tv_sec / EWMA_TICK_LEN) to an unsigned int.
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There are two big changes here:
- We store active circuits in a priority queue for each or_conn,
rather than doing a linear search over all the active circuits
before we send each cell.
- Rather than multiplying every circuit's cell-ewma by a decay
factor every time we send a cell (thus normalizing the value of a
current cell to 1.0 and a past cell to alpha^t), we instead
only scale down the cell-ewma every tick (ten seconds atm),
normalizing so that a cell sent at the start of the tick has
value 1.0).
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Each circuit is ranked in terms of how many cells from it have been
relayed recently, using a time-weighted average.
This patch has been tested this on a private Tor network on PlanetLab,
and gotten improvements of 12-35% in time it takes to fetch a small
web page while there's a simultaneous large data transfer going on
simultaneously.
[Commit msg by nickm based on mail from Ian Goldberg.]
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This changes the pqueue API by requiring an additional int in every
structure that we store in a pqueue to hold the index of that structure
within the heap.
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We do this in too many places throughout the code; it's time to start
clamping down.
Also, refactor Karsten's patch to use strchr-then-strndup, rather than
malloc-then-strlcpy-then-strchr-then-clear.
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Fix statistics on client numbers by country as seen by bridges that were
broken in 0.2.2.1-alpha. Also switch to reporting full 24-hour intervals
instead of variable 12-to-48-hour intervals.
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The HSAuthorityRecordStats option was used to track statistics of overall
hidden service usage on the version 0 hidden service authorities. With the
version 2 hidden service directories being deployed and version 0
descriptors being phased out, these statistics are not as useful anymore.
Goodbye, you fine piece of software; my first major code contribution to
Tor.
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Conflicts:
ChangeLog
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Do not segfault when writing buffer stats when we haven't observed a
single circuit to report about. This is a minor bug that would only show
up in testing environments with no traffic and with reduced stats
intervals.
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Conflicts:
ChangeLog
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The new rule is: safe_str_X() means "this string is a piece of X
information; make it safe to log." safe_str() on its own means
"this string is a piece of who-knows-what; make it safe to log".
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Apparently Panther doesn't like comparing ints and enums
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In connection_dir_client_reached_eof, we make sure that we either
return when we get an http status code of 503 or handle the problem
and set it to 200. Later we check if the status code is 503. Remove
that check.
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